THINGS OF INDIA
MADE PLAIN

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'THINGS OF INDIA'

MADE PLAIN;

OR,

A JOURNALIST'S RETROSPECT.

98359

By W. MARTIN WOOD

(*Formerly Editor of the* Times of India *and of the* Bombay Review).

TO CONSIST OF FOUR PARTS.

PART I.

"THE MOTHER OF FORESIGHT LOOKS BACKWARD."—EGYPTIAN PROVERB.

LONDON: ELLIOT STOCK, 62, PATERNOSTER ROW.
CALCUTTA: THOMAS S. SMITH.
BOMBAY: THACKER & CO., LIMITED.
MADRAS: HIGGINBOTHAM & CO.

1884.

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PREFACE.

"AT last!" as Charles Kingsley exclaimed, when fairly started on that voyage to the "Spanish Main" that had been the dream of his life, that Spanish Main the histories and scenes of which had mingled with all the more enthusiastic efforts of his own literary career. In much more prosaic mood, but with somewhat similar sense of long-deferred purpose brought within reach, may the present writer be permitted to congratulate himself that there is at length—after many delays that need not be here accounted for—some prospect of chance gleanings of past years of labour being garnered in fresh print, and rendered available for inspection and reference by those whom they may concern.

Whether any one else can be congratulated on the publication of these excerpts, is a question that can only be tested by the verdict that may be passed on this volume by those whose experience and position give value to their opinion on so special a subject. But at least some show of justification is needed. It has been aptly said that the editor of the broad-sheet diurnal is one who writes on the sand with the tide coming in; so the question arises, can there be much use in exhibiting a few of these otherwise transient inscriptions which have happened to escape obliteration, as is occasionally shown in the ripple-marks retained on the level strata of a sandstone quarry? Perhaps the possibility of such rescued improvisations being of occasional use will be admitted. As the geologist, viewing petrified indentations and wavy curves, can trace the course of streams that have long before found other channels, or perceive the set of tides that elsewhere still obey those laws that are perennial; so the political philosopher, if he deign to dip into these notes of days gone by, can see the efflux of once heated controversies; or he may more usefully trace the bearing of those ever-present factors in national life that must always be counted with, and perceive the operation of those political and social principles which always tell for good or evil alike in the East as in the West, in India as in Europe.

Perhaps it may be said that as this republished matter relates to scenes and circumstances that are remote and already historical, and concern India wholly, how is it to be expected that the busy and much preoccupied British public of to-day can take an interest in such disconnected memoranda as are here collected? It is not expected that the public at large will rush to read this unmethodical cyclopædia; but it is hoped that a few persons of inquiring and thoughtful turn of mind may, by aid of our Index, find some side-lights thrown on the great problem of British rule in India, which they have sought ineffectually in more pretending volumes where the subject is treated in a direct didactic method. It is amongst the patient few who take the trouble to scan these inconsecutive chapters of Anglo-Indian affairs that we may expect to find those who most fully realise, on one hand, the weight of the responsibility, on the other the grandeur of the task involved in Britain's sway over the ancient Empire of India. True, there may not be much of heroic strain in these old newspaper articles, though something here and there to recall the nobility of character, the self-consuming energy, which, as expended on the founding and building up of the British Indian Empire, have gone to form, and will stand in

history as an enduring part of our long island story. But abler pens than this have done ample justice to that higher aspect of Anglo-Indian affairs. The much humbler service is required of making these affairs plain, of assisting the untravelled Englishman to find his way in judging rightly regarding races and social systems so alien to his own, and in deciding on questions of polity and administration most of which are foreign to the whole course of our domestic politics. It may at once be said that it is mainly in the hope of fulfilling the modest functions of an expositor, of one who makes plain, that these extracts have been selected and reprinted. It is not pretended for a moment that the opinions set forth and the various conclusions indicated are likely to be accepted by all who may scan them now. In respect of many topics, the writer's own views must have been modified in the ten or fifteen years since they were penned. He sought to write what seemed true and reasonable at the time; and, relying on the reflex influence of that method of dealing with public questions, he believes that even the portions of these notes that touch upon topics now superseded or forgotten will, at least, serve to enable English politicians to see that Indian questions can only be mastered by painstaking, detailed examination. It is one of the foibles of the English people to shun the taking of trouble; and it is another to assume that a knowledge of first principles will suffice for judging of any set of political circumstances. In tracing our way through the vast and varied field of Indian affairs, where ancient customs are still struggling against modern needs, it is necessary to scrutinise those affairs closely, to examine them in detail, and, as much as may be, at first hand. Several passages in these extracts may serve such useful purpose; and, though the selections are necessarily fragmentary in form and intermittent in order, it is believed they will supply some links that have been unavoidably dropped in various Indian histories and biographies published since the period of the Mutiny.

Notes of what a journalist has had to write as exigencies of the time arose, come nearest in form to that of a politician's or a statesman's diary. Let it not be supposed that the present writer would be rash enough to risk comparison with works comprising any such weighty and authoritative matter; but here is one suitable passage that may in some sort serve, on the one hand, as apology for reproduction of writings on incidents so long past, and, on the other, as justification for reprinting these writings just as issued in and under pressure of the time. The diary of the Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India in 1813, was not published until 1858. His daughter, the Marchioness of Bute, who prepared the papers for the press, thus vindicates their publication after so long an interval, and justifies the giving them exactly as they left his Lordship's pen: "At a time like the present, when India absorbs so much general attention, it may "not only be interesting, but useful, to observe the impression received even forty-five "years since by a man of mature age, of experience in life under various phases, "and whose position afforded him an unlimited insight into all points, both civil and "military, of the vast Eastern Empire. It is, therefore, strictly copied from the "original manuscript, even to the very words, though the changes that are constantly "in our language tend to throw a look of antiquity over what was in Lord Hastings' "time polished English."

It cannot be said that India now absorbs anything like such general attention as in 1858, when that realm was still vibrating with the shock of the great revolt; but it may perhaps be affirmed that there is now a more continuous and settled desire amongst English public men to know how they can best fulfil their responsibility to the trust imposed on the nation by our possession of India. Hence it may be hoped that much that is unusual in the course thus adopted, of presenting writings on Indian topics that are mainly retrospective, will be forgiven so far as they may prove suggestive for present and future use.

Many of these extracts may fairly claim the humble but distinctly useful purpose of *memoires pour servir*, more especially as scarcely any consecutive general history of India has yet been published that covers the period since 1865, when these records begin. They relate to the administrative history of three Governors-General—Lords Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook; and to the tenure of three Governors of Bombay —Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, and Sir Philip Wodehouse. They include current references to events now so remote as the Bhotan War of 1864-5; the Orissa Famine of 1866; the Abyssinian Expedition; H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh's visit to India; the Central Asian question, both in its geographical and political aspects; the catastrophe of Earl Mayo's assassination; the great Durbar held by Lord Northbrook at Bombay in 1872; the development of railways and other public works; the commercial vicissitudes and financial policy during nearly ten years of India's rapidly changing circumstances.

Possibly it may be objected that considerable portion of these extracts relate to Bombay and its territories. Those who cannot stoop to such local interests can easily skip the passages occupied therewith; but there are others who will think it worth while to learn something more than they may know already about the second city in the British Empire. It will be remembered that, after a remarkable and sudden accession of prosperity, one of the severest monetary crises of modern times befell that city; and amongst these extracts will be found notes that may prove of interest to captains of industry and managers of finance in other great centres of commerce. It cannot be uninstructive also to trace indications of the struggles of an Indian city in taking on itself the charges and responsibilities of modern conservancy, water-supply, and harbour works. Personal references, criticisms, or eulogies may seem to English readers to occur in undue proportion; but Anglo-Indian affairs have hitherto been mainly dominated by personal influences; therefore the journalist must deal largely therewith in as broad and catholic a tone as may be.

After all, this collection of excerpts presents but a "thing of shreds and patches," and a meagre show, if it were to be taken as representing the journalistic labours of nine years. It will be seen that in scarcely any case is a complete article given; so that, in all, more or less violence is inflicted on the argument and composition; but this was inevitable if the reprints were to be brought within manageable compass. On the other hand, it has been found impracticable to rescue various articles that were desirable to keep up the semblance of continuity, and, as usually happens, some of these are what the writer set most store upon. It should be stated that, whilst the columns of the *Times of India*, when under his charge, were often enriched by contributions from practised writers and public men intimately conversant with Indian affairs, all here reprinted are his own handiwork, such as it is. Here also the writer may be permitted to mention that in the interval from the date when this series ends, February, 1874, to the close of 1878, he frequently wrote for other Indian journals. At the last-named date, he commenced the publication of a weekly paper, the *Bombay Review*, which was continued up to January, 1881. On that journal, during a period when war and famine cast their deepest shadows, was expended much of his riper experience in Indian affairs; let us hope that he did good service at the time, and if any students of contemporary history care to have the record, the two or three volumes of the *Review* may be still extant in certain public libraries.

June, 1882.

[*It is desirable to explain that the above Preface was written under the intention of printing a larger selection of Extracts than has been found practicable.*]

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PART I.

1.—PERSONAL AND HISTORICAL.

A CIVILIAN AND A MERCHANT.

YESTERDAY, amongst the numerous homeward passengers by the *Baroda*, there were two men taking their final leave of Bombay who each might be referred to as representing two distinct classes of our Anglo-Indian community. Henry Lacon Anderson as the administrator, and John Fleming as the merchant, stand as types of men whose characteristics must determine the fortunes of England in the East, and who will, so to speak, set the fashion as to the form that Western civilisation shall take in India. In saying this we are not unmindful of the great influence which at least one other special class may have in this country; but it is the constant action of character through daily intercourse which, in this work-day world, really tells. Educationists, religious teachers, military and professional men may each contribute their share of European influence in this country, but its broad mark and lasting impress will come through our civil rulers and settled merchants. . . . . .

A year or two later found Mr. Anderson, a member of the Supreme Council of India, associated on equal terms, in tasks of general Indian legislation, with men of ripe experience, extensive knowledge, and finest culture. He has himself characterised his colleagues in sentences which leave nothing to be added; and it is the most decisive testimony to Mr. Anderson's talents that, at so comparatively an early age, he should have been mated with men like Harington, Maine, and Muir. His more special labour in the Supreme Council has been to promote a reconciliation between the requirements of modern jurisprudence and the conscientious scruples of a people whose social usages and religious tenets are continually misrepresented and misunderstood everywhere except in Bombay. In this difficult task—at Calcutta, one requiring a good deal of moral courage—Mr. Anderson has admirably succeeded; and his name will be revered by the Parsees, even long after their community may have outgrown those views in respect of which he has obtained for them legal protection. This portion of Mr. Anderson's public labours is perhaps the most characteristic of any. He has ever striven to show consideration to the feelings of those who differed from him, or were subject to his power; and by this last test it is that a man's character is most fairly tried. It is not a trait very commonly seen in the Anglo-Saxon character, this ready deference to and respect for the feelings of those with whom we happen to be brought into unequal relations. Yet it is one which has been cultivated in the school in which Mr. Anderson was trained, and the result has been to produce some men, who, as types of English character, have not been matched on any other field. . . . . .

We have already admitted that he has nobly earned his leisure, but we own to a twinge of jealousy on behalf of the State. Many much smaller men than Mr. Anderson have acquitted themselves well as Chief Commissioners and Lieutenant-Governors of our largest provinces. India, in this, her transition stage, needs men like him of a genial and impressible stamp, and of fully ripened powers. Shall we not then be pardoned in expressing a hope that Mr. Anderson may yet find it his "pleasure and his pride" to turn his face eastward once again?—*May* 15, 1865.

II.—It is much to be regretted that the community of Bombay had not some public opportunity afforded them of bidding farewell to Mr. John Fleming. Holding no official position, there was not conventional excuse for pressing it upon him; but it will be agreed that there has seldom been an instance when so much practical instruction could have been gleaned from the recital of a simple narrative, as would have been if Mr. Fleming had himself told the story of his sixteen years' residence in Bombay. . . . . .

It was in 1849 that Mr. Fleming took his place in the Bombay branch of Messrs. Nicol and Co.'s firm. Led by the ordinary course of business into intimate acquaintance with the native cotton merchants on the Green, he, by his frank and considerate address, speedily gained their confidence. This was not sufficient to satisfy either his persevering habits, or that spirit of genuine politeness which pervaded all his intercourse with those around him. He gladly undertook the study of the native languages, and acquired a more thorough practical knowledge of the Guzerati tongue than, perhaps, any other European has done. This it was chiefly which gave him such influence with the native mercantile community. He met them on their own ground, and by that means they came to repose confidence in his judgment to an extent greater than ever has been the case, except, perhaps, in that of some official "residents" of the olden time. This acquirement of Mr. Fleming's, no doubt, tended to the pecuniary advantage of his firm; but we feel quite satisfied that it was with him but a secondary consideration. Even on these grounds it would be abundantly worth while for any young merchant to follow his example; yet it is for higher and more comprehensive purposes that, in this particular, we would have them emulate him. Those who have had the opportunity to observe his mode of addressing a native assembly—how admirably he combined suavity of manner with a dignified respect for the judgment of those to whom he was appealing or explaining—will often have felt they had incidentally gained a lesson in humanity from this British merchant. As Englishmen increase in India, especially in the Presidency towns, there is more temptation to shirk the labour of acquiring the vernacular tongues. It should be remembered, however, that the field of enterprise and intercourse with the interior is also ever widening in its scope; and we cannot conceive of any young merchant, at all acquainted with this admirable feature in the career of John Fleming, who can hesitate to follow his example in this respect. . . . . .

To mention that Mr. Fleming was the first of our great promoters of reclamations may, in this rueful day, provoke a growl of dissent against our estimate of his business character. But it is well known that he has, on more than one notable occasion, bent all his influence to check the crave for high premiums. That some have driven at a reckless pace along the road which he opened, is clearly the fault of the passengers and not that of the road-maker. The Elphinstone docks and bunders are of immediate practical service to the port, and have already been of assistance during the pressure of our unwonted trade. Were we inclined to criticise Mr. Fleming's course in connection with this part of it, we should say that it might be taken as an illustration of his too exclusively practical bias. In the position which he enjoyed, and with the resources at his command, it was within his power to have carried through a project for the construction of docks for *sea-going ships* of large size. . . . . .

Mr. Fleming has been an active supporter of the Scottish Ophanage Institution; but as to that, the world will set it down to his patriotism. Even under that light his efforts to relieve the fatherless in a strange land are worthy of honourable mention, as well as of more general imitation. The same may be said of his continuous exertions on behalf of European artisans, for whom so little adequate accommodation is yet provided. Thus it was not only in doing well to himself, and even to the mercantile class with which he was connected, that Mr. Fleming's deeds command our respect. . . . Although, like the rest of his class, his residence here was avowedly a temporary one, he laboured as

earnestly for the good of the people around him as he could have done if all his life were to have been spent in India. This country, and especially Bombay, cannot progress unless Anglo-Indians give more diligence to its affairs. Mr. Fleming's excellent influence on the native community will leave an impression which will last till the latest days of those who have known him. This, above all in his career, is worthy of imitation.—*May* 16, 1865.

AN UNJUDICIAL JUDGE.

ALTHOUGH the rumour went abroad on Saturday that Mr. T. Chisholm Anstey had been raised to the Bench, many who then heard it will, this morning over their matutinal cup, pause with involuntary astonishment as they peruse the announcement in print. The statement was with us on Friday evening, and we could have given it on Saturday morning; but deeming it an incredible one, we waited for confirmation doubly strong. However, there is now proof of the fact freely offered for public comment, and it is one that will form a striking item for the news home by the *Malta*. In various ways Bombay has done its best to obtain fame in the old country; but at any rate she is now sure of a brief notoriety. Professional men and old London politicians who would read with stoical indifference of our cotton wealth, our speculation, our panic, and our financials, will be aroused into a momentary sensation of wonder when they scan this last appointment to the Bench of our Supreme Court. Such men will turn to their old acquaintances and defy them to "guess who has been made a Judge at Bombay?" When the smile of incredulity has passed off, the query in return will be, "Were there no other lawyers of any experience at Bombay that the Governor was shut up to such an appointment?"

This is one of those matters about which it is not necessary to go into any prosy discussion; an instinctive judgment is at once passed upon it, and no after attempt to account for it avails to remove the first impression. We have never under-estimated Mr. Anstey's force of will, the volubility of his utterance, his powers of denunciation, and his skill to argue one side of a question, for it is these qualities that have mainly made him so successful as a barrister. Yet the possession of these qualities in *excess* is necessarily inconsistent with that balance of mind which is needed in a Judge. Thus the mention of Mr. Anstey's name in connection with a Judgeship, at once excites a quick sense of incongruity in the minds of those who have watched his public character for many years. It is true that familiarity blunts the perceptions; and in a small community, as in reality is the European community of Bombay, this remark especially holds good. Besides, audacity goes a long way in the common concerns of life, and wherever Mr. Anstey has met with timidity he has at once felt his advantage and has used it unsparingly. Whether it be the effects of the climate or from contact with Asiatics, we know not, but it is evident that with even some Europeans in Bombay there is a lack of moral courage and personal *à plomb*. Where else would Mr. Anstey have been permitted to defy the Bench, to browbeat witnesses, and to denounce with unsparing vituperation, whenever he chose to do so, any of his brethren of that bar of which he has been the self-elected champion? Where else than in Bombay could Mr. Anstey's diatribes against the Executive authority have been allowed to pass without rebuke? Now, we all find that Mr. Anstey knew "how the land lay;" there was a method in all these volcanic outbursts of temper, these dramatic displays of forensic power were well calculated, and he has given a brand-new gloss to the satiric line of his more genial countryman:—

"He who peppered highest was surest to please."

Mr. Anstey has occasionally "peppered" the "highest" functionaries in our little commonwealth, and now he has his reward. Let us strive to hope that a large proportion of those somewhat striking peculiarities for which the barrister has been noted will be doffed as easily as the gown; and that gravity, moderation, and wisdom will be donned with the new garb of the new Judge. . . . . .

It is not, however, our business to account for this unexpected and extraordinary selection, but only to note how it looks in the daylight of fact. We must confess that with us the effect has been to confirm very uncomfortable feelings with regard to Sir Bartle Frere, against which we have had to struggle for some time past. Space does not here permit of, nor is the occasion suitable for, our recapitulating the many reasons for

which we admire the character of His Excellency and approve of the general course of his administration. He certainly has no room to doubt the sincerity of the independent support we have given to most, if not all, of his public conduct. Yet there have been indications that when exigencies have arisen requiring firmness and self-reliance, Sir Bartle Frere has hesitated in exercising that responsibility which his position imposes upon him. One instance of this was his adoption of the hastily passed Resolution regarding the circumstances attending the march from Mhow of the Artillery battery in April last. At the time that Resolution was passed we felt that the decision was one inconsistent with the personal character of His Excellency, and one at variance with his better judgment. Yet, on its being placed before him by others, he had adopted it as his own, including the very unnecessary censure embodied in paragraph 4 of the Resolution. We have heard one of the noted orators of the day sum up in masterly array the striking excellences in the character of Henri Quatre, and then turn round and blur the grand picture by exclaiming that—this great man failed because he had never learned to say "no." It would, of course, be quite possible for dull men to fail by saying "no" at the wrong time; but Sir Bartle Frere has a clear intelligence to guide him, and an excellent judgment of his own, which could seldom if ever mislead if he would but rely thereon, and give his own decisions apart from the plausibly insinuated advice of gratuitous advisers. Of course we do not attempt to fathom the considerations which have induced him to make the choice on which we have just commented; but have to remark that it does not tally with our conception of Sir Bartle Frere's own judgment.—*Aug.* 7, 1865.

SIR BARTLE AT HIS BEST.

SIR BARTLE FRERE'S address, delivered "in their own tongue" to the Sirdars of the Deccan, is well worthy of close and thoughtful perusal. For the unobservant reader, it offers the ordinary attraction of good sense expressed in smooth but appropriate language; but, besides all that, it is the speech of an experienced politician, and as such it is not without deep and comprehensive significance. His Excellency speaks of having, during a period of thirty years, been acquainted with many of the families of the Sirdars, and of having from the first taken a warm and unceasing interest in the people whose tongue he was speaking. That this was no rhetorical device, like Louis Napoleon's borrowing of scraps from the Koran, can be made evident by the mention of a little incident occurring thirty years ago, when Mr. Frere, the young civilian, had before him, then untried, the "life which has been spent in the public service." He, and another young civilian happened, in travelling, to have been witnesses of some occurrences which became the subject of a criminal trial in the *kutcherry* of Rutnaghiri. The Magistrate, in accordance with the courtesy granted at home to witnesses of distinction, offered to the two civilians a seat near him on the bench, where they might give their evidence to him in English; this favour Mr. Frere declined, saying they had rather stand where other witnesses stood. They did so, and both gave their evidence in the language of the court, and which was understood by all who were present. The court was crowded; and an old mofussil Judge—who, besides the Magistrate and the two civilians, was the only other European present—remarked afterwards, that the moral effect of these two young Englishmen thus cordially complying with the circumstances of the occasion had an excellent and striking effect. This was only a passing incident, no doubt taken as a matter of course by the two young men; but, glancing back to it over the space of thirty years, it may serve to throw a clear light on the Durbar-speech to the Sirdars that we report to-day, and brings out its political significance very distinctly. The other young civilian, thus speaking Marathi in the mofussil witness-box thirty years ago, was Mr. Claude Erskine—who, we believe, is shortly expected to return to Bombay to pursue yet further that honourable career which in his case is, indeed, laid on him as an hereditary obligation.—*Sept.* 7, 1865.

II.—Had the Indian career of Sir Bartle Frere been far more encumbered with care than it has been, the scenes of Monday and Tuesday last would have gone far to obliterate from his retrospect all remembrance of past disappointments and vexations. It is to the Tuesday's scene that we here refer more particularly, as having exclusively a

personal interest. Many Indian statesmen have had conferred on them higher rank at home in recognition of their services here, but very few have received from the people of this country so singularly appropriate an acknowledgment of life-long effort on their behalf as did Sir Bartle Frere at Poona from the Sirdars of the Deccan. We refer not so much to Mr. Jansen's faithful portrait of His Excellency—which we trust may for generations to come adorn the Council Hall at Poona—as we do to the Anglo-Marathi address which, on a beautifully engrossed scroll, Sir Bartle Frere will take with him from these shores. The text of the address, with its counterpart, the reply, will duly take its place in that authentic though unattractive historical work, the *Bombay Government Gazette;* but it is much to be desired that some suitable means might be devised whereby these addresses could be rendered as accessible, if not so conspicuous, as the likeness itself. Although, as His Excellency remarked, "nothing can be more unlike the Deccan of my early days than what I see it now," it is yet, and, indeed, must always be, the highest duty and wisest course of British administrators in India—as it has ever been Sir Bartle Frere's delight—to follow the path indicated in this passage from the Sirdars' address:—

> It is our conviction that the high position which your Excellency has attained as Governor of Western India is but a fitting acknowledgment of the earnest efforts made by you from your first coming amongst us to promote our happiness and well-being, by *a patient study of the languages, manners, and customs of our country*, and by a warm sympathy and free intercourse with all classes with whom you have been brought in contact.

The words we have ventured to italicise, or rather the disposition and pursuits indicated by them, seem not less, but more than ever important to be had in regard. The more frequent intercourse with home, the more constant influence of English manners and modes of thought—circumstances which we can never alter if we would—all tend to unsettle the Government servants of these days, and to weaken their inclination for close sympathy with the career which they have chosen. . . . .

The chief burden of Sir Bartle Frere's address—his didactic legacy to the Sirdars—is to be found in his remonstrances, or rather pleadings with them in reference to the great social reform they have yet to commence—the education of their wives and daughters, and their liberation from domestic bondage. This great advance will take long to accomplish; the advantage of it is probably not recognised by half a dozen of the Sirdars themselves; hence the necessity for His Excellency to set the matter so plainly before them. He appealed to their pride of class, and pointed to the fact that the first aristocracies of the world have kept their relative position mainly in virtue of their superior elevation of character gained by their women being zealously trained to a social and intellectual companionship with themselves. . . . . .

All this, notwithstanding the Governor's good Marathi and carefully emphasised sentences, was, no doubt, a great mystery to the mofussil squires; but it is a proof of Sir Bartle Frere's earnestness in the matter that he should have taken so much pains in making the strange subject so plain to them. He leaves this work of solid renovation as a charge to the few educated members of the class, whom he besought to press on the attention of their "untravelled and unlettered brethren"—"how among the nations which now bear rule in every part of the earth, there is no instance of a class of nobles retaining its position without being superior in intelligence and education to the mass of the people; nor any instance of an educated nobility, the ladies of which were allowed to remain uneducated."

We doubt not, in thus so strenuously urging efforts towards the elevation of the women of India, Sir Bartle was speaking as much for Lady Frere as for himself.—*Nov.* 2, 1866.

HIS SHORTCOMINGS AS A GOVERNOR.

THE *Daily News*, in commenting on the address of Sir Bartle Frere to the Sirdars of the Deccan, has done so with more judgment than some other of the English papers. In eulogising His Excellency it was quite needful to remember that "no doubt there are and ever have been many Indian servants fully equal to the present Governor of Bombay. It is not so much the merits of the man—although these are certainly above the average—as the fitness of the official training he must have received that has to be

pointed out. Very different are Governors of this class to those who formerly claimed these appointments as almost a traditional right of their order." . . . If, however, the *Daily News*, judging only by the remarkably suitable and often excellent speeches delivered by Sir Bartle Frere, wishes to credit him with the possession of those stronger qualities of practical statesmanship that are needed in a Viceroy, then a grave mistake may be made. Public addresses are in these days, especially in India, an essential part of a statesman's work; and any man pretending to that title must be ready on every suitable occasion to describe in popular language even difficult questions of State policy. This Sir Bartle Frere can do particularly well, so far as the matter of his speeches goes; but, after all, though his addresses go to the end of the earth, they only give an outward presentment of His Excellency. As to the practical administration of high executive posts, we are far better able in India to judge of a Governor's fitness. It may be granted that Sir Bartle Frere's rule has not been characterised by any gross and palpable blunders. Yet no Indian ruler can afford to be passive. The conditions of government here are quite different from those at home. The *laissez faire* principle, which is very properly accepted as an axiom in England, is a misleading notion if applied to Indian affairs. Probably, so far as theory goes, this may explain some of our present Governor's short-comings. Western India has been inundated with a flood of wealth; and yet it appears to be subsiding without having left any definitely economised results behind it.

The heterogeneous society here, with little business training, with nothing like the perfect monetary machinery of Europe, without any but the most hastily organised associations, has been allowed to struggle as it could with this unmanageable influx of capital; nothing, comparatively speaking, being left to show for the effects of the fertilising flood. Common country roads, the lowest form of permanent improvement, have made no appreciable progress in this Presidency. Irrigation, for which many portions of Western India thirst almost as much as famine-stricken Bengal, is still to be begun. True it is, that Sir Bartle Frere, amongst the rest, did many weary months ago pen a noble State-paper on this subject; but nothing we have heard of is at present likely to come of that fine writing. Then, again, we have our Municipality started with a new constitution; but it is bound hand and foot with liabilities which our Governor not only does nothing to remove, but appears to have done a good deal to increase. Of course, he is the last man to do such a thing directly and of purpose; but here it is we have revealed that pliability and weakness of official character, of which the *Daily News* writer could know nothing, but which causes the juxtaposition of Sir Bartle Frere's name and the Governor-Generalship to appear incongruous. It excites also a feeling of deep regret as one glances over what might be done, if only the abstract and didactic statesmanship of Sir Bartle Frere could be crystallised into practical work. It is not only that His Excellency's own views are not acted out, but the misfortune is that the real outcome is something very different from the spoken promise of his State papers and speeches. The incapacitating besetment of Sir Bartle Frere has been—especially during recent times—that he has allowed himself to be swayed by personal influences, and by opinions of practical matters emanating from minds far less comprehensive and judicious than his own. Though cherishing the deepest respect for His Excellency, we have had frequent occasion to point out where the action of his Government has been utterly at variance with his own acknowledged policy, and differing *toto cœlo* from the temper of his own better mind. If this be so in the comparatively restricted circle of a presidency, such a besetting habit of deference to individuals who by chance happened to gain his attention, would expose a Viceroy to the most perilous courses. If on this barren stage a few astute, determined, or wily men have been able to impress their personal views on Sir Bartle Frere in his executive action, what would become of his wisdom and judgment if he fell into the hands of the ambitious and skilled politicians of Bengal, or those of the hereditary obstructives of Calcutta? To take one instance, what would become of the real Sir Bartle Frere if once subjected to the manipulation of a plausible and restless official like the Hon. Mr. Ashley Eden? Some one recently, in a sentence of fulsome flattery, spoke of Sir Bartle Frere as "a statesman of plastic mind." It is good, indeed, for unripened and inexperienced men to preserve "a plastic mind," and to take heed that their opinions "do not become set;" but Sir Bartle Frere is rich in the industriously gathered experience of thirty-five years' service. The great misfortune for India is,

that with all his wisdom he has proved himself of too "plastic" a mind ever to become her supreme ruler.' Indian policy in its transition stage needs a firmer and stronger man.—*Nov.* 13, 1865.

AN UNOBTRUSIVE SERVANT OF THE STATE.

NOTHING teaches so effectually as character and example, and nowhere does the continuous influence of a life-time of earnest work tell with more certainty on contemporaries than in the Indian Services. Here no man can be hidden, as in a crowd, for if he have any force of character at all, his career and influence are known from first to last. This is conspicuously the case with those who may have distanced their contemporaries and seized some of the prizes which are offered in Indian service. The effectual influence of character to which we allude is not, however, confined to men of demonstrative temperament and manner, but is often exercised—in India far more than in the crowded societies of Western Europe—by those who, though unobtrusive and retiring to a fault, are often men of solid attainments, deep sympathies, and comprehensive knowledge. Men of this class instinctively shun the beaten track of popularity; it would be a martyrdom to them to be toasted at public dinners and besieged with complimentary addresses and ostentatious deputations, amongst which are so often seen those who, while "they come to praise, come that they may themselves be praised." But it is a pleasing trait of Indian society that the men of whom we speak are sure of the only reward they care for—the consciousness that any goodness which may have dwelt in them and whatever they have done worthily is fully appreciated. The simplest outward recognition of this is honour enough for them, as, for instance, an address like the one which we observe is being presented by the native community of Bombay to the Hon. Claudius James Erskine, who, we need scarcely add, belongs to that invaluable class which we have endeavoured to describe.

Mr. Erskine's hereditary connection with Bombay—as the son of a distinguished scholar and linguist of this city, and as the grandson of Sir James Mackintosh—is sufficient of itself to claim for him some special notice on his final departure from India; but it is also well known to those who are familiar with Mr. Erskine's career, that he has well earned an excellent name for himself. Mr. Erskine arrived in Bombay on October 10, 1840, and allowing for two furloughs to England, has been resident in India for nearly twenty-five years. . . . . .

Owing to the *purdah* system under which all the higher departments of our Executive Government are carried on—and to a great extent necessarily so—we cannot, if we would, discuss the course followed by Mr. Erskine since taking his seat as a member of Council here. Some of the more important labours of the Executive Government are carried on hidden from the general public, and the connection between the workman and his work is seldom apparent until long after the former has departed from these shores. It must be so in the case before us. Mr. Erskine has been only a short period in Council, but we have good reason to believe that the Government of Bombay will benefit largely from his work, and that for years to come. There are various exceedingly intricate questions which Mr. Erskine has finally disposed of, and many others which he leaves in a fair way to be settled. This has not been accomplished except by dint of untiring exertion on his part; and although he relinquishes his valuable appointment on the score of ill-health, he has, up to the eve of his retirement, worked from morning to night. But it is not so much a question of a foot or two more or less of actual work accomplished by men of this stamp, which constitutes the criterion of their value to the State: their worth is proved rather (though to those only who possess the requisite appreciative faculty) by the high sense of justice and fair consideration which these silent workers are often able to infuse into the administrative organism—a potent influence which will long linger behind Mr. Erskine's steps. We might hesitate to use direct eulogy in his presence, but this busy and noisy age needs examples like his; and this can do him no harm, for there is ever blended as a corrective in finely-strung natures a feeling of that keen responsibility which is inseparable from their unusual endowments. None know better than they, that—

"Fine spirits are not finely touched,
But to fine issues;"

and that, to whom much is given, from him is much required. We might say of Mr. Erskine's character that it presents nearly an exact antithesis of that "Philistinism which Mr. Matthew Arnold would have us believe is the normal type of the modern English nature—a phantasy which we shall protest against so long as there are extant men like the one before us, who recall the memory of many whose names live fresh and green in "our long island story," and of others known in the records and traditions of the Indian Services. We have already alluded to the peculiarly judicial cast of Mr. Erskine's mind, and this quality has, we believe, proved a very strong attraction to those educated and thoughtful natives who have fairly come in contact with him. That turn for exhaustive analysis which is a striking characteristic of his intellectual faculties, would alone suffice to fascinate them: but the quality that specially attracts them lies deeper still. However deficient in strength and force of character we may consider the people of this country, we must admit that when emancipated from prejudice by proper culture, they have a very fine innate perception of what is just and right. They have recognised in our departing Councillor a clear-eyed and unswerving devotion to this supreme principle. Does not their perception in this instance suggest a tangible hope that the cultivated English and native mind may gradually be brought to work together unfettered by any of the barbarisms and mere traditions of European legal systems? There is even already some ground to hope that the Bench and the Legislature may mutually act and re-act upon each other until there shall grow up a purely Indian system of jurisprudence second to none in the world, and it is towards some ultimate advance of this kind that the patient and enlightening influence of Mr. Erskine's judicial career will tell. The usual demand on a public man at the close of his career is that he, or some one on his behalf, should show some definite success that he has achieved. We have already intimated that Mr. Erskine is not to be judged by that superficial and exacting standard. His work has been of a very different, and, as will generally be admitted, of a more valuable and durable kind. In the Educational Department, on the Bench of the High Court, and at his desk as a member of the Executive Council, he has been laying foundations which we doubt not will prove firm and enduring beneath the work of other master-builders who, we feel sure, are ready to follow him. He may point to this work, or rather others may on his behalf, and say :—

> "And whoso wills, is very free to mount
> These labours as a platform, whence his own
> May have a prosperous outset."

May 11, 1867.

EDWARD IRVINE HOWARD.

IT falls to our lot to record a shocking accident which, in causing the untimely death of Mr. Edward Irvine Howard, has cast a gloom over the city. The Judges of the High Court yesterday, participating to the full in the deep and general feeling of grief for the loss of the learned gentleman, at once acceded to the request of the Bar—expressed through the Advocate-General, the Hon. Mr. Bayley—that the Courts should be closed for the day as a public mark of esteem for their colleague, and an indication of their sorrow for his loss. Particulars of the accident by which Mr. Howard met with instantaneous death are so well known that we need not here dwell upon the circumstances by means of which, when in the full tide of life and thought, he passed in a moment from this state of existence into that world of silence and mystery from whence none return. It is one of those casual coincidences, on which people remark without any attempt at inference or deduction, that Mr. William Howard, the elder brother of the deceased gentleman, also met his death by accident. Mr. William Howard practised at the Bombay Bar for about twenty years, and of him it may be stated that he was a favourite pupil in chambers of Mr. Bethell, the late Lord Chancellor. Mr. W. Howard was leader of the Bombay Bar for several years, and at the time of his finally quitting the Bombay Bar, on July 11, 1856, he was acting Advocate-General for Mr. Le Messurier. On the occasion of his departure a substantial testimonial was presented to him by the Bar and the public. Some few years after his return to England he was killed, whilst hunting, by a fall from his horse.

Mr. E. I. Howard was a student of Lincoln College, Oxford, where he took second

class honours in classics, and obtained his degree of M.A. of that University. Like his brother William, he was also a pupil in chambers of Sir Richard Bethell, and was called to the bar on November 17, 1853. . . . . .

When we come to notice the accomplishments and social qualities of Mr. Howard, our remarks necessarily bear upon his personal and family history. He was the son of Mr. Henry Howard, R.A., as much distinguished for his talent as a painter as for his lectures on Art, and who attained a very great age, being upwards of ninety at his death. His wife was the daughter of another Academician, Mr. Reinagle; and thus Mr. Irvine Howard enjoyed a double hereditary taste and talent for the fine arts. As an amateur draughtsman he possessed very considerable talent, while his great taste for, and knowledge of, music were highly appreciated, and aided much in cementing the close social attachments that he formed. He had an extensive acquaintance in literary and artistic circles at home, and numbered amongst his personal friends the late John Leech. He contributed to the *Bombay Quarterly Review*, a publication which deservedly bore a very high character: and amongst his contributions to that periodical we may particularly refer to an article on "Thackeray's Novels" (first part, vol. I.), another on "Oxford" (published in the second part of the same volume), another on "Music" (in the second part of vol. II.), another on "Burton's Pilgrimage to El Medinah and Meccah" (second part, vol. IX.), and an essay on the subject of the "Exclusion of Religious Instruction from Government Schools in India" (published in the October number of 1857). These reviews were exceedingly well written, and the last mentioned one, which was written shortly after the writer had become Director of Public Instruction, is particularly valuable for its breadth of view and liberality of sentiment. In regard to another article, the review of Thackeray's novels, we have been informed that it afforded great satisfaction to that great writer himself, and that he said it showed a truer appreciation on the part of the critic of the writings it dealt with than did any other review of his works that he had seen.

One of Mr. Howard's chief characteristics was his remarkable facility and power of adapting himself to circumstances. This was shown in the readiness with which he again took to his briefs on his return to the Bar in 1865. His recent success in his own profession has been very great, and he had before him every prospect of a most lucrative practice so long as his mental vigour might have served him. His address in the Khojah case—which embodied the results of most extensive research, and in which he displayed a mastery over an intricate and difficult historical problem—is sufficient in itself to establish a reputation for forensic skill of a very high order. Mr. Howard's suavity of manner and courtesy to all classes are well known. It gives us sincere pleasure in this dark hour thus to testify to those estimable qualities and unusual talents which the deceased gentleman undoubtedly possessed. Though it was our duty to stand in very decided opposition to him during part of his public career, the memory of that had all but passed away. Several months ago Mr. Howard voluntarily relinquished the claim that he had maintained—no doubt, in all good faith; and it is some little satisfaction for us to remember that the last reference to him in these columns, though only a casual one, would not be unpleasing to him —indicating, as it was intended to, that no root of bitterness remained.—*Aug.* 31, 1866.

AN UNPOPULAR SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIR CHARLES WOOD has gone at last, and there is little need to attempt to give distinct words to the chorus of thankfulness which the mention of that event will evoke throughout the length and breadth of India. Every class in our varied society has its story of wrong or despite, suffered at the hand of the late autocrat of these realms. The Army, Local as well as Royal, and each particular corps, has its long-nursed grievance, in contriving which the hand of the late Secretary can be traced. Civilians of both branches, doctors, chaplains, interlopers, and "old Indians," Governors and municipalities, have each in their turn, and have often together, prayed to be delivered from Sir Charles, his despatches and "instructions;" and now they will draw a long breath of relief in thinking that at last they know the worst that can befall them. What can be the explanation of this intense and universal dislike of the man who from the centre of power has administered the Government of India? The late Secretary cannot

have been always wrong. In his dry, drudging sort of way he has given evidence of a plodding industry, by dint of which he has acquired as extensive an acquaintance with Indian affairs as is possible for a man trained in officialism, having naturally the smallest modicum of political capacity, destitute of imagination, and with the dimmest perception of moral principles as affecting the government of States. Sir Charles Wood has not been so incurably dense as Mr. Vernon Smith, nor so stupidly mischievous as Sir John C. Hobhouse, and yet he has earned a more indelible odium than they; and there follows him into retirement a far more vehement dislike. In fairness to the departing Secretary it is needful to discriminate a little the different elements which go to make up the retiring pension of aversion and indignation so freely awarded Sir Charles by the Indian public, and which will be punctually paid should he be spared even to a patriarchal longevity.

By far the largest portion of this animosity is due to the prominent part that Sir Charles Wood has taken in the revolutionising of the three Indian armies. He has in that been but the instrument of designers more determined and more capable than himself; but he has laboured at the ungracious task with that obstinate zeal and indifference to remonstrance which is peculiar to commonplace men when they devote their powers to working out the behests of others. To annihilate the independence of an extensive organisation like that of the Indian Army, knit together by hereditary ties and special historical associations, was in itself a design belonging to the domain of high politics; but the carrying of it out in detail demanded the help of an administrator characterised by an unusual deafness of intellect and fullest development of official obtuseness. Such an administrator the Amalgamation schemers found ready to their hand in Sir Charles Wood, and he must make the best of their private approbation in order to compensate himself for a public condemnation more severe and sustained than has followed any retiring servant of the State during the present generation. . . . . —*Feb.* 17, 1866.

His Successors.

There is indeed, nothing to be said against such a smoothly sailing professional politician as the young Earl de Grey and Ripon; but an estimate in matters of this kind, to be worth anything, must be comparative, and it is personally unjust to the young peer himself that Earl Russell should have placed him in an office a "world too wide" for his present growth of statesmanship. The choice bodes no good to the brightening prospects of the cause of the Indian Army; for, if we mistake not, the Earl, as Secretary at War, was considered too pliable to the pressure of the Horse Guards—a quarter from whence the Indian officers have nothing whatever to hope.

The appointment of Mr. Stansfeld as Under-Secretary somewhat balances the inadequacy of the new arrangement; though, oddly enough, the only public connection of Mr. Stansfeld with Indian affairs has been his chance association with Sir Charles Wood as Member for Halifax. Mr. Stansfeld was not, like his colleague, reared within the official circle, but has fought his way there by force of character and assiduous attention to public affairs. His short apprenticeship to official duty, as civil Lord of the Admiralty, sufficed to show that he had within him a capacity for work which might some day prove valuable to the public. Mr. Stansfeld will find scope enough for that in his new post; and if he is to be spokesman for Government in the Lower House on Indian affairs, he will have a task more arduous than any rising politician would willingly choose. Fortunately his "gift of articulate speech" is in contrast to that possessed by the late Secretary, and there is some hope that, under his lead, Indian debates will attract auditors rather than repel them.—*Feb.* 21, 1866.

LORD RIPON FOURTEEN YEARS LATER.

THE event of the week, not only for Bombay but all India, is the landing of the new Governor-General the Marquis of Ripon. Our daily contemporaries have elaborately described the scene at the Dockyard, and the procession round by the Statue of Her Majesty, and so on to the Malabar Point. . . . We will go a step—we dare not say how long a step—back in his Lordship's own history, and recall from the dim past a scene which affords striking contrast with that of last Tuesday under the *shamiana* and on the dais where his Lordship received his first Viceregal greetings. It was in a large

music-hall in the north of England; the occasion a great meeting to promote parliamentary reform; Cobden and Bright were there in their best manner of the graver tone; and the Mayor of the borough presided—a very bluff Englishman of the Philistinian order. It was in this vein he seized occasion, in his opening remarks, to astonish the modest, earnest Viscount Goderich—who, just then emerging from his "Christian Socialist" stage, was sitting by as one of the promised orators of the evening—by drawing the whole attention of the vast audience to his Lordship, with the exclamatory interrogation—"Ah! what will that young man do?" We do not remember that there was any response to this uncouth introduction, except, perhaps, in thundering applause. But we do remember with what tact and reassuring encouragement Richard Cobden, in the course of his own speech, which was on the Ballot, turned the incident to account. He had described, in his clearest and deftest manner, the tripod and other appliances by which votes were then (and probably are now) taken in Oxford University in order to ensure secrecy, and with it independence and freedom of voting. Warming with his subject, he bethought him to respond to the blunt query of the Mayor; but, putting it as if in a finer language, he turned, in his genial manner, to the Viscount, and said, "I will tell you what I would do were I that young man: I would go through the length and breadth of England and say, 'Vote as they vote at Oxford; vote as they do at Oxford!'" And, though the "young man" did not literally adopt that suggestion, he has remained faithful to the more moderate, but firm and consistent order of liberal principles which he was then imbibing. And, after all, it would seem as if the blundering Mayor had in him somewhat of a "prophetic soul;" for who, of the most imaginative in that great audience, on glancing down the vista of duties and honours to which "that young man" might aspire, could have then dreamed that amongst the things he should "do" would be to accept the Governor-Generalship of India? But so it is; and the thin, young, aristocratic orator of the reform meeting, with the most moderate "imperial" on his chin, is now the broad-chested, bushy-bearded Viceroy of India.*—*June* 5, 1880.

II.—This morning Her Majesty's present representative in India has landed, for the second time, on the shores of Bombay Harbour. Since his first disembarkation in June last he has seen a good deal of India from the outside. His Excellency has had, in his recent tour through the Punjab and Sinde, some opportunity to free himself from the unreal and misleading impressions which pervade all the atmosphere of Simla life. He will now, in his week's stay amongst us, have fair occasion to acquire some of that vital suggestive knowledge of Western India and its people without which no Viceroy can develop into a true Governor-General. Here, in this little island, where the British-Indian power has been longest established and found its firmest base, His Excellency will most readily realise the truth that centralisation is a snare, and that diversity in unity, provincial autonomy, or federal self-reliance, are essential conditions in the success of Indian Empire.

It is scarcely needful to say that we fully sympathise with the encomiums that have been passed alike on the matter and manner of Lord Ripon's public utterances in the Punjab and Sinde. There is also substantial ground for these eulogies in so far that, all through his Lordship's speeches, may be traced the knowledge of Indian questions that he has acquired during long years of official life at home, several of which were in connection with the India Office itself. We dare say fresh evidence of this ripe experience of the administrative side of Indian questions will come out in the remarks that His Excellency may be making to the members of the Byculla Club whilst these lines are being printed. This is an excellent thing in a new Governor-General; but regarding one side of Lord Ripon's idiosyncrasy we have our misgivings. His Lordship is too constantly in good humour. This is perfectly natural with him; and it may, at first sight, seem strange to regret the manifestations of geniality and hopefulness. But it is not this healthy, trustful cheerfulness that we view with apprehension. It is that *optimism* as regards India and its affairs, which is so often allied with these attractive personal qualities, that we deprecate—nay, dread.

We would not have urged the Byculla Club to adopt some modern device, which might easily be hit upon, comparable to that ghostly if not ghastly expedient adopted by

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* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

the ancient Egyptians on their festive occasions: but a word of warning will not be thrown away on his Lordship. As with many empires and households, India has its "skeleton in the closet"—whence, indeed, the bony form has emerged with dread effect more than once during the last few years—and it is good that our optimist Viceroy should be reminded of the silent witness that "hath no speculation in his eyes."*—*Nov.* 27, 1880.

ABYSSINIAN WAR—ITS ORIGIN.

IT is well known that during several months past the British Foreign Office has been either outwitted or defied by his Abyssinian Majesty that most Christian King Theodorus. Since February of last year our Consul of Massowah, Captain Cameron, has been held in durance at, or near, the Abyssinian capital. And his case is not a solitary one; there are some other Englishmen as well as Germans, principally missionaries, who are also in confinement. . . . . .

Judging from the information before us, it seems that the whole of this Abyssinian negotiation has been mismanaged—has been a blunder *ab initio*. It is evident that the Foreign Office has been misled, and the public in England have been mystified, with regard to King Theodorus and the proper method by which he may be induced to release Captain Cameron and the other European captives. The King, albeit of European name, and professor of a faith tinged with Christian theology, is a monarch of savage race, and has somewhat barbaric notions of diplomacy. Those European Powers who hitherto have desired to communicate with him have adapted their plans to his notions of what is the correct code of Court etiquette. For instance, Theodorus has an unsophisticated appreciation of useful presents. Treasures of ivory, cattle, and slaves he has in such abundance that he esteems them very lightly, but silks, bright cloths, and cutlery he regards as above all the riches of Ethiopia. Acting on this knowledge, those Europeans who seek any favours from the Abyssinian usurper have generally provided themselves with a persuasive supply of the showy tissues or useful hardware of their own countries. His Majesty, when thus conciliated, has usually, like a man of business, at once intimated his consent or objection to the requests that have been made to him. Again, Theodorus entertains a somewhat barbaric contempt for mere epistolary communication. When the French or Germans have approached the Abyssinian throne—whatever that regal seat may consist of—they have selected from their own people one as high in station as could be obtained for such an unusual mission. Properly accredited, these European gentlemen have presented themselves in person at the Court of Gondar. In this case our Foreign Office has utterly disregarded the prejudices entertained by King Theodorus with regard to the personal status of those who are officially sent to seek favours from him. Mr. Rassam, formerly a Mahomedan, is now a Christian, but it is very unlikely that this change of religious views brings him much nearer to that type of Christianity which satisfies the Abyssinians; and, moreover, Mr. Rassam is not of European race at all, but is a Chaldean. Though not possessing much general linguistic knowledge, Mr. Rassam has a good command of Arabic which has enabled him to perform good service in certain subordinate negotiations; but that tongue is of no service in communicating with the King Theodorus. The "Special Commissioner" also retains many of his Mahomedan habits of thought, and is well versed in the diplomatic artifices needful in dealing with Arab Sheiks. Yet all these Semitic accomplishments go for nothing with a genuine descendant of Ham, especially one of such marked individuality as that of King Theodorus. With his African notions, he feels half justified in detaining our Consul, seeing that the Queen of England has not been able to find an Englishman to carry her letter.

Then, as to the financial style in which the negotiations have been conducted, there is room for remark. Mr. Rassam, although enjoying a good round salary so long as he keeps the mission in hand, may, for aught we know, feel hampered as to funds for the public purposes of his mission. He has apparently been chaffering in the cheapest Soumali market for his messengers, instead of offering a good round sum to the first man who should bring down to the coast an invitation from the King. One cannnot be

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

surprised that Theodorus fails to appreciate such misplaced economy. If he felt insulted on first hearing that the English had sent an Asiatic envoy, he would probably express his disgust in summary royal fashion at the sorry sight that would be presented by some of Mr. Rassam's woolly-headed heralds. King Theodorus is fully aware of the liberal fashion in which the English conduct their diplomatic affairs, and when he hears of the higgling of our "Special Commissioner" in his attempts to gain an audience, he will naturally conclude that the English Government are quite indifferent about the detention of Captain Cameron. . . . . .

It must be admitted that linguists are scarce amongst English gentlemen; but there was at least one English officer who is not only quite familiar with the Abyssinian *patois*, but has also (or had) great personal influence with King Theodorus himself. Had such a man been selected for this mission, instead of a person likely to arouse the antipathy of the King, it is morally certain that Captain Cameron and his fellow prisoners could have long ere this been released and restored. Probably, if the gallant Captain were once fairly back at his consulate at Massowah, he would rest quietly for a year or two before again venturing to make light of the command of that "noble savage," King Theodorus.—*Feb.* 14, 1865.

THE ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION, 1868.

ADMIRABLY does the Chief's General Order, of April 20, sum up the story of the Abyssinian campaign. That brief document will form the text for future historians, and when, in remote times, all details respecting our quarrel with the last King of Ethiopia shall have been excluded from the overcrowded page, Sir Robert Napier's terse but comprehensive little narrative will keep its place in the chronicles of our century, and in the records of the Indian and British armies. But for the purposes of the day we want all the details we can get, and the effect of the Chief's proclamation is vastly enhanced when all the surrounding circumstances, and the scene at which it was read, are taken into account. These are all fully described in the letter of the 21st from our Special Correspondent, and we must leave the General Order whilst we gather the threads of the continuous narrative, which, in our paper a week ago, was brought up to Easter Tuesday, or rather to the 16th, when the captives had all been received, Magdala had fallen, and the once dreaded Negus had been lain in the same grave with the Abuna, one of his distinguished victims. The letters before us open with another exciting scene, the demolition and retributive conflagration on Magdala, which, as the Chief says, "is now a scorched rock;" fitting monument at once of a merciless tyrant and British determination and sense of justice. Having thus obliterated every vestige of Theodore's defiant power, our countrymen in Abyssinia could well afford to turn their backs on the terrible or disgusting scenes they had unwillingly witnessed, and every reader's heart beats in response to the expression of their delight on turning their faces northwards and homewards.

Again, in these letters it is shown by what a narrow chance some serious trials and danger have been missed by our troops. The Transport Train was being strengthened and extended; but had the Force been required to move but a few marches towards the south-west, the casualties from sickness and exhaustion must have been very numerous, not to say alarming; and had it been needful to "sit down" before Magdala, nearly a month must have passed before adequate provision and shelter for the troops could have been conveyed across the Djedda and the Beshilo. In another way the delay would have been equally trying or disastrous. As will be observed, the Djedda had already risen considerably from the effects of the rain and hail storms, which are only precursors of the dreaded rainy season, when the Abyssinian soil is sodden, and every ravine is a valley of death. The Chief in his General Order makes due reference to the hardships endured, but, as every true soldier would have it, he does no more than that. Nevertheless, we who stay at home at ease should take some pains to realise in detail what is comprised in those privations of which the outline is given in the Order. Hunger and thirst, especially the latter, will wait neither for time nor tide, and when the exhausted soldier has arrived at the end of a march—it may be in cutting wind or in the torrid glare—and finds no water is to be obtained that night, the sensation of thirst becomes aggravated tenfold. . . . . .

Whilst we thus run over these circumstances in detail, before the most careless or cynical can forget them—and there are many more people besides the campaigners with whom "the remembrance of these privations will pass away quickly"—it must not be supposed that such strains could long have been endured; and we may fairly expect to hear that reaction will bring its penalty in sickness, if not mortality. This will be the case even under the present exhilarating feelings that must pervade every man of the Army; but how would it have been had Theodorus taken the captives off towards Godjam? A pursuit apparently interminable would have had to be entered upon, and that would have been attended not only with all the privations to which we have just referred, but, as the reaction would also have come after Theodore's escape, some of those privations must have been followed by deplorable consequences. . . . . .

The political results of the campaign are beginning to disclose themselves. We cannot draw much augury of good from the patronage that has been extended to the Wakshum Gobayze, and we feel no regret to learn that his Dejaz (or commander) has been beaten and captured by the Gallas. The Wakshum has, indeed, overcome Tesso Gobazye, who held sway in the west; and that is so far satisfactory, for, according to Dr. Beke, this Tesso is as great a rascal as the Wakshum is a coward. The only hope for any good coming from the latter must be looked for in connection with any help he may receive from his cousin Tiferri, who, having been long since locked up by Theodorus, is probably a somewhat capable man. This new man may do something to strengthen the Wakshum, whose weak and fitful character will stand him in poor stead when he has to confront an invasion of the Egyptians from the west. This may be regarded as inevitable, but if the Abyssinians of Lasta and Amhara alone were firmly united against these invaders—the Mussulman slave stealers from the Nile—they would be easily repelled; but with no better Abyssinian leader on the south-west than such "a feckless" one as the Wakshum, the result is very doubtful. If the younger Queen of the Gallas, and now "Duchess of Magdala," should make an alliance with the Egyptians, it would go hardly with all the plain country of western Abyssinia and the fertile portions round Lake Tsana; but, though the merciless Mussulmans will harry the land, we somehow think that the Abyssinians will be able to hold their own. Relieved of the recently destructive tyranny of Theodorus, the land will rapidly recover all the simpler elements of material prosperity, while the pounding that Theodorus has given to the feudal system will, perhaps for a generation to come—as did our wars of the Roses for ever afterwards—forbid the great chiefs from indulging in prolonged intestine wars. . . . The most hopeful item in the present dismal prospect of Abyssinian politics is that contained in the last paragraph of the letter. After all, the young son of Theodore is not to be subjected to the perils of an English climate, but is to come to the more salubrious and congenial region of Bombay, and here pass under the care of our learned and venerable citizen, the Rev. Dr. Wilson. The notion of an emperor for all Abyssinia must be regarded as a bygone dream; but it is very possible that in twelve or fourteen years—unless those pestilent Egyptians get the upper hand—the southern and western provinces of Amhara may be ready to welcome the heir-apparent of Theodorus, whose memory may then be associated more with traditions of kingly greatness than with recollections of his ruthless cruelty. From our correspondent speaking of the child, Dejaz Alnago, as the grandson of Oubie, the former Prince of Tigre, it is evident that the now widowed Queen of Theodorus must be the same as the once proud princess whose haughty mien towards and quarrel with the Negus were so graphically described by M. Lejean. One could desire that Sir R. Napier may be able to make some secure provision for the maintenance and protection of this now desolate lady: why should she not come to Bombay along with her boy? Even Sir John Lawrence, that stern guardian of the Indian revenues, would not object to the little bill for the maintenance and tendence of this forlorn but interesting guest.

We find it quite impossible to pass in review all the important matters referred to in our special correspondence. Some of it, however, belongs to the light literature of the campaign; as, for instance, the description of the "crowds of enthusiastic psalm-singers" and the capering clergy, one of whom beat his drum with "a vigour which indicated with unmistakable clearness the extent of their expectations"—of dollars. Then as to the revelations of the Abyssinian post-office, we fear those disclosures will long afford food for "chaff" at many a mess table. We regret not to have done justice—indeed, we

cannot—to the noble and yet simple proclamation by Sir Robert Napier. Those only can appreciate it who have long known the sincere, earnest, and generous character of the beloved Chief; while none can fully realise its significance but those who had the opportunity of hearing him converse on the possible perils and serious issues of the great enterprise whilst the earlier preparations were being made; or those again who at the St. Andrew's dinner heard him, in modest but trustful and courageous phrase, commit to Providence the issue of the Expedition, toward which he felt assured all concerned would give their best endeavours. And so has it been.—*May* 20, 1868.

II.—The tune of "marching home" has been played to some purpose by the Abyssinian Force, as shown by our correspondent's letters up to May 5, written at Ashangi. These letters also contain a complete sketch of the arrangements for the departure and embarkation of the whole Force, giving many particulars which may have still greater private than public interest. It will gratify every one in Bombay to find that His Excellency Sir Robert Napier will come here from Zoulla, instead of going to Europe at once. Bombay claims to have acquired a sort of proprietary interest in him; and seeing that the Presidency and its Government are also determined to get as large a share as possible in the credit and honour of the expedition, the Chief must come to Bombay to take his place as the central figure in the grand *tamasha*, which no doubt His Excellency Sir Seymour Fitzgerald has already devised. Unluckily, this festival will have to be under a roof of some sort, for as the *Feroze*, with Sir Robert and Staff, is not to leave Zoulla until June 4, we shall be under the full burst of the monsoon when that illustrious band shall arrive. Considerably before that time we shall have welcomed back again the 2nd and 18th Bombay Native Infantry, with some of the Marine Battalion; but the Naval Brigade we shall not see, as the *Octavia* goes to Trincomalee. As all the Bengal and Punjab regiments return by Bombay, there will be opportunity for comparing notes with other provincials of this great Empire; and, altogether, there is a prospect of much bustle in Bombay and its harbour during the coming monsoon. Nothing could be more complete and—to the wearied campaigners—more enticing than the "grand military picnic," which is to commence at Senafe, if not before, and to be supplied with "breakfasts, dinners, and teas," all the way down the passes—where every couple of men are to enjoy one whole mule between them; then, finally, have breakfast at Kumayloo, and dinner on board in the still waters of Annesley Bay.

This is a pleasant programme, but there is very much to be done and endured before Senafe is reached by the whole body of the force. The letters we have from Dildee and Latt contain accounts of worse difficulties than any which would be likely to come after, unless the sickness which was fairly laying hold of the followers should have rapidly increased since passing Ashangi. This is scarcely likely to have been the case; for improved diet, increased hospital accommodation, with more of Dr. Gordon's "medical comforts,"—which have surely turned up by this time—and the influences of a milder climate will tell even upon the weaker constitutions of the natives. The experience gained during this campaign should form a valuable contribution towards the settlement of that all but exhausted question, the expediency of employing native Indian troops in our colonies. The health of the European troops is still reported to be excellent, in spite of the privations and violent exertions they have gone through. We see no evidence to indicate that the superior health of the European troops in the ("legs-uppermost") table-land of Abyssinia, as compared with the condition of the natives, is attributable to essential superiority of constitution in the former. It is simply that the climate of these mountain regions is much better suited to the constitutions of northern Europeans than it is to the natives of tropical India. . . . . .

The description given in the despatch, of the descent into the valley from Dalanta and the ascent of the all but impregnable heights beyond, not only confirms the account already given in our columns, but tends to enhance one's admiration of the energy and endurance of the men, Indian as well as European, who overcame every obstacle so completely. It appears that the more careful writers at home who deprecated the Abyssinian expedition on a large scale, because of the physical impediments to be encountered, were tolerably correct in their description of those frowning heights and portentous ravines. They left out of their calculations what were to them the unknown quantities of a wise General's well-laid plans, and the capacities of a composite European

and Indian force—each branch of it dovetailing into the whole, and each single man doing his best towards the one great end.

Perhaps the most interesting portions of the despatch are those by which may be traced the agitation and changes of Theodore's mind. Until after the wonder-working display of the rocket battery, on the 10th, he appears to have retained much of his obstinate and half-fanatical belief in his kingly power and importance. Hence his absurd resentment on receiving—instead of, as he evidently hoped, a missive from the Queen—the Chief's letter demanding, for the last time, the surrender of the captives—and, for the first time, of himself. The despatch contains the important addition to our previous accounts of the passing to and fro of Mr. Flad and Lieutenant Prideaux between our camp and Magdala. They had come twice from Magdala into our camp as envoys, when they returned the second time with their lives in their hands; and, as is very evident from the despatch, leaving a terrible load of anxiety on the mind of the Chief. Then, late on the Saturday afternoon, it was that they met Mr. Mayer, almost at the gates of their prison, bearing the mandate or rather permission for their release. And still the anxieties of the Chief were not at an end, for Mrs. Flad and some other European captives "for whom," as Sir Robert says, "we were bound to take thought," were still within the tyrant's grip. Happily, reason and common sense were returning to Theodore's mind, and in his Sunday morning's letter he appears to have drifted as near towards a repentant frame of mind as his obdurate and murderous heart could permit. In this letter the proffered cattle are referred to; and it would seem as if Mr. Rassam's misunderstanding as to the Chief's acceptance of these gifts may have raised the unpleasant rumours to the disadvantage of the late envoy. But though Theodorus had done what he hoped would suffice for his own escape, his limit of concession had been reached. He would not surrender himself to the least chance of the fate to which he had consigned thousands, and as the Chief says: "His failure to submit himself, therefore, left no other course open to us but to proceed towards him as an enemy." The world knows the rest.—*May* 26, 1868.

NAPIER AND SIVAJEE—A HALTING PARALLEL.

THE other day we took occasion to comment on certain indications in the home press of a desire to depreciate the services performed by the Abyssinian Force. But there have also been writers who run to the opposite extreme. The eulogies which some of the home journals lavish upon Sir Robert Napier, and the force which he has led to victory, are so extravagant and fulsome that they are calculated rather to injure the General's reputation than add to its lustre. Nothing can be so provoking, to a man of sense and moderation like Sir Robert, as to be drenched with inconsiderate adulation, and to have his successful conduct of a very arduous expedition magnified into one of the most dazzling feats of arms that the world has ever seen. We have already endeavoured to show that we appreciate what he has done, in a reasonable sort of way, and have given full expression to the praise which is generally accorded to him among reflecting people. That he has performed a great achievement in the way of campaigning and organisation there can be no question; and so long as the Press confines itself to discriminating compliments, and a rational recognition of his services, we shall be only too glad to swell the chorus. But to sing pæans about the triumph of the British arms over a half-armed horde of semi-barbarous Abyssinians, to talk in a fervid strain of the devoted gallantry of our troops in storming an almost undefended stronghold, is nothing but nauseous brag, that is nearly as harmful as it is offensive. It is harmful, because it is liable to divert attention from the real merits of the achievement, and to blind the eyes of the public to the valuable lessons that may be learned from a calm and discreet criticism of it. The following paragraph, taken from the columns of a journal of high repute at home, will serve to illustrate the extravagance of that trick of adulation here complained of: "The long mountain march in which nothing was forgotten, nothing left to chance, was crowned *by one of the most daring and romantic feats of arms ever performed*, a feat which reads more like one of the exploits of the great founder of the Mahratta power than anything done by the General of a civilised army." This is, to say the least of it, very "tall talk." And what features of the campaign can have suggested its being likened to any of Sivajee's deeds of daring we are utterly at a loss to conceive. Whoever wrote this remarkable

paragraph must have a very hazy idea of the character of Sivajee's military operations. We hope that he did not mean to compare Sir Robert Napier with the famous Mahratta, nor the troops that he commanded to the plundering bands that swept over the Mogul territories.

It is difficult also to understand why the Abyssinian campaign reads more like the incursion of barbaric soldiery than "anything done by the General of a civilised army." It strikes us forcibly that any other than a civilised army would never have reached Magdala at all, that the secret of the success lay entirely in the fact of our expeditionary force being a highly-trained, perfectly-equipped, and carefully-organised army, and of its being led by a scientific and anything but barbaric General. Sivajee would have found it a more arduous undertaking to convey a body of ten thousand fighting men to Annesley Bay—to march it, with all its necessary *impedimenta*, through passes that were made practicable only by science, to move it forward four hundred miles over a country destitute of grain, and possessing nothing worth looting, to annihilate the whole of his enemy's host with a mere handful of men, to take his state fortress, and the tyrant himself, and get back again without the loss of half a company of infantry, either by sword or sickness—than he found it to overrun Guzerat, and plunder Surat. The concluding portion of the article is devoted to a panegyric on Sir Stafford Northcote, which is almost as astounding as the flattery showered upon Sir Robert Napier. The Indian Minister, it solemnly avers, has "earned his Viceroyalty" by the attitude he has assumed with respect to the Abyssinian war. No doubt we might have a worse man in Government House, Calcutta, and there is more than a chance that we shall have him there. But to say that he has earned that proud position through the success of the Abyssinian campaign, with which he has had nothing very particular to do, that we are aware of, is to go a little too far.

"Sir Stafford Northcote," the *Spectator* writes, "is not a great Minister, still less a great man. But the consequences of failure would have been visited upon his head; and to refuse him the credit of unexampled success, of a success which makes every Englishman feel more hopeful than he felt yesterday, is not to fight, but to swindle one's political enemies. The man has earned his Viceroyalty, and if there is a trace of decency left in Mr. Disraeli, if he can understand, ever so little, that service to England constitutes a greater claim than service to himself, Sir Stafford Northcote will be the next ruler of the Indian Empire."

That he may possibly be, but it is a strange moral to draw from the Abyssinian campaign. Had there been a reverse, instead of a success, no blame would have attached to Sir Stafford Northcote. He is about the last man that any one would have thought of sacrificing to public indignation. Sir Robert Napier's hands were left unfettered, a wide discretion was given him. The Government acted wisely in surrendering the whole management of the business to him, and for this act of wisdom Sir Stafford Northcote doubtless may claim a share of credit. But, as everything had been done by the authorities, both here and at home, that could be done in the way of placing at Sir Robert's disposal a splendid force, and everything that he required for its support; and as this unusual liberality was well known to the public, there can be little doubt that had Sir Robert succumbed to the difficulties of his task, *he* would have had to bear the brunt of the storm of odium that would have arisen. We suspect that the Whig Ministry that made the first false step in the matter, and really sowed the seeds of the whole of the subsequent mischief, would have come in for no small amount of the obloquy as well as the Ministry that gave the order for hostilities to be actually commenced. The latter would, of course, have been bitterly attacked, for success is the acknowledged measure of political ability.—*June* 13, 1868.

ABYSSINIA AND PRINCE KASA.

BOMBAY is not yet quite indifferent to the fate of Abyssinia, though the recollections of the Magdala Campaign are dying out from amongst us. The Intelligence Department of our Political Resident at Aden does not seem to be able to penetrate much beyond Mussowa, and hears nothing from the mountains of Adowa, or the valley of the Takazi. . . . . .

It thus plainly appears that Prince Kasa of Tigre is gradually gaining such general sway in Abyssinia as can be acquired by any chief in a country so wretchedly poor and

politically incohesive. This testimony, too, we may observe, is prejudiced; hence we do not believe a word more of those stories of cruelty and pillage—they may be warranted by what we know of the general character of the Abyssinians and their mode of making war. It is one of the small blots on the first-class and admirably-conducted magazine just quoted from, that its editor seems never to have forgiven the *quasi* recognition of Prince Kasa of Tigre by Sir Robert Napier. For our part, we think the British Commander might have gone even a little further towards providing the miserably disorganised country with some head to look up to. But as the Prince of Tigre managed to hold his own for a while—in spite of his rapacious neighbours, the Egyptians—he has since succeeded in obtaining the anointing under the authority of the Coptic Patriarch, by his Abuna, or Chief Bishop of the Abyssinian Church. He thus stands forward as the accredited head and king *de jure* of the country. That he might soon become so *de facto* is apparent even from the presumably one-sided narrative we have just quoted; but that chance is reduced very low by the assiduous efforts which the Egyptians are making to hem in and surround Abyssinia. In this they have, so far as the Red Sea littoral is concerned, an effective instrument in the sagacious Munzinger Bey, our C.B., whom we foolishly flung away after having proved his value and recognised his worth. We are so hide-bound by rules and regulations, and have so little inventiveness, that we do not know how to utilise a man of special ability when we catch him. Yet surprise is expressed at England losing her foreign influence.—*Oct.* 6, 1873.

A PARSEE PEABODY.

THE pecuniary liberality of Mr. Cowasjee Jehanghir Readymoney, C.S.I., seems inexhaustible. He now offers a donation of 10,000 rupees towards paying off such portion of the debts of the Municipality that may be considered as having been incurred for improvements of which the present generation will reap the chief advantage. This offer is, however, a conditional one. It is to stand good for three months, if within that period other public-spirited citizens will make up the amount to a total of five lakhs. Before estimating the probabilities of this liberal offer being met, we take occasion from it to give expression to an opinion we have long held in reference to the large assistance which, in future, may be looked for from individual beneficence in aid of municipal revenues and civic improvements. It is a large subject on which we can only briefly touch at present. In the West there have been many exceptional instances of this practice of modern public charity, for such it is in the fullest sense of the term; but bequests and donations in relief of local taxation and for purposes of material improvement, are not yet generally recognised as customary and suitable modes for the disposal of surplus wealth. Religious, educational, remedial, and alms-giving institutions receive constant accessions of funds; but very few wealthy persons have learned to imitate that practical benevolent thought for the bodies of the labouring classes which was manifested by the American merchant who built the Croton Aqueduct for the city of New York; and by Miss Burdett Coutts when, the other day, she constructed salubrious covered markets for the poorest classes of the honest poor of London. The unavoidably excessive cost of the modern system of civic conservancy, when carried out faithfully according to the best architectural and hygienic principles, presses with scarcely endurable weight upon all classes of rate-payers except the wealthiest. The difficulty cannot be evaded by resort to clumsy and inequitable methods of mediæval taxation, which, though "no one would feel them," combine the maximum of unfairness with the minimum of net result. If wealthy citizens begin to see that the cities wherein they have dwelt and got gain have, next to kith and kin, a close claim on their ever-accumulating profits, they will acquire the habit of giving in aid of water supply projects, drainage, or for the opening out of new streets, and constructing healthy habitations for the poor on other than commercial principles. As is found in connection with nearly every project of public benevolence that can be suggested, a basis for this modern form of civic charity may be found in the customs and traditions of this ancient country. In the *dhurmsalas* and *serais*, the tanks, wells, and bridges constructed by wealthy Hindoos and Mahomedans, whenever the land has had rest for a time, there is abundant precedent and usage, to which Mr. Cowasjee Jehanghir, with his ready adaptability to circumstances, desires to give a liberal and fit modern interpretation.

In the example he has set of willingness to contribute to general improvements with which the names of benefactors cannot be associated, and to relieve the overweighted rate-payers, who may never know to whom they are indebted, we trust to see the beginning of a wise modern usage, a policy of practical charity which may be gradually followed in all the large towns of India.—*June* 15, 1869.

A PARSEE PATRIOT—MR. DADABHOY NOWROJEE.

THERE can be no question that testimonials and hero-worship—or rather the weak echo of this in platitudinous adulation of pretentious men who have merely been more successful or prominent than their neighbours—have become, in many instances, a weariness of the flesh and spirit. We need, in these noisy days, more and more to cherish the example of England's or India's "forgotten worthies"—men who did their duty bravely, endured silently to the end, leaving their mark, though not their name, in their country's annals. And yet, as the wise man has told us, "there is a time for everything and for every purpose under the sun." There are men whom, if we can feel sure of not spoiling them, the community does itself good by publicly honouring; and there are times—very few indeed, we admit—when it is suitable and in the true sense profitable to emphasize a unanimous public sentiment by a substantial gift. The conditions which render the testimonial of a community sincere and suitable, and which make appropriate a gift of money for private use, given to a man while yet in the midst of active life, are, we think, to be found in the circumstances which have resulted in the presentation to Mr. Dadabhoy Nowrojee. The movement was, in the first instance, quite a private or social one. It has only within the last week or two assumed such a public character that we could comment upon it, and that we can do more freely now that the honoured citizen has left our shores. Whatever may be thought of the East India Association and the work it is likely to accomplish, all who cherish lively political sympathies must have been gratified in observing the great impulse that has been given to public spirit in this presidency since Mr. Dadabhoy commenced his recent series of exhortations. It is a distinctly national feeling that has been aroused; but never was patriotism more free from bitterness and mere antagonism. There has been no current event calculated to arouse these political aspirations. We can only refer it to certain peculiarly happy characteristics and facile ability in the chief promoter of this revival, that we have seen not only the Parsees but Hindoos of all castes—the poor compositor and the wealthy Shettiah, the presidency towns and the sleepy Mofussil, all uniting in responding to Mr. Dadabhoy's earnest but moderate and intelligent patriotic appeals. Political revivals are, usually, of far more permanent and general benefit to a community than those called religious. The discussion of public affairs, the stirring of the sentiment of patriotism, though often accompanied with much superfluous enthusiasm, has reflex effects in numberless directions, tending to the spread of knowledge, the discouragement of stolid selfishness, and gives new stimulus to every educational influence. If there be any who have looked askance on Mr. Dadabhoy's recent lectures and agitation because of their political character, we may remind them that there is very much in connection therewith in which the most conservative and timid can rejoice. It is not, however, only these, or all the valuable political services which Mr. Dadabhoy's popular qualities have enabled him to render to his countrymen, that have induced them to come forward so handsomely to do him honour. Young as he still is, the testimonial now presented is the acknowledgment of many years of steady, continuous service, including very much besides the political effort, which, though necessarily attracting more attention, may be of less permanent advantage to Bombay and its people than other work of which the address has revived the recollection. . . . . .

His very prominent exertions since the establishment of the East India Association —in the founding of which he afforded important assistance to the Indian officers' committee with whom it originated—are too well known to need enumeration here, though those exertions form the immediate occasion for the honours which he has just received from his fellow-citizens. It is not so generally known that in previous years, through the "London Indian Society"—which he established in conjunction with Mr. Mohun Tagore, of Calcutta, and Mr. Nowrojee Furdoonjee—Mr. Dadabhoy did important service in

promoting certain changes in the regulations affecting candidates for the Civil Service examinations, including an important modification of the system of marks for Sanscrit. He also fought hard against the capricious and unjust exclusion of certain successful native medical candidates. . . . . .

It would, as we have said, be unnecessary to give here any account of Mr. Dadabhoy's five papers, for which, with the discussions attendant on them, the East India Association, and through it the public, are under obligations to him. Those contributions add very much to the permanent value of the *Journal*, which, if it could be freely distributed at home, would do more than any other current publication to correct mistaken impressions about India, and to excite an intelligent and productive interest in our affairs, now shunned by many worthy men simply because they have no adequate means of information thereon. Mr. Dadabhoy is yet in his prime, and is still exposed to all the temptations, all the chances of error and mistake, that beset active public men. The reception of the honours just conferred upon him—sincere and hearty as is the feeling which prompt his friends and admirers—is a test of character, and entails on him new responsibilities, though only meant as an acknowledgment of past service. The sentiment of these donors of many races towards the man whom they regard as one of their national representatives, is similar to that expressed by Sir Robert Peel towards Lord Palmerston in the great Don Pacifico debate, when, though criticising the spirited Foreign Secretary's policy, he avowed —"We are all proud of him!" Knowing what we do of Mr. Dadabhoy, we cherish the belief that he will continue to justify the very general admiration and confidence of which this testimonial is the expression.—*July* 28, 1869.

THE HYDERABAD MINISTER.

THE unfounded report which cropped up a few weeks ago of an attempt on the life of Sir Salar Jung, to which we gave contradiction the other day, may serve as text for a few notes on the present position of that Minister and the administration of the Nizam's dominions. It is well understood that since the decease of his late master, Sir Salar Jung has been assured of hearty support from Mr. Saunders, the British Resident, in any reforms he (the Minister) desired to carry out, and also in the general conduct of the administration. It is too soon for any definite results of the earnest co-operation between two authorities to be reported upon, but there is sufficient general evidence of the opening of new paths for steady progress. Probably the public have cherished somewhat too high expectations as to what Sir Salar would do when, by an event wholly unexpected, he was freed from restraints which had crippled his power for good. The reputation which had gathered round his name had reference mainly to his tact and discretion—to the comparative success with which he controlled fierce and selfish rivalries in a kingdom the monarch of which took little active part in administration and whose character had probably deteriorated under the combined depressing influences of seclusion, self-indulgence, and political distrust, for which last there had been too much ground. During an eventful decade—for in 1857 Sir Salar had a prominent share in stemming the rising tide of Mussulman fanaticism in Southern India—he had sustained a peculiarly difficult part. His success in that is sufficient to entitle him to historical fame, without giving to the public the right to demand of him the highest administrative skill in ordinary circumstances. It is very likely that, in speaking of him as untrammelled, we may be unmindful, or, indeed, ignorant of the impediments which faction and selfish rivalry may be still putting forth to thwart the efforts of the Minister whose high position and well merited favour with the British authorities expose him as a mark for envy and systematic opposition. As will be remembered, it was rumoured soon after Sir Salar had entered on his "untrammelled" position that, because of the opposition and dislike shown towards him by some partisans in Hyderabad he had resolved to retire to his own people and his patrimony in the remoter provinces. Happily, this not unnatural inclination was overruled, and he still remains as the guardian of order, and the pilot of the great Mussulman kingdom of the Deccan.

Nevertheless, with the firm and disinterested support he now receives from the Paramount Power, it will be expected of him to live down any mere factious opposition—including that from the potent influence of bigotry—and in due time the public will

expect to see tangible results of his own policy. No more than any other public man can Sir Salar Jung rest on his past career. The world will judge him on his merits, as tested by new and, for him, more favourable circumstances. It is significant of the high reputation he has to sustain that the public are somewhat impatient to see the fruits of—as they suppose—plans long pondered, and measures slowly matured under clouds of heavy discouragement. There is no reason, that we are aware of, to doubt that these expectations will be fulfilled. . . . . .

With regard to public works, it is understood that the Minister, even under the Nizam, did all that he could with the resources at his command. The larger part of the funds available for developing the material resources of the Nizam's dominions, the "surplus revenues of the Berars," are needed for making the railways from Kulburga to Hyderabad, and from Khangaum to Jullum on the Nagpore line. These are for British objects rather than for the Nizam's; but if the lines are constructed economically, they will leave a profit that may go to the Hyderabad public funds. On the other hand, the Godavery navigation, made at a great expenditure of Imperial funds, if it answer at all, will be of immense service to the Nizam's territories from Sironcha downwards, in giving them their only outlet to the sea. As to the progress that has been made in smaller public works in the Nizamate, we cannot give any account. Some time ago, when noticing the Administration Reports of Travancore and Cochin, we queried, Why should there not be one issued from Hyderabad? Any impediment that formerly existed in the way of adopting this excellent method of comparing notes with other provinces, is now removed. Sir Salar Jung could make a fair show with public works and police; and we do not see why, in a year or two, he might not, under the heads Education and Justice, compare fairly with the two Native States on the Malabar Coast. The first two years or so, a Hyderabad Administration Report should partake much of the nature of a gazetteer; and by this means we might come to know very much more than we do at present of the resources of the Nizamate, and the openings it affords for profitable commercial intercourse.—*Sept.* 21, 1869.

A MILITARY POLITICIAN.

SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD cannot complain that he is allowed to glide out of India unnoticed. Our own columns, as well as those of our contemporaries, have abounded with freely expressed opinions on the retiring Chief's Indian career, with criticisms on his share in civil administration, and the way in which he has performed the high military functions that he now turns over to Lord Napier. Though adverse and sometimes angry comment have in this gained the ascendant in the public voice, Sir William has not been without apologists. In one instance, that of our Umballa contemporary, he has been dismissed with an unequivocal vindication little short of eulogy. As to our Allahabad contemporary, though its articles having the late Chief for their subject are generally interesting, it has come to be regarded as such a partisan where he is concerned, and its views are so remarkably similar to those of Sir William Mansfield, that it does not serve us much in attempting to estimate how impartial public opinion regards that statesman or soldier. Were he to be judged simply as one or the other, we should have little difficulty in drawing our conclusions, and in casting the balance of the good or evil he has done the State. But if we have to set against the errors of the Commander-in-Chief the civil services which, by voluntary option, he has rendered in his place as one of the Executive Government of India, the net results of such process can scarcely be satisfactory. There cannot be a clear debit or credit on one side or the other. Neither as statesman nor military administrator can His Excellency claim to have silenced criticism—we write before his grand and final effort under the former character—and any painstaking judgment that aims to review Sir William Mansfield's Indian service as a whole must comprise many opposed and some doubtful decisions. It is impossible that we should attempt any such review; here we can but notice, on the "irregular system," a few of the more vital questions raised, mainly by the apologists of Sir William Mansfield. . . . . .

Our Umballa correspondent, when he speaks of "the old, easy-going style of things of the Company's time," seems to be thinking only of the Bengal Army, which fell and

paid the penalty. It would be difficult to make out that there was any "easy-going style," any proud flesh or fatty degeneration in either the Bombay or Madras Armies, that could be remedied by the double-distilled acetic acid which, speaking chemically, was the principal contribution brought by the Chief of the period to the work of amalgamation in Bombay. But, says the *Pioneer*, Sir William Mansfield was "not one of those" who framed the present disorganisation of the Indian Army. Perhaps not, in the sense in which certain Indian officers—unfaithful to their brethren and their colours—yielded their practised fingers and departmental brains to the service of the courtly schemers of the Horse Guards; but the work did not end with that combination. Sharp cutting tools, pitiless operators, and subservient agents were urgently needed in carrying out the vivisection, and promoting the "painless demise" of the Indian Army—especially of its tough and sturdy vanguard in Bombay—and all these essentials were united in Sir William Mansfield. If the State were to be saved, if the military *régime* of India were to be regenerated by the rough, merciless, and undiscriminating course to which the Bombay Chief of seven years ago lent himself with such keen delight, the spirit displayed by him might be merely dismissed as a personal trait of bad taste. And, perhaps, at that time Sir William Mansfield—though with Sir James Outram's minute staring him in the face—might honestly believe that to destroy the autonomy of the Indian Army, and to root up everything from its organisation that was special to this country, was wise as a military measure. If he did believe so, then it says little for his judgment as a military man; but he can have no excuse for persisting in that opinion now, though at Calcutta a month ago, with his accustomed hardihood, he virtually defended all the ruinous measures which have left Indian military organisation in the costly and inefficient condition of to-day. In this Sir William is more consistent than his apologists; for, in spite of the *Pioneer's* disclaimer, he is inseparably linked with the amalgamation revolution as one of its ardent abettors. . . . . .

He felt a professional difficulty in the prospect of having in China to receive orders from Sir Hope Grant in turn; so that, instead of field service, he elected to drive the ploughshare of amalgamation at Bombay, and qualify himself for a parliamentary career by disputatious practice in the Bombay Legislative Council. Matters of inspection, field parade and reviews, where brigade learns to work with and to camp with brigade, are pursuits to which a "soldierly chief" would have given far more attention than has the retiring one. He has worked administrative centralisation to death, but has done little or nothing to promote military *solidarité* even in those few divisions where extensive field manœuvres are practicable, and the climate renders them advisable. Perhaps we should not blame Sir William solely for all that he has done in the way of exaggerating the functions of his office, and in superseding the judgment and annihilating the discretion of all the military hierarchy beneath him. Centralisation and subserviency are characteristic of the Horse Guards *régime*, but they have flourished luxuriantly under the retiring Chief's influence, while not a single defender (save the *Pioneer*) is found on behalf of Sir William's characteristic edict destroying the discretional power of commanders of native regiments. . . . . .

Several of Sir William's papers on financial subjects, on the Central Asian question, on decentralisation, and on many subordinate topics of general administration, would, if they could be published, serve to throw much light on the esoteric aspects of Indian polity; but there is little to show for all this activity beyond his own special function. Sir R. Temple generously remarked last year that "if India, by the means now adopted, shall enjoy the benefit of a gold currency, that will be largely owing to the exertions of His Excellency." But the means then adopted have not sufficed to attain the end. "The exertions of His Excellency," notwithstanding his clear and excellent minute, have been barren, and he leaves India without having made the one resolute step further which would have given us a legal tender gold coin. In many of Sir William Mansfield's public legislative efforts, we see him betrayed by the foible of intellectual arrogance, and his keen logical faculty is often observed in alliance with an invincible unreasonableness. We see that in his mischievous opposition to the Bombay "Wagering Bill" in 1864, and in his recent alliance with the fanatical opponents of the Punjab Tenancy Act. Though as a debater he was equal to any in either Council, and superior to all but one member, he could make no permanent impression, because his intellect had no hold on the soil, his spirit was not in harmony with the country. Seldom has such wholesale

mischief been done in commercial affairs by the passing or withholding of any legislative measure as that inflicted on Bombay by the delay which held back the Time Bargains Act until the fatal July 1, 1865, when the *bouleversement* of our community was effected. To Sir William Mansfield's brilliant debating qualities that disastrous delay is mainly attributable, though had the then President of the Council possessed firmness equal to that of the present one, Sir William would have been overruled and outvoted, if not refuted, and the city would have escaped interminable litigations and embarrassment. Sir William Mansfield has pursued success, and has had a splendid reward; but he leaves India full of vigour, and probably with unquenched ambition. Notwithstanding the shortcomings and mistakes of his military administration, and the grave defects of character attributed to him as a public man, there is in the British State ample scope for his energy and skill; so that we may expect to hear much more of him yet, and there is time for him to redeem some of the harsh but just judgments which, for the present, he must bear.—*April* 1, 1870.

A PROMISING CAREER CUT SHORT.

UNCERTAINTY and eager disbelief as to the decease of Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie prevailed so long after receipt of the telegram which was intended to inform us of the event, that, on seeing its full and formal announcement in the obituary of the *Times*—on the very day this incoming mail left London—the Indian public must feel a renewal of the profound regret caused by the first intelligence of that young Civilian's death. He died at Paris, on the 16th ult., at the early age of thirty five. The sudden termination of a public career as encouraging as it has been short, the abrupt removal of an accomplished man in the prime of life and on the threshold of a new arena of public usefulness where all was promising before him, cannot fail, with many, to recall some oft-quoted line or other of the inimitable ode—

> "But the fair guerdon when we hope to find,
> And think to burst out into sudden blaze,
> Comes the blind Fury with the abhorred shears
> And slits the thin-spun life—'But not the praise.'"

Mr. Wyllie entered the Bombay Civil Service by open competition, his name appearing, we believe, in the first list of successful competitors. After only a few years' service in this Presidency, including employment for a short time as Assistant Collector in Guzerat, and afterwards as an Assistant to the Political Agent in Kattywar, where his character received some impress from that of the revered Kinloch Forbes, he was transferred with certain other junior civilians to Bengal. His special merits were soon recognised by the Government of India; and his distinguished services as Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department were, after his retirement from the Service, acknowledged by his nomination to a Companionship of the Star of India. This honour, though its recipient was a "junior," was grudged by none, but was felt rather to be a compliment to the whole Service. . . . One of our correspondents at home writes: "Men generally interested in India, and capable of expressing their opinions in such a manner as to secure an European audience, are not so numerous that you can afford to lose them in the prime of their lives. We all of us here look upon the death of Mr. Wyllie as a heavy loss to India. He had done much, for one so young, but the men who know best say that it was little in comparison to what he would have done had he been permitted to remain longer amongst us." . . . . . .

Certain references in the letterto the ambition of the late M.P. for Hereford, though not intended in any disparaging sense, are a little likely to mislead. It may not be generally known, but such is the fact, that Mr. Wyllie retired from the Service on medical certificate and sick pension, and, as the event has proved, with too much occasion. It was hoped that his ailments, which were directly caused by the Indian climate, would gradually be removed by residence in England, and probably no one felt more confident of this than he did himself. Hence he deliberately chose a new career of exertion and activity which has proved beyond his strength. India had broken the stamen of his constitution.—*April*, 1870.

PRINCE ALFRED'S INDIAN TOUR.

THE letter from the Duke of Edinburgh, read by Lord Mayo the other night at the Lahore banquet, testifies very remarkably to the skill and ease with which a certain Madras writer recently simulated the royal epistolary style. And the similarity between the fictitious and the genuine Prince Alfred letters is deeper than mere style. The Madras one was so far fair and correctly conceived that—apart from the chaff, banter, and quiet satire which formed its *raison d'etrê*—it indicated the good nature, the simple directness, and the plain common sense which characterise every paragraph of the real and familiar epistle dated on board the *Galatea*. That the Sailor Prince's lines should comprise a few slips in composition from which the professional writer's column was free, only serves as a stamp of the genuine and natural character of the letter which appeared in our paper yesterday. Indeed, amidst our income-tax tribulations, we owe thanks to the Duke for his involuntary pleasantry in warning us that he does *not* think we are "in a fair way to successfully surmount our financial difficulties," when he only meant to express the hope that his tour has had no appreciable share in adding to them. This is, no doubt, the plain truth of the matter; though the tribulations already alluded to induce many, besides the illiterate masses, to speak as if the Prince's visit and the Temple budget stood in the relation of cause and effect. It will be much to be regretted if the irritation at present universal should interfere with the due appreciation of the Duke's simple, but intelligent and, evidently, sincerely expressed review of his Indian tour. When he tells the people of India that he "had coveted for years the honour of being the first member of the Royal Family to visit India," we do not see but that this is at least a little more worthy of credence than certain colonists' tales which some persons accepted as evidence to show that the Prince was not worthy of coming to India at all. At that time we ventured to suggest that whatever youthful errors might be debitable to the account of the Captain of the *Galatea*, no moral regimen was so likely to give him a fresh and healthy start in the noble career that lies within his reach as a tour through India under favourable auspices. And this letter to the people of India—making all allowance for possible suggestions from some riper mind—bears unmistakable proof that the moral and political influences of this splendid heritage have reached the heart, as they can scarcely fail hereafter to enlarge the mind and elevate the character of the young Prince. . . . . .

As to the debit side of the account, the serious political evils which some have imagined as likely to follow from this royal promenade, we must confess ourselves unable to apprehend them. When we hear that some chief with a grievance seeks to retain Prince Alfred as his agent to treat with "the Crown" at home, we shall begin to think that there may be something in the far-fetched idea that the Duke's visit "has rendered the government of India in India more difficult than ever." Amidst all the columns of reports it has been our fate to peruse, we do not remember a single instance in which the Prince received even a simple petition, or that he, in the slightest matter, laid his "uncovenanted" hand upon the ark of Indian Executive Government. Administration must be as fragile as a sensitive plant if anything the Duke has done or said, or all his active influence put together, could paralyze a single fibre of that function. Prince Alfred's visit certainly occupied a good deal of Lord Mayo's time, and probably interrupted a good deal of Secretariat drudgery. It staved off for a while the impending financial discussion. It cost the State a few lakhs—perhaps not more than the Asiatic Bank "conveyed" from a certain twenty-five—and it entailed rather heavy incidental private expenses on a few prominent officials. Possibly the Duke's tour, as with all commotions, was the incidental cause of less or more of private bickerings, envy, and uncharitableness. But let all these be cast up together, and we venture to say that those who can, for a moment, compare this little obelisk of petty evils with the pyramid of political advantages accruing from the visit of a son of the Empress of Ind, must either be deficient in the faculty which estimates proportion, or they must have put it under sequestration until this income-tax visitation be overpast.—*May* 13, 1870.

DONALD MACLEOD.

THE Viceroy spoke a word in season at Lahore the other day when, amidst the rapturous fraternisation of the Punjabees gathered round their revered chief, he admonished all fellow-workers in India to eschew "provincialism." It might not unfairly expose us to a suspicion of that weakness were we to forego the high pleasure of speeding on his way Sir Donald Macleod, "the father of the Indian Civil Service." As it happens, we are a little tardy with our tribute of homage; but, though for more than twenty years Sir Donald has been denizen of a province a thousand miles distant from this modern gateway of India, his public character and long proved political and civic virtues are prized in Bombay as part of that heritage of noble, inspiring example, uniting what is best of old and new through all the land, which will, if sincerely accepted, serve to carry the Indian Services and people safely through all the difficulties incident to this transition period of our history. The speech of the departing ruler of Lahore has a deep retrospective interest, which can only be appreciated to the full by men like Lord Napier and other of his comrades in the early "forties," many of whom at home will read between and far beyond the suggestive lines of the Viceroy's narration and Sir Donald's full-hearted response. He is one of the few remaining links left to us between the bustling, perhaps over-confident, present, and that older time of anxiety and struggle which soon we shall be able to realise only by careful study of the historian's page. But it is of his personal character we were speaking, as that of a type of Indian officers which may soon become extinct under the pressure of modern customs and rapid communication with Europe. . . . . .

Napier of Magdala is not quite such an orator for a banquet as is the Napier of Merchistown; but the speech of the new Commander-in-Chief at Lahore was befitting the occasion, and admirably chimed in with the retrospective theme and the hopeful tone pervading those of Lord Mayo and Sir Donald Macleod. At some other time we may have occasion to remark on Lord Napier's sincere but palpably unsuccessful attempt to vindicate the new or "irregular" organisation of the Native Army. . . . . .

Having begun well, having studied the character of the people during his twelve years' political service in the Nerbudda Valley, having, through his association with that extraordinary man, Colonel Sleeman, become intimately acquainted with the thoughts and feelings of every caste and rank,

"———— he keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw."

He passed unscathed in spirit and heart through the great convulsion, his genial nature acquiring from that terrible experience only stronger faith in the might of goodness, and in the safety of political justice. In this faith he continues to the end, and sets it forth in the following passage—the latter portion of which, to twist the saying of a once-noted member for Cork, was doubtless "spoken in italics," as it so appears in the report: "Your Excellency has been pleased to give me credit for having laboured in the same sphere [employing the people in public duties], and it has certainly been my endeavour to do so, and I would earnestly urge upon all who may in future be connected with the administration of this province that my parting advice to them is *that they exert their energies to carry out the good work among a race so admirably fitted to appreciate their exertions.*" In this last remark may be discerned a clue to much of the success which has attended British rule in the land of the five rivers. . . . . .

More than in all those material causes, the root of that true and healthy popularity of British rule in the Punjab is to be found in the exercise of direct personal influence, which, from Sir Henry Lawrence—with, as Sir Donald remarked, "that generous tone and spirit which so eminently characterised his whole career,"—through Sir Robert Montgomery, and up to the latest hour of Sir Donald Macleod's sway in Lahore, has been brought to bear impartially on all the races of the Punjab. Knowing better than most around him the potency of this vital influence, Sir Donald might well express distrust of the possible estrangement and break of intercommunication that may result from the "complex systems" of law, of fiscal and municipal arrangements, and of revenue administration, which "time and progress" force us to adopt. But cannot there be an off-set to this tendency? We must have our subordinate judicial authorities taught to distinguish

between civil suits and criminal cases; but in aiming at this essential object it is surely not necessary to bewilder both magistracy and people with an endless complication of orders, rulings, and statutes, constantly amended. . . . . .

Those would take a very superficial estimate of Sir Donald Macleod's character and career who should attribute to mere benevolent feeling and amiability of disposition his unfaltering desire to teach and elevate the people of this country. His efforts in this direction are based on deep conviction, and are the result of varied and severely tested observation. In the following passage he rises to the level of those wise, far-seeing, and courageous politicians with whom his name will ever be associated:—

> I pride myself on being one of those who believe that no culture or training will ever raise a nation to real excellence, fitting it to take its place as a nation amongst the more advanced nations of the world, except that which results from their taking a goodly part in the management of their own affairs—(hear, hear)—without which I believe mere intellectual culture, valuable as it may be in its way, will never lead to *complete* success. I believe myself that the British Government has laboured under no greater disadvantages than in this: that the almost necessary tendency of our rule here has been to set the bulk of people more or less aside, not from any desire to do so, but from the great difference between their constitution, their ideas and feelings, and our own.

The first of these sentences, more especially, contains the open secret of our future success as rulers of British India; and our security, satisfaction, and prosperity are bound up with the frank avowal and sincere adoption of the policy embodied in these last words from the "father of the Indian Civil Service." There are signs just now that some of our leaders are hesitating as to making good the few forward steps that were taken, under Lord Cranborne and Sir Stafford Northcote, in that true path of Imperial policy indicated in the passage we have just quoted.—*May* 20, 1870.

RETROSPECTS OF THE GREAT REVOLT.

IT is more than five years since the publication of Mr. Kaye's first volume of the "Sepoy War." Though necessarily long delayed, the second volume will be cordially welcomed in India. Amidst the absorbing interest roused amongst us by the great European conflict, this book serves to remind those whose lot is cast in this country, that it is here their duty lies, and that India also is the scene of great deeds in camp and battle-field. And after *Punch's* "Nice Couple" in Europe shall have shed enough blood, Mr. Kaye's History will be at hand to describe for us in India, why and how the Great Revolt spread and was suppressed—and that, too, almost before succour had arrived from Europe. This volume is emphatically a history, and, as described by the author, is "a volume of fact, not of controversy and speculation." The former one did raise many questions, both of policy and as to the interpretation of events which, in Mr. Kaye's view, led up to the possibility of a general rising. It also dealt with, and, as we think, conclusively established, the proposition—to put it with some reserve—that the Sepoy War was the result of, far more than, a mere military mutiny. The present volume does, indeed, treat almost exclusively "of military revolt and its suppression." It deals with events more or less certain and familiar to all, and in this fresh narration of which all must feel that intensive and undistracted interest aroused by poignant personal regret, alternating with national pride and admiration of heroic deeds. It will in no wise limit the universal acceptability of this second volume that—as is also congenial to the author's manner—it is largely concerned with tracing the course and great results arising out of the career of notable men—some of whom had always been looked to as towers of strength in possible times of difficulty; others of whom the fierce heat of the time brought to sudden ripeness.

But Mr. Kaye—so far as we have yet had opportunity to examine this volume—never forgets that he is expected to write as an historian. In proof of his quality in this respect, we think the first chapter of this volume may be referred to with confidence. The second sentence of that chapter (which has reference to the first outbreak of the mutinous spirit, the particulars of which were given at the close of the first volume) is: "But the great fact was patent to Lord Canning that the English had been driven out of Delhi, and that, for a time, in that great centre of Mahomedanism, the dynasty of the Mogul family was restored." Within a few pages we have sketched—with a clearness

perhaps for this purpose attainable by no other writer but Mr. Kaye—the history of the Mogul dynasty and our relations towards it up to the time, when, simultaneously with the intrigues of the Queen Zemut Mahal to promote the succession of her son, the proposals (mainly supported by the Board of Control) to withdraw the kingly dignity from the great Mogul after the death of Behandur Shah, had fairly taken form. Some review of that kind was needed in order to show "the tremendous political significance of the revolution" spoken of in the sentence we have quoted. It is in describing the discussion on this great question of political policy that we see exercised Mr. Kaye's clear perception of the relative weight of arguments, and the judgment of those recording them, as also his impartiality as an historian. Those who may have regarded him as holding a brief against Lord Dalhousie, should observe the exceeding fairness and high appreciation with which his Lordship is dealt with in connection with that then difficult problem. This chapter brings us to the posting of the so-called Persian proclamation in the Jumma Musjid at Delhi. . . . In the third chapter of the volume the interest deepens in intensity as Delhi becomes the scene. We see the Meerut mutineers received with welcome; the defence of the Main Guard and the Cashmere Gate; how gallantly Willoughby and his eight comrades defended the magazine, and blew it up over their own heads; then comes the flight of the English from the Delhi cantonment; the sacking of the *Delhi Gazette* and the Delhi Bank; and finally, the slaughter of the European prisoners—the first of the wholesale murders—in cold blood by pagan hands, which these volumes have to record. This volume necessarily travels over those paths of the great Mutiny story which have been most trodden by every writer on the subject. The difficulty of selection and rejection must have been most perplexing to the author: yet we think, if this be duly borne in mind, it will be admitted that Mr. Kaye has attained that which is, in these days, more than ever, "the last, the greatest art—the art to blot."—*Aug.* 30, 1870.

II.—We have at last the pleasure to give full public welcome to Mr. Kaye's second volume of his "History of the Sepoy War," and we trust that, although somewhat tardy, our recognition of the great value of the work will not be ungrateful, either to the author or to those who have been, or are likely to be, his readers. The story of the great rebellion, however told, must always possess an intense charm. No Englishman who reads the stirring narrative, so full of sadness and glory, of cruelty and courage, of despondency and triumph, of malignant passion and cool heroism, of the crumpling up and rebuilding of an Empire, can help feeling his pulses throb and his heart beat quicker as he reads. Nor, in the midst of his vexation at the astounding political blindness of some of the actors of his own race in this exciting drama, at the wilful and almost sublime stolidity of others, at the imbecility of a few, and the remorseless, retributive savagery of many, can he pause and reflect upon the conduct of his countrymen and countrywomen, as a whole, without experiencing an emotion of pride, and thanking God that, though it pleased Him for a while to cover us with tribulation, out of that tribulation came deeds of devotion, gallantry, and vir ue which have shed everlasting lustre on the British name. The deeds speak for themselves. They require no setting of eloquence. The events which startled Europe in the summer of 1857 were all so pregnant with painful interest, so grand in their dire purport, that their barest recital must fascinate. When we say that this portion of Mr. Kaye's History, treating as it does of some of the most tragic and appalling episodes of our Indian days of terror, is written with considerable command of language and graphic power, in a style generally simple and perspicuous, marked here and there with passages of great pathos and solemnity, or bursts of enthusiasm, we say enough, we imagine, to imply that the subject has, in a literary point of view, been effectively handled, and that the book must be, even to those who do not care to probe below the suface of what it records, a most alluring volume. . . . . .

We have thus two distinct clusters of incidents—each with its crowning denouement. The one with its main current of action trending downwards from Peshawar to Delhi, its scene being the Punjab and the north of Oude, its chief actors Sir John Lawrence, Montgomery, Herbert Edwardes, Cotton, Neville Chamberlain, Nicholson, Corbett, Daly, Anson, Barnard. and Wilson; the other, the tide of relief flowing upwards from Calcutta by the Ganges to Cawnpore, and the heart of Oude, with its source in Lord Canning, and such names as Neill, Havelock, Carr, Tucker, Ponsonby, Gubbins, Olpherts, and Moore, with the martyrs of Cawnpore, to make its course illustrious.

With the assistance of a map, one can readily recognise the geographical individuality of these two groupings, and the mind, by studying each of them in turn, will have no difficulty in taking in the whole situation.

Mr. Kaye, in the volume now before us, adopts this mode of dealing with his subject, and traces the history of the rebellion, from the outbreak at Meerut in May, to the general position at the latter end of August, carrying the narrative, step by step, along the two distinct chains of episodes, to which we have referred. . . . In 1837, Behandur Shah, the King, under whose auspices the mutiny assumed the proportions of an attempt to resuscitate the faded supremacy of the Moguls, ascended the throne. Mr. Kaye describes him as "a quiet, inert man, fond of poetry—a poetaster himself—and not at all addicted by nature to political intrigue." But, unfortunately, he had a young wife, named Zeemut Mehal, who apparently could not exist without indulging in that dangerous pastime. This Queen had borne him a son, a child of his old age, and the desire of her heart was that this son, Jewan Bukht, should be recognised as heir to the throne, instead of the lawful heir-apparent, Prince Dara Bukht. In 1849, the latter died, and the succession legally fell to the next heir, Prince Fakir-odd-deen. Lord Dalhousie thought that he saw at this juncture a suitable opportunity for extinguishing the titular dignity of the Kings of Delhi, a measure which had been some time under discussion. He believed that the perpetuation of this mock sovereignty was a mischievous farce, and he thought that it would be easy and politic to wring from Fakir-odd-deen a renunciation of the kingly privileges of his ancestors as the prize of his recognition as successor of Behandur Shah by the British Government. The Governor-General's views were laid before the Court of Directors, and, after many severe conflicts of opinion, he won the day. Fakir-odd-deen was to be acknowledged as heir to the throne, on the proviso that he was to succeed to a princely instead of a kingly title, and that the humbled family should be removed from the old palace of Delhi to a residence in the Kootab. The King all this time protested against the nomination of Fakir-odd-deen, and pleaded for the boy, Jewan Bukht. Suddenly, in 1856, the obnoxious heir-apparent died, and there were strong suspicions that his death was not due to natural causes. Immediately Queen Zeemut Mehal's intrigues were redoubled, and another urgent application was made for the recognition of her son as successor. But again she was doomed to disappointment. Lord Canning was now Governor-General, and the claims of one of the surviving Royal Princes, Prince Mirza Korash, were preferred by him to those of the boy. The former was duly recognised as heir, on the conditions already prescribed. Thus had the house of Timour fallen to very low estate. Little by little its pretensions, or its legitimate privileges, as the scions of that house regarded them, had been curtailed. The practice of offering *nuzzurs* to its head by the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief had been abolished. The Delhi coinage had been suppressed, and the Company's rupee made the current coin of the realm; all symbols of vassalage on the part even of native chiefs had been prohibited; and now the finishing stroke was to be inflicted, in the abolition of regal title, and the removal of the family from Delhi. We confess that we cannot go quite hand-in-hand with Mr. Kaye in his views with regard either to the morality or the expediency of the course pursued by the British Government in these dealings with the Kings of Delhi. The *nuzzur* practice was doubtless objectionable, and, as a money compensation on a liberal scale was given, there could be no solid grievance attaching to its cessation. But the policy of pulling down the last symbols of sovereignty, cherished as they were by the Royal family, and bound up with Mahomedan tradition, was decidedly questionable. . . . . .

From the hour that it was known that the successor of Behandur Shah had surrendered what was looked upon as the birthright of the Kings of Delhi, the lamentations in the palace were loud. The Queen inveighed bitterly against this last indignity, and forthwith, ntrigue began to be busily hatched again. From certain evidence, which was produced at the King's trial in 1858, it is pretty clear that about the time when Sir Thomas Metcalfe conveyed to Prince Fakir-odd-deen the views of the British Government with regard to the conditions of his succession, great disgust was expressed thereat by the Royal adherents; communications of a mysterious nature commenced to pass between the Courts of Delhi and Persia; and an emissary, named Sidi Kambar, actually went on a mission from the former to the latter, soliciting the countenance, if not the military aid, of the Shah. Later on, when a harder bargain still was driven with Mirza Korash, and the distrust and resentment in the palace waxed hotter, intrigue came outside, and worked sedulously

in the streets and bazaars of Delhi. All over the city, the Mahomedans began to talk of something coming, and an indefinable uneasiness exhibited itself. . . . . —*Nov.* 3, 1870.

RAJAH OF KOLAPORE:

DIED AT FLORENCE.

THERE is mourning throughout Maharashtra, and in commercial Bombay there is much sorrow, for the untimely death, whilst on his way home through Italy, of the most promising young Prince in Western India. No information has yet been received as to the cause of this sudden decease. Letters dated six weeks since have been received from him, written while in excellent health and spirits. It is just over four years since, at Sir Bartle Frere's farewell Durbar with the Sirdars of the Deccan, that the young Rajah of Kolapore was invested with the *kilhat* of State, and took his seat on the right hand of His Excellency as the premier Sirdar and representative of Sivajee, the head of the Mahratta Confederacy. On that occasion Sir Bartle, in his admirable address, caught the spirit of the political and historical associations of the scene, using them with much felicity in urging the Chiefs to persevere in that course of good government and practical improvement which he gave them credit for having fairly entered upon. While little further progress could be hoped for from the elder generation he was addressing, there was good reason to believe that the seed might find good soil amongst their sons or nephews, and especially in the mind of the young Chief at his side. We will quote one passage from that address, which shows how the speaker used the Past as foundation for the New order to which the Old should give place: "You have an immense advantage over the upper classes in many other parts of India, in that you belong to the same race as the mass of your people, and that no impassable barrier separates you from the great body of those whom you rule and influence. You have a national history, and national as well as family traditions of ancient achievements. You have a copious and flexible language spoken alike by prince and peasant, and capable of any amount of improvement to adapt it to the wants of a civilised people." While the genuine national spirit permeating this address has never been lost sight of in the training of the young Rajah of Kolapore, due pains have been taken to assimilate thereto all Western culture that could be suitably imparted to him without anything like forcing his intellectual growth. So long since as 1866, we believe, the young Chief's tuition had commenced under the guidance of Captain W. West, latterly assisted by an able Parsee graduate. That officer has been his constant companion ever since, has attended him during his journey to England and tour in Scotland, and we expect to hear that he was with him at Florence when in that fair city the unexpected stroke of death overtook the travelled Rajah.

There are many special reasons why, on broad public grounds, this early removal of the Kolapore Rajah is to be deplored. Since the suppression of the revolt which took place about twenty years since in that State—at the close of which the forts were dismantled, and the native forces disbanded—the province has had constant repose, only temporarily broken during the Mutiny, and its prosperity has been progressive. The last Rajah died in 1865, and since that period the State has been administered with success by Colonel G. S. W. Anderson, the Resident. The State is out of debt, and its revenues are increasing. This position of affairs offered a most favourable field for testing the administrative abilities of a native prince, after his having received a varied and suitable training. Great things may be done for a while in a Native State by an efficient British officer, especially when coming after a period of misrule; but, at best, the system of administration is uncertain, costly, and artificial. If our work in this country is to stand, it must be by striking its roots into the soil, by its best lessons permeating the minds of the Mofussil populations; and this it can only do through their natural chiefs and kindred leaders. Everything gave promise that the young Rajah of Kolapore would do much to acclimatise in the Deccan the teaching of British administration and the lessons of Western culture. His career could scarcely have failed to embody the general principles so skilfully suggested in Sir Bartle Frere's valedictory address, from which we quoted above.

What is likely to be done in the important and critical affair of settling the succession, we are unable to surmise. The Rajah had two wives (one only betrothed), and had a

daughter born to him who died while quite an infant." The wife first betrothed is the daughter of the Nimbalkur, Chief of Phultan, and she is said to be fairly educated for her years, and of very pleasing manners. She is younger than the wife since married, who is daughter of the Jaghirdar Senaputtee. According to "Hindoo law and custom," the first espoused Ranee has all the right and duties of a full wife, and in her hands lies the power of adoption. This she can do; but both for her and the wife of somewhat riper years there remains only the prospect of life-long widowhood and seclusion. The law of succession being thus clear, the only difficulty will be in deciding on the selection of a suitable boy as heir. The former heir-presumptive, Chimma Sahib, died about a year since, while still under detention at Kurrachee; but we are not sure that a successor may not be found more nearly related to the deceased Chief than the two old Mahratta houses of Sattara and the dispossessed Nagpore Bhonslas. And it is to be feared that the local jealousies in Kolapore State against the other lines of Sivajee are so strong as to discourage a selection in that quarter, if the authorities concerned desired to look in that direction.

The area of the Kolapore territory—which formerly extended to the coast north of Vingorla—is over 3,000 square miles, and the population about three quarters of a million. The revenues are over ten lakhs, but of those fully four belong to the Jaghirdars within the boundaries of or adjoining the State.—*Dec.* 2, 1870.

A VETERAN POLITICAL.

ANOTHER of our veterans, Brigadier-General Lynch, K.L.S., leaves India to-morrow, for at least a time, possibly altogether. General Lynch's varied and invaluable se vices extend over a period of forty-four years. These services have been rendered not in India alone, but in all parts of Asia. He entered the service in February, 1827, and in 1829 we find him marching in command of a detachment of his regiment—the gallant 16th Native Infantry—at a few hours' notice, from Baroda, to repel an expected attack of Bheels on the Treasury at Kaira. A severe Guzerat fever drove him home in 1831; and we next trace him in October, 1833, riding with despatches, for the Ambassador at the Court of Persia, from Constantinople to Tabreez, a distance of fifteen hundred miles, which journey he performed in fifteen days—a feat equal to Sir F. Bond Head's rough ride across the Pampas. Shortly after his arrival in Persia, Futtee Alee Shah (the King) died, and the young officer was just in time to take a part in the war of that period. For his services with the Army under the command of Sir H. Bethune, he received the Order of the Lion and Sun, and was mentioned very favourably by the Ambassador, Sir John Campbell, in his despatches to the Government of India. The war over, General Lynch was sent with despatches to India, but he shortly returned to Persia, where he remained till his services were required in aid of Sir William Macnaghten, at the Court of Cabul. He was appointed Political Agent in the Ghilzie country, but when troubles broke out there, finding that Sir William would not listen to the advice of those who knew the feeling of the country, he struggled hard as long as he could in a bad cause, and then resigned his appointment and returned to England. Before doing so, like a true political of the old school, he warned the Government of India, in a long minute, which afterwards appeared in the *Bombay Times*, of April 23, 1842. Of this Dr. Buist, the Editor, wrote: "We have from time to time referred to the warnings given to the Envoy and the Government by Sir Alexander Burnes, and promised that, by-and-bye, we should lay before our readers documents on this subject, adequate to satisfy the most sceptical and fastidious. We see no reason why we should postpone the publication of Major Lynch's papers, proving, as they do most satisfactorily, that there were other lights than those supplied by Sir Alexander Burnes placed before the Envoy, adequate to show the dangers surrounding him, of which he most unhappily failed to avail himself." It is not too much to say that had General Lynch's advice, with that of other officers, been taken at the time, the dreadful Cabul disasters might never have taken place.

We are glad also to have this opportunity of thanking General Lynch for various valuable contributions in times past, both to our editorial and correspondence columns. Up to a comparatively recent period, the gallant officer has occasionally contributed to this journal, more especially on political topics; for Lynch was a political of the days when there were giants in the land. But when the term "recent" is used, it must be

remembered, as stated above, that General Lynch has seen service in India during a period of nearly half-a-dozen administration generations—those *lustrums* of which the *Pall Mall Gazette* speaks. In the early part of 1867 we republished the minute General Lynch wrote concerning the affairs of Ghilzie and Candahar in 1839, which is an important contribution to the right understanding of that episode of political blunders and heroism—the invasion of Afghanistan. General Lynch leaves behind him many a true friend, and carries away many a pleasant reminiscence of duty done under most trying circumstances. —*April* 21, 1871.

ONE OF THE UNCOVENANTED.

IT is written—"The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor, again, the head to the feet, I have no need of you!" This natural simile serves well to illustrate the mutual dependence and inseparable relationship between the different branches of the Indian Services. Amidst all our changes and new-fangled organisations, this sense of mutual inter-dependence is never lost sight of, and there is always, though tacitly held, a strong conviction that the bond is indispensable. It will be an ill day for India when this feeling of *solidarité* becomes weakened. We have often had to take note of the departure of veterans of the camp and council-chamber, then again of Covenanted Civilians, who may have moulded the administrative policy of a generation, and wielded, during a decade, that strangely potent force—executive power in India. We have now to record a few notes on the career of one who, in the ranks of the great "Uncovenanted" Service, has performed a long series of exceedingly important duties. We allude to Mr. R. H. Showell, who, at this the last day of the month, retires as Second Magistrate of Police for the town and island of Bombay. Seldom have those who have worked through the regular grades of this irregular and always subordinate branch of the services, attained to so prominent and responsible a post as that just now vacated by Mr. Showell. His service commenced, we observe, in May, 1834, continuing in "non-gazetted appointments" until January, 1848; and, subsequently, in posts to which he has been "gazetted" up to the present time—a total period of rather more than thirty-seven years, during which he has had less than two years' leave to England. In looking back through the vista of European affairs, we all feel that a very wide span separates us from that period. On the surface of history the changes in Western India have perhaps been fewer in that time than in most European countries; but beneath the surface and in nearly everything that concerns the steady under-current of administration, the transformation in methods of work, manner of doing business—in a word, the style of manipulation in the art of government—has been as complete as it well could be in any Asiatic State. Within that period our admirable land revenue system has been introduced, English education has sent its threads of Western influence through the more apt and aspiring castes of the people, the Codes have superseded, or complemented, the excellently drawn old "Regulations," not always with advantage; and in countless ways, fully appreciable only by our most experienced administrators, our attitude towards the people and theirs towards us has been subject to unsettlement and changes on every hand.

An officer in Mr. Showell's position has had the best opportunity to trace the course of these changes in detail. He has watched how the people took them; he must know better than many of his superiors what the brown men think about the doings of that well-meaning, but very strange and very powerful *Sirkar* which has done so much in the Deccan, Konkan, and Guzerat since 1834. . . . . .

In reviewing so lengthy a career, it is impossible for us to trace the retiring Police Magistrate through nearly all the different services he has performed. It has been his lot to stop many gaps; and, as is often the fate or fortune of the ever-present and ever-serviceable Uncovenanted, he has had his share of knocking from pillar to post; but his ready adaptability and willingness to make the best of things have aided his solid qualities in keeping him well to the front. He has three times acted as Collector of Bombay; was Commissioner and Collector of Income Tax, whilst carrying on three or four other minor services in 1860; was President of the Bombay Municipality, when he drew an exhaustive report on the city finances of that period; his valuable services as Secretary to the 1863-64 Commission on Prices and cost of living in Bombay Presidency, we

have recently referred to; he was also Secretary to that terrible revolutionary body, the Rampart Removal Commission in 1863. He has also been a Cotton Frauds Inspector and a Railway Magistrate; in fact, we find it difficult to name any branch of civil service to which Mr. Showell has not put his hand—though we believe he has been kept outside the P.W.D., an exclusion which may or may not have been to the public advantage. His recent work on the Magistrate's Bench in Bombay is known of all men and open to their criticism. This Uncovenanted Servant of Government has not been left without recognition and reward, though, compared with many retiring prizes and honorary distinctions, his seem small, when his long, arduous, and effective services are fairly considered.

In thus recalling to mind Mr. Showell's long and varied services we have not only had his own career in view, but have written partly in the hope of inducing a better appreciation of that large class of Indian State servants to whom very few prizes pertain, whose rules of furlough and pension (so far as Europeans are concerned) are not such as to inspire zealous effort, though a very large proportion of public business must pass through their hands, and in their fidelity much trust must be reposed. It is true there is one great difference between the modern aspirants to the Uncovenanted Service, and men like Mr. Showell: he had to carve out his career from the rough, and he began on the lowest rung of the ladder; whereas the new comers expect to begin where he left off.—*Sept.* 30, 1871.

ASSASSINATION OF LORD MAYO.

LONG before these lines reach our readers, the astounding and distressing tidings which it is now our lot to record will have penetrated wherever our broad sheet is read. The ghastly story is soon told—the genial, warm-hearted chief ruler, fresh from his pleasant trip to Burmah, where high political duty had called him, visits the most miserable corner of this Empire, anxious to ameliorate the deplorable condition of its denizens, who of late have seemed to find "beneath the lowest depth a lower deep" of wickedness and wretchedness—when one of them steps forward, and, with swift stroke from murderous knife, strikes down the representative of Her Majesty, who dies shortly afterwards. His Excellency was on the pier at Port Blair, just about to return on board H.M.S. *Glasgow*, when a convict broke through the guards, and, as we have said, stabbed him to death almost on the spot.

There is nothing to mitigate the grievousness, and, so far as we can see, the needlessness, of this great political calamity. Again, as in the case of the Chief Justice, the public will indignantly demand, why were not common precautions used? The question is too common-place to be asked when a moment's consideration is given to what any gaoler knows of convict nature.

When regard is had to the place and circumstances of this great crime, it will be seen to have little, if any, political significance in its motive. What the political effects of this startling crime may be, it is not so easy to say; though it is well to be forewarned of the tendencies which it will influence. Whatever there is that is stern and unsympathetic in the ruling race will, insensibly, acquire a harsher tone and a more antagonistic spirit. What there may be of malignancy and hate in the hearts of the few disaffected will be stimulated into malevolent restlessness. But, perhaps, following some inscrutable tide in human affairs, this foul deed—the cruel murder of a man who ever had at heart the good of India's millions—may evoke a revulsion of loyalty and right feeling.

According to the settled order, Lord Napier of Merchistoun will act as Governor-General until further orders; and thus Madras, a second time within recent years, sends its Governor to wield supreme power at Calcutta—the last instance being that of Sir William Denison, who took up the post on the death of Lord Elgin.—*Feb.* 13, 1872.

II.—From the telegraphic news distributed here in "extras" early yesterday, the public learned nearly all that we can wish to know concerning the foul deed which has sent a tremor of grief and indignation not only throughout India, but all the British Empire. It may be said that His Excellency Earl Mayo has fallen a victim to his zeal in performing an unpleasant public duty. Port Blair had been thoroughly inspected; the day's work had been fairly done; but there remained an hour more of daylight, and his Lordship thought it well to spend the time in visiting another corner of the settlement, a place called Hope Town, and there the catastrophe occurred. Our implied censure of yesterday, on the local authorities and Viceregal staff, was not, it would seem, quite deserved. Due precautions had been taken to secure His Excellency's safety while moving about in that cage of unclean birds; but the shades of night had begun to fall ere the Viceroy and party got clear of Hope Town, and in the partial obscurity the assassin found his opportunity. . . . . .

Now we have to deal with the event: what is its complexion—is it a symptom of any general malady in the body politic? It is a great relief to find that the miscreant is not a native of India. It is a further satisfaction to find he is *not* one of the mutineers, and that, so far as can be now divined, there was not the slightest trace of political animus prompting to the crime. Fanaticism there might be—the homicidal impulse blended with some vague notion of doing a meritorious action as a means of escape from a miserable life. Against a baleful passion like this, the wisest laws and most beneficent ordinances can do nothing, except by continuous all-pervading influences extending over many generations. This peril is not peculiar to India. European nations are not exempt from it; and we must take our account for that danger, much the same as for the deeds of pure lunacy, accident, or elemental disasters. No other event of the kind since the assassination of President Lincoln has produced such a profound sensation as must be caused by the death of Earl Mayo. That was purely a political event—"the assassination wheel in the machinery of revolution had long been wound up"—but, as we have said, this murder seems conspicuous for the absence of political motive or purpose in connection with it.

In turning to estimate the loss that India has sustained in the untimely death of the Viceroy, we do not wish to forget that we were amongst those who severely criticised Mr. Disraeli's choice of Lord Lawrence's successor. We thought that several abler men might have been found, and we still think that Lord Mayo would never have stepped into the ranks of great statesmen. But when we recall his modest plea at Cockermouth, in taking leave of his constituency, that "he never thought his countrymen would condemn a man untried;" when we run over in retrospect his three years' work in this country, from the Umballa durbar to the brief but emphatic Rangoon speech, and the special service of thankless duty in which he perished; and when we note Mr. Disraeli's sober testimony, uttered on Monday night, that "the country has lost an inestimable servant," we accept it in all the fulness of the words, and could almost wish that some of our three-year-old criticisms were blotted out. Perhaps we can do better without great statesmen in India. The last we had well-nigh ruined the Empire. Lord Mayo, affecting no grandeur in manner, bore his high office with mingled ease and dignity, and it was this which made such a great success of the meeting with the Afghan Ameer immediately after his arrival. Trained in the habit of deference to colleagues, he at once fell into the grooves of the Executive Council work, and readily appreciated the judgment of men whose minds had ripened in grappling with the practical work of Indian administration—albeit so different from the Parliamentary system under which he had to work as Chief Secretary. Yet he retained his independence, ever and again vindicating his individual perception of the relative rate proper to be attached to the different courses open to him and his colleagues. We have had to raise our objections to the mischievous fiscal policy which his Finance Minister was permitted to carry out; but Lord Mayo deserves high credit for having so early recognised the primary importance of a sound financial condition, and for his resolute determination to check waste and lavish expenditure. It was this principle which led him to persevere so firmly in the path of economical railway construction in which the Government of India was about to enter when His Excellency arrived in this country.

We must remember that Lord Mayo's career as Governor-General has been cut short in the midst. From his disposition and manner of regarding public questions, it is very

plain that he would have done much to curb that tendency to restlessness and ever-recurring revision which, during the last few years, has been the foible and snare of the Indian Government in legislative and judicial procedure, military and civil administration, public works, and fiscal experiments. He was just the man to hasten slowly, and appreciate the good sense of letting alone where possible. His frequent tours, and his desire whenever practicable to "see for himself," were fast confirming him in the conviction that Indian administrators do not need new tools or increased powers of any kind, half so much as they require to be prompted to more zeal, industry, and discretion in utilising the facilities they already possess, and which, by dint of more active sympathy with the people around them, would be extended a hundredfold. His recent voyage exemplifies the characteristic we have just referred to; though men in whose judgment we cherish great confidence have spoken dubiously as to the value of "these flying visits." The very day we write, His Excellency was to have landed in Orissa, and no one can doubt that province needed to be seen with fresh eyes. . . . It is not intimated which vessel would bring back the widowed Countess, but no one can forget that she and the other ladies who just now made Rangoon so unwontedly gay, were waiting on the deck in the twilight of Friday last, and watching for the boats bringing off the Viceroy and his Staff. It is probable that they would perceive that some commotion had occurred; and amidst all our grief and excitement in Bombay, we can but faintly estimate the horror with which the grim truth would be whispered on board the *Glasgow*.

As for more particularly characterising the personal qualities of the murdered ruler, we cannot do better than adopt the terms used yesterday so feelingly by the Senior Judge on the Appellate Side of our High Court: "He whom we welcomed in this city but three years ago—he who by his noble and manly bearing, by his kind and genial manner, captivated those who had the good fortune to meet him— is no more. He who most earnestly sought and truly laboured for the good of the people of this Empire has fallen by the hand of the assassin."

It is too early to discuss the question of a successor; but the names of the two Napiers occur to the minds of all of us—the one being marked out by prescriptive claim and grace of manner, the other by almost universal desire in the hearts of all classes amongst the Indian populations.—*Feb.* 14, 1872.

III.—The story of the Viceroy's murder, and the circumstances immediately preceding that dire event, are related by the correspondent of the *Pioneer* with a simplicity and distinctness that leave scarcely anything to be desired. Though the narrative is sent to that journal only by telegraph, it is full enough to settle all our surmises concerning the history of His Excellency's last act of public duty and the catastrophe which followed thereon. The story induces, for the moment, something approaching to an awful sense of the inevitable, as if we also must interpret the event by the blank maxims of the fatalist. . . . . .

No precautions that are practicable or endurable will avail to protect our rulers against perils like this: so they must be faced. The question, as yet inscrutable, is, why does this dream of assassination arise—and how is this murderous purpose cherished? Its existence is intelligible; but we hold very few of the links that connect the inception and the crime—a crime that defies all terrors either of this world or the next. Why do our administrators know so little of this horrid malady of the body politic? Have Indian officers of every service lost those apprehensive and keenly perceptive faculties which in the political, the scholar, or the medical man of the last official generation were in every province available for the special service of the State? After all our educational efforts, municipal and judicial reforms, and professions of desire to associate the people with us in the walks of responsible administration, is it really the case that we are now removed further from them—that there is a greater gulf than in former times between the rulers and the ruled? For our part, we do not think these queries should be answered in the affirmative; but they are borne in upon our thoughts at this time.

In one telegram received by a contemporary yesterday, it is stated that the murderer avows himself a clansman of Abdool, the assassin of Justice Norman; and, it is implied, that he only performed the traditional obligation of his tribe in taking signal revenge for the death of his clansman. There is nothing improbable in this; but it is just such a story as would be likely to rise to the lip of rumour amidst the hundred surmises that are

afloat. And even this theory, it must be noted, does not lend itself as evidence of any general deep-seated political incitement.

The details as to the personal incidents of the tragedy, as told by the *Pioneer's* correspondent, are of the deepest interest. Lord Mayo's last words, "They've hit me, Burne," is the simple, natural exclamation of a man prepared for any emergency, and entwined within whose character were heroic fibres suitable for great occasions should such have arisen. The testimony to Lady Mayo's noble bearing on board the *Glasgow* in that hour of crushing dismay and overpowering grief, is prizable as proving the high character of the race which holds the destinies of India. One or two of our native contemporaries have expressed the fear—not unnatural from their point of view—that this second murder in the ranks of our chief rulers, during a few months, will deter men of high position at home from accepting office in India. Quite otherwise, we think, will be the effect. The sense of public duty, and the relish which courageous spirits feel in confronting personal risk, will combine with more practical considerations to render high positions in India more alluring to well-bred men of strong intellectual character. How poor and tame compared with the Indian career of Lord Mayo are all but the very highest achievements of politicians at home! India and its vast interests will acquire fresh attraction to noble minds from this mournful incident.—*Feb.* 16, 1872.

IV.—Now that we know all about the incidents immediately connected with the catastrophe at the Andamans, inquiry will be busy and conjecture set free to trace out the motives which impelled the murderer's arm. The Indian press throughout may, we think, be commended for the tolerable firmness with which it has held its judgment in abeyance in respect of this alluring theme of deepest interest. To many minds the act is sufficiently accounted for by the now well-established homicidal tendencies of this blood-thirsty Khyberee. Men who are satisfied that the ingrained crave to kill would be adequate to impel this wretch to sacrifice his own life, and that the unwonted presence of a high official from the outer world only gave the slight incitement needed, will demand some tangible evidence before they can regard the act as the result either of theological fanaticism or political hate. If it were proved that the convict had heard of the murder of Justice Norman by Abdoola, and that Shere Ali recognised him as his clansman, the act need only be regarded as an extreme instance of the malignant custom of tribal vengeance. . . . . .

The most plausible of the theories which seek to trace this dire event to general political causes is that which may be thus stated—the numerous changes of late years in official organisation have unsettled the minds of the masses, and the change in our administrative *personnel*, during the same period, has been of a nature not calculated to soften the asperities arising from those changes: during the same period "fiscal science" of a sort has made such "progress," that the most ignorant villager feels the touch of the tax-gatherer; and the tedious, costly methods of our judicial system, though a source of profit to some classes, press heavily on the people generally. Thus, from a variety of causes, a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction has been spread abroad, which, as it were, emits an atmosphere in which murderous thoughts are bred, inciting a malevolent creature here and there to desperate deeds. We must confess that this theory, though worthy of consideration, seems to us quite insufficient to fit the circumstances of the event before us.

There is another political theory which does fit; being, indeed, made strictly for the purpose. It is assumed, to begin with, that there is lurking somewhere beneath the surface of one large section of the Indian population a compact and consecutive conspiracy, having for settled aim—whether of theologic and political hate, or wild revolutionary scheme—the notion of striking terror into the hearts of the ruling race; and thus, it is hinted, these savage assassins are but the tools of cooler and more Satanic villains. We have already scouted the idea of any such result arising from the attempts of the assassin and the plotter—that British Viceroys, or the men of whom they are made, can be moved by fear; but it is scarcely needful to take the possibility into court for a moment. This theory of calculated terrorism, which, as we have said, is made to fit the event so exactly, remains as yet under the essential disadvantage of having no facts to support it. Not a tittle of tangible evidence has yet been produced to show that either Abdool or the wretched convict at the Andamans was incited by any secret conclave. We do not affirm this is

either impossible or violently improbable; but we do say it would be as unwise as mischievous to treat what is a notion of pure assumption as if it were a fact half proved already.—*Feb.* 17, 1872.

V.—The "extra" we circulated early yesterday would apprise our readers that the last act of the tragedy at Port Blair has been performed. According to the rule of life for life, Shere Ali, the convict, has been put to death, not because he committed a high political crime, and plunged a whole realm into mourning and indignation, but because he was guilty of wilful murder. So far as appears from the brief telegram about the execution, the penalty of the law—a law equally efficacious for the protection of the poorest coolie in the land—has been inflicted without the slightest trace of passion, or any sign that the British Government could be moved to revenge, or seduced, even by this tremendous provocation, to depart from its settled ordinances, or stoop to borrow some special terrorism from the superstitions of the ignorant masses. The vindictive Khyberee has been allowed to live just long enough for his trial to go through all its proper stages of inquest, formal arrangements, sentence, and confirmation; long enough for him to divulge any secrets he chose to tell, and also for close investigation into every circumstance that may recently have connected him with the outward world. The Government of India has, doubtless, been plied with numberless incentives to use pitiless devices for wringing some assumed secret from Shere Ali's inmost soul, also with still more cogent persuasives towards the infliction of some ineffaceable disgrace on the criminal or his corpse, which it is supposed would carry to the minds of incipient traitors and fanatics the stigma of everlasting defilement and eternal perdition. The eagerness with which suggestions of the kind to which we allude have been brought forward, whilst testifying to an unmistakably sincere zeal on the side of rightful authority, throws a weird light on the workings of the native mind. Let us trust that the calm, unimpassioned demeanour of the British Government, and of all the authorities concerned, in disposing of the assassin, will have its due effect on the mind of the people of India, showing them that—though an official here and there may occasionally forget himself, like the two in the Punjab in January—the majesty of English law is far above the tumult of passion and all the incitements of vindictiveness.

It is not necessary to deny the existence of a murderous plot against the late Viceroy; still less would we try to prove the negative, that "the murder of Justice Norman and the murder of Lord Mayo do not proceed from a common origin." What we say is, that monstrous as is the crime, it can be accounted for without the far-reaching, disturbing hypothesis of a fanatical or general political motive carried out by a subtilely concocted plot. The telegram now before us implies that Shere Ali (has apparently) confessed the crime was committed in revenge for what he deemed the injustice of his first conviction. Again the London Letter comes in very pertinently to carry on the argument. The writer remarks that "if he coveted the gallows, pure and simple, he need not have waited for the very improbable visit of a Governor-General to Port Blair." Certainly, not necessarily, for a Viceroy; probably Lord Mayo's visit was only just in time to save General Stewart's life; for Shere Ali's first revenge had so much method in it that "he had determined to murder some European of high rank."

As to the injustice which the embittered mind and malevolent heart of Shere Ali taught him he had suffered, we would refer our readers to the sketch of his biography given in our columns the other day. It will there be observed that when he was condemned to *kali pani*, the assessors "did not find Shere Ali guilty of murder." We would ask those who feel themselves capable of sitting in judgment on this strange, eventful history, to go back to that stage of it, and then ponder the fateful issues which then took their rise. There we must leave the mystery.—*March* 19, 1872.

AN ANGLO-INDIAN JOURNALIST—OF THE COLONIAL TYPE.

THE speech of last Thursday evening, delivered at the Esplanade Hotel, and duly reported in Saturday's papers, is one that must attract notice, and one which, when well looked into, cannot fail to evoke some criticism. From inclination we should have preferred to refrain from comment on an address that was mainly, and in the pleasantest

sense, a personal one. If we try briefly to indicate our points of divergence from some of Mr. Maclean's propositions, it is certainly from no wish to give countenance to the strange notion of his friend "on the other side of India," that Bombay papers "are always full of contention." Nor should we feel called upon in this instance to try to justify the speaker's excellent remark that "where there is agitation and movement, there is sure to be life, and vigorous life, and the outcome of all that is sure to be good, whatever mistakes may be made." This is not an occasion for agitation and combative debate. But his speech, which is now sent through the length and breadth of the land, is, in some sort, a political manifesto, the bearing and tendency of which it may be of some public service to consider.

It is avowedly a declaration and advocacy of a colonial policy, and comes little short of a proposal to transplant the British Constitution to India, together with the usages and rude independence of English public life, and all the immunities, with more than the chances and prizes which tempt the ambition and life-long struggles of our home politicians. Such a programme has an irresistible fascination for an assembly of Englishmen. Moreover, the experiment has answered fairly in Australasia, in South Africa, and in "the Dominion" on the St. Lawrence and the great Lakes, to say nothing of its transcendent success in the great federal Republic of the West. But, unluckily for the argument, though these illustrations are effective, the analogy is incomplete. In all those instances the course was clear. A colonial policy reckons nothing of aborigines; and in each of those cases the material to work with was as racy of its natal soil as the men of Kent, Yorkshire, or the Lothians, albeit with a freer dash of the invaluable Celtic element than has yet been allowed to come to the front in the conduct of public affairs in the United Kingdom. It is scarcely needful to ask, what have we in this country at all comparable to these elements and conditions? We must remember that the relative political importance of town and country, which at home, from our youth up, we have been accustomed to regard as immensely in favour of the former, is here in the opposite scale. It is true that in the great ports and presidency towns, where foreign commerce has its focus—and trade is becoming of more political moment every year—there is necessarily more of discussion, more outward manifestation of what we regard as the essentials of political life.

But no one can hope to comprehend the affairs of this vast and diversified empire of two hundred millions of souls who does not constantly look beyond the more obtrusive interests of the presidency towns, and strive to consider the far larger affairs and really more exigeant claims of the vast silent mofussil peoples on behalf of whom there are so few articulate and wholly trustworthy interpreters. . . . . .

Much of Mr. Maclean's criticism of bureaucracy was amusing enough, and the passages in which he asserted the natural and inalienable right of Englishmen to occupy the highest posts in the State to which their talents and energy entitle them, were very telling; but the ringing cheers with which these periods were received have passed away, and the question that will now be eagerly discussed by the Indian press, is—how much of that criticism is strictly applicable; and how, in this Indian constitution of things, can we hope to satisfy the British politician's claim to have all he can win in the strife of public work? There were cries of "Name, name," when Mr. Maclean drew the picture of the jolly Councillor of the olden time in his easy chair, and there would be little difficulty in identifying the honourable gentleman; but the speaker could scarcely be serious in reference to the present state of things when he added, "I say that is a fair description of, I will not say all of them, but of the way in which a Council so constituted and so cut off from publicity may be expected to do its duty." The misfortune and complaint of the present day is that our honourable Executives will not absorb their magnificent salaries in peace, but must needs be ever minuting and resolving in order to do something for their money. . . . When Mr. Maclean describes an effete, supercilious, and exclusive bureaucracy, and demands to have all this changed, he must be reminded that it *is* changed, and that the whole Service is in course of transformation. After Dr. Birdwood and other assailants of crammers and competition-wallas have done their worst, it is admitted that the young and rising Civilians are, as a class, eminently worthy representatives of the English people. The testimony of "W. G. P.," and some others who recently wrote on this subject in our columns, should be conclusive as regards the personal aspect of the question; while, as to the system itself, when certain obviously required reforms are introduced—when, for instance, the limit of age shall be again extended so as to admit university men—it may be said that the open Civil Service—free to every British subject who can obtain sufficient education—presents, with only a slightly different reading, a practical realisation of that ideal which Mr. Maclean thus

puts before him as if it were some dream of the future: "And what I should like always to aim at is this, that we should throw open the higher posts of the Government of this country to men of intelligence and position in India, and especially to those Englishmen who spend the best years of their lives in the country." . . . . . .

This skilful and interesting address, though tolerably complete and admirably fitted for its purpose, presents almost a blank in regard to, and in comparison with, the vast interests of the people of the country, by whom and for whom the imposing fabric of British Indian empire is maintained. The people were only referred to in a secondary sense, though in a tone kindly enough; but this was all strictly in keeping with the colonial idea, which, as we have pointed out, is the key-note of the whole speech. Of course the local native community are fully included in all Mr. Maclean's references to the long-pending municipal reform; and we join heartily with him in the firm trust that, under the hand of Sir Philip Wodehouse, Bombay will shortly be "a city in which the example of self-government will be shown to all India, and all nations will see what Englishmen can do in a country which is said to be a conquered one."—*July* 22, 1872.

II.—In course of his letter this week our friend, "J. M. M.," casually makes a confession of political faith. He says: "Now, speaking for myself, I am, in common with the majority of Englishmen, a Liberal by instinct and training;" such is the writer's own report. But the result of our examination of the specimen in question is, that it belongs to the order of Whig-Radical, in the proportion of about seven of the former to three of the latter. Sufficient of the declamatory and demagogic element to speak ill of dignities and denounce those who stand in its way; but, after all, leaving room for that exclusiveness, hauteur, and demand to rule in its own name and for its own sake, which has made the typical Whig so irritating an entity in our political system. . . . With regard to the people of India, the policy of this Whig-Radicalism, which is the real character of the politician in question, may be thus summed up: "Keep them down—make them pay; and, as to the Native States, sweep them clean away." If this is what comes of being nurtured on Liberalism, we can only say, "May we, and India, be delivered therefrom." *—*Aug.* 23, 1879.

III.—That was a skilfully written and, in many passages, graceful valedictory letter, addressed, on the last day of 1879, to the readers of the *Bombay Gazette* by its retiring editor and proprietor, Mr. J. M. Maclean. . . . As it happens, a certain rather pronounced personal demonstration, a few months ago, in one of the London Letters of "J. M. M.," caused us to essay that classification for which the "candid" critic we have named is at a loss.

It is not needful to quote that here [it is recorded above]: what we have now before us is the present retrospective confession of political faith; but we note, in passing, that the following item of the confession curiously corroborates one side of our former estimate of Mr. Macean's political character: "At least, my attacks have always been directed against men high in authority, and their aim has been to secure the public against abuses of power." But here is his own declaration, in brief, which we are bound to quote:—

> A steady supporter of English rule, I have nevertheless always striven to submit the conduct of English rulers in India to the judgment of an intelligent public opinion; and if my efforts have helped to raise the character of the Indian Press, to make it more independent, respected, and powerful than it was when I first came to this country, I have spent my time in India to some purpose.

Far be it from us to detract from this honourable boast; but there still remains the question, In what sense has this "steady support of English rule" been rendered, and what has been the tendency of these "attacks on men high in authority"? In suggesting an answer to this question we may note the mention made by the writer of the "faithful friendship" and "unvarying support" with which his journalistic career has been attended. Very gratifying, no doubt; but is not this popularity, so far as it has political significance, due in great measure to the circumstances that Mr. Maclean's views of "English rule" in and over India are those that pertain rather to colonial notions of the policy that should be followed in dealing with dependencies of the British Empire—views that are

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* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

always "popular" in the presidency towns of India and, more or less, with non-official Anglo-Indians everywhere? This view is to the effect that India should be administered, first of all, so as to subserve the profit, pride, and political prestige of the paramount Power; afterwards, if any funds, honours, or favours can be spared, let India and her people have what they can get, and be thankful. It is obvious that this principle of determining the relations between England and India, though always certain to be popular in most Anglo-Indian clubs and coteries, is, to say the least, somewhat one-sided. And, as we all know, this interpretation of "English rule" for India has led the *Bombay Gazette*, under its late editor's direction, to decry the evidence of the very adverse financial conditions under which India has to struggle; to deride and oppose the claim of its sons to some appreciable share in the responsibilities of executive administration; to resist the true Imperial policy, declared by Crown and Parliament, which seeks to maintain and develop the autonomy of the Native States of India as individualised, though still integral, portions of the Empire. This attitude goes well with the temper of restlessness and aggression beyond the frontier, which the *Gazette* has usually favoured, the bitter fruits of which India is now tasting, and will be sick from the effects thereof for a generation or two yet to come. This being our honest version of what should be "the judgment of an intelligent public opinion" on the political course of the retiring editor, the appeal—

"Ah! defend
Against your judgment, your departed friend,"

comes to us with somewhat testing cogency. But we do not shrink from the test; and, having thus expressed our own judgment, we are free to acknowledge, with the rest, that the perseverance with which Mr. Maclean has struggled with the difficulties that beset journalism in this country, the energy which he has displayed in the treatment of public questions, the literary skill and intellectual force with which he has conducted the *Bombay Gazette*, claim from us very high praise indeed, and this we cheerfully accord him.*—*Jan.* 3, 1880.

IV.—Seldom, if ever, has any public entertainment in Bombay gone off with such complete success as did the banquet given by the Byculla Club to Mr. J. M. Maclean last Monday evening. The learned Judge who presided was in his best gravely-humorous vein; His Excellency the Governor gave himself up unreservedly to the purpose of the gathering, and in his speech, just of the right length, was peculiarly apt and felicitous. Sir Richard's reference to his own approaching departure gave enhanced interest to the proceedings of the evening. He was, in this, as frank as could be expected under the circumstances; but, necessarily, he left much scope for varying surmises as to the future that must await a man of his skill, energy, and ambition. The speech of the evening by the departing guest was at once worthy and characteristic of the speaker. The theme being his "noble self," he was bound to do justice to that, by way of heartily acknowledging the unbought enthusiasm of his hosts; while, as a journalist and politician, his comprehensive review of public affairs in Anglo-India was full of interest and suggestiveness. Retrospect, humour, argument, sympathetic recognition of old friendships' claims, were all dexterously blended with a forward glance towards that "fame" which

"Is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise."

As every word of Mr. Maclean's speech will have been read and re-read in the daily papers' reports, and so many appreciative notices of it have already appeared, there is little scope for us to remark on any of its passages. Four weeks ago our estimate of the politician and journalist was recorded in these columns. . . . We are content to leave it to the few who care to go into the comparison, to consider how far this passage traverses, and how far the whole speech confirms our "distinctive note" of the speaker's place and influence in Anglo-Indian politics during these last eighteen years.* —*Jan.* 31, 1880.

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* These Extracts are from the *Bombay Review*.

A SCOTCH BARONET.

IN the report that we published of the Indian Budget debate, it might be observed that we allotted a somewhat larger space to the short speech of the member for Ayrshire than had been awarded to it by the London papers. We had met with a Scotch paper which gave the speech in full, and though Sir David Wedderburn's few remarks are dwarfed in presence of the "large utterance" of the member for Brighton, there is justification both on personal and general grounds for our quoting the baronet of Ayr in full, and for our thus again drawing attention to his remarks. Sir David is closely connected with Bombay. This, and not Albion, is his natal isle; his father having been a well-known Civilian of last generation, who for long held the post of Accountant-General under the pre-Trevelyan system of public book-keeping. General Wedderburn, killed at the storming of Broach in 1772, whose tomb may be seen on the hill unto this day, was a member of the same family. The brother of the Ayrshire member, as all men know, was Acting Political Secretary to the Bombay Government during the more important portion of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's reign; and, what is more to the purpose, Sir David himself "did" an Indian tour some years ago. As regards that tour, we may err because of local prejudice, but it seems to us quite possible to infer from a certain passage in his speech what was the direction taken by the Scotch baronet in his Indian journeys. In the bias which leads him to desire that the Governors of Bombay and Madras should be placed "on a similar footing with the Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal, the North-west Provinces, and the Punjab," we think fit to trace the influence of visual impressions on one whose direct knowledge of India was gained mainly in the valley of the Ganges and in Upper India. Still, the member of a family so intimately connected with Western and Southern India should have taken more thought on behalf of the historical associations which secure to Bombay and Madras a self-dependence bordering on autonomy—an administrative constitution and imperial relationship very different from that of the three or four satrapies north of the Vindhyas, which are over-shadowed by proximity to Supreme authority. That the member for Ayrshire does not acknowledge the full and, as we think, the due force of our local associations, may be taken as a proof of the conscientious care with which he has set himself to study the Indian problem. . . . . .

No doubt Sir David Wedderburn is fully aware of the terrible gap in our financial system caused by the injurious inequality which exempts Bengal and the territories adjacent thereto, on the south and west, from contributing their *pro rata* share to the Imperial treasury; but he must also know that though the State misses a proportion of its rightful dues—equal in amount at least to the whole Bengal revenue from opium—the masses of the helpless race that tills the soil are stripped of everything not absolutely needful for bare subsistence. The difference between the Bengal land revenue and the true rent is muddled away amongst perhaps a million or so of unproductive, litigious middlemen and idle rent-receivers; but all this belongs to the wheels within wheels of our diversified financial affairs, and we may be content to allow the member for Ayrshire more time before expecting him to dive into the intricacies of the great subject, which, as a member of the Select Committee, he has exceptional means of studying. In the few remarks on which we are commenting, he was, above all, bent on being practical—on suggesting how our ever-expanding expenditure can be curtailed without loss of power and efficiency.

This is an excellent object; but, as already intimated, we think he overshot the mark in aiming to cut down those very tall poppies, the Governors of Bombay and Madras. Some few thousands per annum might be retrenched from princely salaries and gubernatorial display, but a Governor, independent of all local influence and bearings, who, like Sir Philip Wodehouse, attends to his duty continuously and assiduously, may often avert the premature and misplaced expenditure of many lakhs. . . . . .

His opinion that "there is no danger in India, either political or military, except such as is involved in the financial difficulty," is a courageous one, and we believe it to be the simple truth; only it is well to know how much *is* "involved in the financial difficulty." The honourable member's remarks on the various ranks and terms of the Civil Service, covenanted and uncovenanted, native and European, are very suggestive, and, though evidently not fully thought out, are such as afford another proof that Sir David Wedderburn has bestowed careful thought on Indian affairs, and that he bids fair to be of real service in this country.—*Sept.* 12, 1872.

EARL MAYO'S SUCCESSOR.

NEARLY three years have passed away since, in the cool morning hours, Earl and Countess Mayo stepped up the gangway at our Dockyard, and, walking along the covered and guarded way, received their welcome to the shores of India. Lord Northbrook is, indeed, no stranger in Bombay. His figure and name have been familiar to us since he landed at the Apollo Bunder in the bright sun-light of afternoon in April last; but so little has been heard of him, so little has his influence been perceived during the last six months, that his stepping ashore at the Meanee slip this afternoon has about it all the significance of an historical event.

Let us recall the essentially personal aspect of this incident. During the dark hour of horror and indignation immediately after the crime which deprived India of her last chief ruler, many intelligent native politicians, who sincerely appreciate British rule, queried whether the dire event might not deter men in the foremost ranks of English life from accepting the high service of the Indian Viceroyalty. This, though a natural fear with those who expressed it, was, we knew, quite a misapprehension. As soon as England had recovered from the shock, and after a very few weeks occupied in arranging on whom the arduous lot should fall, and to whose hands the great prize should be committed, there steps forward this peer of the realm, who accepts the charge with, as we may be sure, a full consciousness of all the responsibilities it involves. . . . But the time for expression and for action must soon arrive. Such an extensive and varied tour as that now being accomplished by his Lordship must produce fruit. It must tend to ripen rapidly the thought and research of six laborious months, passed in the comparative seclusion of the bureau and Council Chamber. His Excellency must know his own way, and also the right time for the manifestation of his policy, better than any adviser can tell him; and it is no secret that much of the confidence with which the public await the development of his plans arises from the tolerably well-established assurance that he does not lean on advisers. He is not a man to undervalue those lessons of experience which often serve to give wisdom even to commonplace men, if of honest intent; but the growing belief, that he can listen with all due deference to advice and still follow his own course, is one which we trust will receive somewhat distinct confirmation before his Lordship leaves Bombay. Here, after all, we have drifted into grave talk of affairs of State, whereas our object was only that of joining in the welcome which our jubilant city gives this day.—*Nov.* 14, 1872.

THE VICEROY'S CONVOCATION ADDRESS.

LORD NORTHBROOK'S address in the Convocation of the Calcutta University is of a kind in which points of personal interest predominate. It was not to be expected that his Lordship, speaking amidst men experienced in all the details of Indian College progress, and fully acquainted with the peculiar difficulties that have beset University policy, could tell them anything new. It was not likely that, in a special address in which the speaker was compelled to notice many topics into which he could not fairly enter, he would be able to bring out the several points now in dispute concerning high culture in India with that sharpness and peculiar distinctness which is requisite for determining conclusions and settling off arrears of controversy. Yet when we come to regard this Convocation address as marking off the personal attitude of a new Viceroy to collegiate education and university influences, we find it full of interest. And to those who listened to it when delivered, the deliberate parliamentary manner of the speaker would permit of the rise in the minds of the audience of a crowd of suggestive and retrospective thoughts—glancing "before and after"—of which the whole theme is full. Leaving his own position out of count, there is enough to inspire high enthusiasm in the survey of what has been gained for intellectual culture in the period from Lord Canning—who, in the time of peril and amidst the upheavings of revolt, inaugurated the Bengal University system (in the same year as our own)—to Lord Mayo, who, speaking in a time of assured security, but ever rising controversy, avowed courageously that whatever the effect of English education on the people of this country, it is the duty of

Government to go forward in the work "without fear or hesitation." This remark, as will be remembered, is the counterpart of Mountstuart Elphinstone's well-known reply, when warned that in compiling Mahratta school books he was affording a fulcrum that might serve for the ejection of his own ruling race from India.

In what may be described as his subjective view of Indian education, Lord Northbrook takes up a position that may fairly be regarded as one of high historic interest. In the familiar story of English politics, the date of 1854 seems to most of us but as yesterday. In the slow, struggling history of Indian social affairs, in the conflict between ancient creeds and restless modern thought, amidst great political changes and financial troubles, the time that has passed here since 1854, the years during which the first graduates of our universities have been testing the education then received in the stern school of practical life, seem equal to half a century of the less changeful European progress. . . .

He seemed rather to waive, than to meet the controversy as to whether Indian Universities should be entirely examining and controlling bodies, or they are to gather professorships and lecture halls under their wing. The Calcutta *savans* having been unable to settle this disputable point, it has been settled for them, Lord Northbrook considers, by the circumstance that the Tagore Professorship of Jurisprudence has been founded. This is to be the beginning of great things; Comparative Philology, Grammar and Logic, also Physical Sciences not a few, are all to be taught under the direct guidance of the University and its Syndicate. It is not clear whence the means for this ambitious scheme is to come; but such is the programme, and we suppose its fulfilment must wait upon the decease or the gifts of some large-minded native capitalists, of whom, amongst the zemindary of Bengal, there ought to be half a dozen equal to the occasion. If it were not for this prospect of extraneous eleemosynary assistance, we should be inclined to fear that the promulgation of this scheme for a teaching university is somewhat premature. It is true that at home, notwithstanding the different plans that will have to be adopted in the reform of Dublin University, the tendency of opinion has been towards giving to universities a local habitation and restoring most of them to their old ideal—still maintained with many imperfections in Oxford and Cambridge—of an organisation of intimately connected colleges, libraries, and lecture halls—a federal union of distinct and independent, but mutually helpful and inseparable scholastic institutions. . . . . .

Before leaving this Viceregal address we must note that in regard to the ever occurring query, What shall our Indian graduates do with themselves and their culture? it was an excellent suggestion on the part of His Excellency, when, taking as examplars Sir Francis Grant and Mr. Goschen, he pointed to the fine arts and the higher walks of commerce as fields in which men of culture might find a career for themselves and do service to their country. Wealthy native merchants there are in abundance in our three great ports; but when we witness the blind rule-of-thumb and traditional fashion in which business is carried on, we are inclined to wonder what influence our colleges have on every-day life, seeing that they fail to inculcate any knowledge of the principles which underlie banking business, or the operations of exchange and international commerce. Lord Northbrook, in the emphatic passage with which he closed his address, must have convinced the Bengalees that he is no enemy of the higher Western culture, of which he said: "I hail the extension of high English education as being to my mind, in addition to all the other advantages which it possesses, the most powerful aid to the complete social equality which I desire to see established in India between all Her Majesty's subjects."—*March* 24, 1873.

DAVID LIVINGSTONE.

BOMBAY will have no need to be ashamed of her confidence and pride in "plain David Livingstone." Some eminently Cockney writer in one of the overland weeklies has amused himself with picking out some of the colloquialisms and blunt phrases used by the rescued traveller in writing to Mr. J. G. Bennett. These, being torn from the context of Livingstone's plain, terse language, and strung together in a "lacustrine" paragraph studded with quotation marks, may provoke a moment's titillation; but those who read the documents for themselves (and we have reproduced them) will see that the gentleman, writing in London at his ease, has made but very poor fun of two of the noblest and heartiest letters ever written—under "creditable circumstances." We do not find that

they "are full of gush and quotation;" and if, in addressing a representative man of New York, the long-lost explorer did here and there catch the phraseology of his benefactor, it were a very small matter. When the phrases which appear odd, as standing alone, are read back into their places, they are mostly referable only to his rebound of good spirits after taking in three or four years of European news in as many days, and after his mind, during its long period of fallow, had no journalistic sustenance save a few very ancient copies of the *Saturday Review* and *Punch*. He had much to tell, and it must be put down in such language as came to hand; and, taking it as it is, we are not only glad to have it, but consider that these letters fitly show forth the plain, rough, but clear-sighted and indomitable explorer, the long-enduring, unaggressive hero, the catholic Christian, and, above all, the man of intense humanity. Quotations are complained of; but they are few, and those that strike us most are two short phrases from Burns and one from Scripture. This last comes after the story of the broken-hearted prisoners from Rua, and that terrible passage describing the chorus of ghostly vengeance sung by the wretched Babeemba captive slaves, when the traveller writes: "The laughter told not of mirth, but of the tears of 'such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter.' He that is higher than the highest regardeth." On reading that passage and those about the Manyuema—cannibals on occasion, but, as Livingstone thinks, finer specimens of humanity than the Anthropological Society itself—and their simple, vivacious market women, held sacred from all the risks of tribal strife and war's alarms until the cursed "Nigger-Moslems" broke in with all the horrors of the Arab slave-trade, we can fully realise the fervour with which Livingstone says, "It would be better to lessen human woe than discover the sources of the Nile." . . . . . .

There are, we know, many estimable men amongst this large caste—men who feel as strongly against these atrocities as Europeans themselves, and who can follow out the logical propositions that what a man does by an agent he does himself, and that to carry on a trade which can only thrive by the destruction of thousands of human beings, is a far more heinous sin than it would be to shoot all the pariah dogs in Western India. Let but a score of Banians unite in their punchayet to stigmatise the iniquity supported by their caste fellows at Zanzibar, and we should see that caste organisation is not the entirely evil thing that too eager reformers would have us believe.

But Dr. Livingstone does not forget the task confided to him by his "very dear old friend, Sir Roderick Murchison,"—that of examining the watershed of South Africa. From recent telegrams we see that the "carpet geographers" have again been cavilling at Livingstone's topography as interpreted by the amateur delineator, Mr. Stanley. Let them jangle. We can afford to wait until the *savans* and critics of Burlington House, and the dry-as-dust Mr. Cooley, of the Museum, have demonstrated that they know more about it than the man who has been there, and who still remains at his post. Meantime, Dr. Livingstone's own account is sufficient for us, and, with the aid of ordinary maps, affords ample explanation for all but a strictly scientific comprehension of the nearly solved problem. Taking that handsome though unpretentious work, "Black's General Atlas," dated 1870, on which Livingstone's position as conjectured at that time is marked down, it is easy to define the Manyuema country, where he has stayed so long, and whence he had to return, baffled by the rascality of the Banian-sent "Nigger-Moslems," who consumed or abandoned the stores for want of which he well-nigh perished. . . . . .

Thus is much contention going on at home about the Search Expedition, and its turning back. The disputants are not duly posted up, or some of their tongues are tied. It is highly probable that when the letter of our Zanzibar Correspondent arrives in London, a good deal of light will be thrown on the controversy. The Geographical Society has itself something to answer for, and the Foreign Office a good deal, as regards the humiliating collapse of that enterprise.—*Aug.* 22, 1872.

II.—After receipt of the Government of India's telegram stating that the news of Dr. Livingstone's death, brought to Aden by the Calcutta mail steamer, had been forwarded to the Viceroy, from Consul Cameron at Unyanyembe, under date of October last, it would be downright incredulity not to accept the fact that David Livingstone has gone to his rest, and that he died in harness. We had almost written that he must have finished his work; for if he died in June at Lake Bemba, as the first telegram said, he must have been beyond that great reservoir, and would have had time to travel along the watershed to the west until he came on the upper waters of the Leeba and Lomoni. If this

were accomplished, he might be said to have completed his task; for the only remaining portion will be a comparatively simple matter—that is, the tracing up from his own most northern point at Nyangwe, through the "unknown Lake," to Piaggia's "unvisited" one, and so on to Petherick's Nile and the Bahr-el-Ghazl. But the second London telegram says that it was at Lobisa the weary traveller succumbed. . . . . .

After that has been settled, the one question will be, where shall the remains of this noble Scotchman find their last resting-place? There will be fitness in every way in his being laid in African soil at Zanzibar, the scene of some of his saddest hours and brightest hopes. But on that low-lying strand he should have some worthy monument, which, with tall spire or lofty pinnacle, should greet the eye of every new comer from the sea. If not at Zanzibar, where, at times, discreditable jealousies and animosities tended to throw a shadow across the brave, good man's path, then we would say at Aden should be his last resting-place—there also in sight of the sea, and in view of the thousands of our race who pass that way on their various civilising errands. It is useless now for us to express regret for the loss of him; that is felt, sincere and deep, by all of British blood who hear the story, and by many of other races, for we would not forget that Livingstone, the explorer, was also a Christian missionary. . . . . .

But Livingstone's fame will not lack its meed because "society" affects to have grown weary of his name. Neither will the petty jealousies of so-called men of science diminish the high appreciation which those who follow in his footsteps must ever cherish with regard to his wonderful achievements. In Sir Bartle Frere's Glasgow address, he says: "The geographical problems alone which he will have solved must exceed in importance and interest those of any other explorer since the days of Columbus." And the re-examination of his later discoveries which we have been able to give during the last two or three days had already led us to a similar conclusion. Now, all this is as simple as making the egg stand on its end; but operations of that kind require a strong, much-enduring, God-fearing man, like Livingstone, to carry them into effect. Then, too, beyond all the praise of geographers, and the commendation of enterprising patriots who look to future commercial gains from Central Africa, is the remembrance that Livingstone struck the death-blow at slavery in Africa.—*January* 30, 1873.

LITTLE STARS.

THE award of the small cluster of Stars of India recently distributed, though in all the instances—except, perhaps, that of the Khan of Kohat—conferred on men well known for their public services, has not escaped criticism. Considering the large stroke of work he has done within the last two years, and the magnitude of the province under his charge, no one can grudge Mr. Campbell getting a handle to his name; but the personal dislike that his Honour evokes so plentifully seems to have checked those congratulations that might otherwise have been anticipated. In the case of Sir Jung Bahadur there has been not a little grumbling. It is alleged that the famous Ghoorka knight is responsible for the secluded valley of Nepaul being closed against European settlers and visitors; but it is difficult to know what would satisfy some folk. There is no space in the well-populated valleys of Katmandu; but perhaps the Services in Bengal and on the Jumna would like Nepaul to be unto them as is Cashmere to the Punjab. If the Resident at Katmandu had been a man who could show the Rajah and his energetic Minister how to develop the mineral resources of their Himalayan valleys, great advantage would accrue both to Nepaul and central Northern India. If rifles and weapons of all kinds can be manufactured in and from the minerals of the valley, then all the smaller descriptions of iron-work for railways and other public works might also be made there, much to the profit of Sir Jung Bahadur's master and to economy in our Public Works and State Railway departments. For the rest, Sir Jung deserves his G.C.S.I. better than many who already wear that decoration. . . .

We have mentioned this lesser Star partly by way of referring to a Bombay man now translated, to whom some such recognition has long been due. We refer to Dr. George Birdwood, formerly and for several years Honorary Secretary of our Asiatic Society, and recently associated with Dr. Forbes Watson in the Indian Museum and Kensington Exhibition work. The display of popular esteem just manifested towards Sir Bartle Frere rested, no doubt, on many substantial grounds; but that it should be so lively and warm is

not a little due to the enthusiasm of Dr. Birdwood in times past, who, as an expositor of Sir Bartle Frere's sentiments and feelings, did much to secure for his Excellency the trust and affection of the leaders of native society. But there is also quite sufficient in Dr. Birdwood's literary and expository labours on behalf of India to entitle him to some such recognition as C.S.I. when next such trifles are going.—*June*, 1873.

HENRY LAWRENCE.

COMMUNICATIONS from Mount Aboo, or its neighbourhood, inform us of the celebration of the "Founder's Day" in the Aboo Lawrence School, on the 24th instant. On that day, nineteen years ago, Sir Henry Lawrence, surrounded by the residents and visitors of the locality, declared the Aboo School open for the children of soldiers and others serving in Rajpootana. The assembly of Tuesday last bore full testimony to prove that the good Sir Henry's labours have borne, and still produce, good fruits. The anniversary of the "Founder's Day" was, as usual, made the occasion for the presentation of prizes and medals to the children, who, in the presence of numerous and much interested visitors, received the awards from the hands of Colonel Brooke, the President of the School. . . . . .

Out of the rather large number, considering the remoteness and isolation of this station, of ladies and gentlemen assembled at the Aboo Lawrence School House on the 24th, not more than two or three could have been personally acquainted with the late Sir Henry Lawrence. Thus the changeful character of society in this country, with all the chances and trials of an Indian career, must have been impressed somewhat deeply, though we would hope not painfully, on the minds of many present, when scanning the long vista of nineteen bygone years between the foundation of the School and its present position. But seldom can have been more apparent the reassuring and consoling truth, that "the good men do lives after them, the evil is oft interred with their bones." The healthy, happy, frank appearance of the school children, and the interest evidently taken in them, more or less, by all present, bore sufficient and impressive evidence of that wise benevolence and foresight that prompted the late Sir Henry and his noble wife to the establishment of an institution which thus, twenty years after its foundation, must be regarded as one of the most admirable and useful in Western India.

If we needed excuse for making thus prominent reference to this pleasing anniversary, we might find it in the circumstance that during the twelve months just closed a far larger number of Indian residents than at any earlier period must, through the volumes of Sir Herbert Edwardes and Mr. Merivale, have become intimately acquainted with the character of Sir Henry Lawrence and the Honoria Marshall so worthy of him. In its pages they will have learned how, in the tenderness of conjugal intimacy and oneness of aim, the conception grew which afterward took shape in the Mount Aboo and other similar institutions for the tuition and shelter of otherwise forlorn and friendless children of military and other European parentage. Let us trust that the founder's name and character will be more and more honoured by liberal contributions from all parts of India towards perpetuating and improving the institution with which his name is associated.—*June* 30, 1873.

A DEPARTING BENGAL RULER.

THE duty has not been laid upon us of expressing any very exact estimate of Sir George Campbell's course as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and as his career in that position is, in all probability, far from being closed, we need not take upon us the task of summing him up before the time. Some of his measures we have criticised, more especially those which remind one of his old foible of plunging into the midst of subjects about which he knew least, and pronouncing most positively on those to which he could have given but little consideration, and in respect of which his idiosyncrasy rendered his consideration of little value. It has been our part to look on from a distance, as amused, rather than seriously interested spectators. So long as he has avoided experiments which might imperil the peace of the country, and has only grieved or irritated sleepy officialism, and alarmed no more formidable class than a pampered and artificially created landed aristocracy,

Bengal critics have been sufficient, if not more than a match, for the Knight of Belvidere. To many in that Presidency he might be "an uncomfortable wind of God;" but it had long been felt in the rest of India that some visitation of the kind was sorely needed in Bengal. Alike in capital and mofussil, in district and Secretariat, a thorough rousing was required in that Presidency; and few will doubt that this purpose has been effected. . . .

The recent threatened judicial revolution, which, notwithstanding the protest of the High Court, seems likely to result in the institution of a distinct judicial line "at reduced prices," is a case in point. Although there has not been time yet for the institution of a separate and voluntarily elected judicial branch of the Bombay Civil Service to work its way through to completeness, yet to discuss the principle of such separation would on this side of India be regarded as idle and superfluous. Sir George Campbell is a scribe who makes use of his opportunities, and in the mass of minutes and letters on this subject sent in from all parts of India, many of them from Bombay, on which Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's treatise was founded, there were abundance of arguments which afford irresistible condemnation of the loose condition of the district judicature in Bengal. It is confessed that men drift on to the Bench, attracted thither by the rather better salary attached to that position than to revenue work; and we need no longer wonder that such "Judges," like some of Malda and Patna within the last three or four years, could, under propulsion from a craze in high quarters, accept cart-loads of depositions from police and spies, and treat such rubbish as "evidence." Had not Bengal and its Civilians been lulled into a chronic state of somnolency, it would not have been left to Sir G. Campbell to point out the absurdity and mischief of an improvised and amateur mofussil judicature.

And now we see how an inherent defect of the Lieutenant-Governor crops up. He has got hold of a good idea, no matter where, and proceeds at once to thrust it into the existing order of things, without due consideration whether circumstances admit of the new idea finding conditions in which it can exist and have its being. The ardent Caledonian ruler is constantly putting new wine into old bottles; but, nothing daunted when the vessels crack and break under the unwonted tension, he merely "resolves" and "orders," which is, in effect, equivalent to calling out, "Stitch 'em up." Thus, when he found that the other, the revenue or miscellaneous branch of the Service, might become envious of men who become Judges whether possessed of judicial ability or not, he hits upon the device of fever doctors of the old school, and, with regard to his new line of Judges, writes: "Keep them short." His Honour thinks that his judicial branch can thrive well on abstinence, dignity, and a lingering gaze towards the Calcutta High Court Bench, which not one in thirty of them may reach. . . . As to the audacious remark that "a High Court Judge (on the Appellate side) has little wear and tear of body and mind," that in their Lordships' career there "is no hurry or high pressure, and no excessive hours of labour," there will not be wanting those in Bengal who will meet all this by an *argumentum ad hominem*, to wit—first, his Honour speaks from his own experience, which is thus shown to confirm the more disparaging estimates held as to his value as a Judge when on the Bench; second, that as Sir George Campbell is notoriously deficient in the judicial faculty, he can have no adequate conception of the labour that is required to make a Judge, or the strain that is needed to keep him up to the high water mark of his vocation when on the Bench. Altogether, we are inclined to think that this *tour de force* in the judicial line will prove to be the most serious mistake that Sir George Campbell has committed during his career as a ruler. Other measures have excited far louder clamour, but that has often been so much the worse for those who clamoured. In this instance, we conceive that the essential misconception of the subject matter with which he was dealing, and the grave errors committed and defended in dealing with it, will decide many thoughtful minds against the Lieutenant-Governor, though, because of their strong desire to see Bengal roused and reformed, they have as yet hesitated to cast an adverse vote.

There is another subject in regard to which the impetuous and essentially one-sided mind of Sir George Campbell has hopelessly committed him. We refer to his almost unctuous letter to the Bishop of Calcutta. . . . That pseudo-missionary epistle from Upper Assam is full of points inviting the keen criticism of either the cynical "heathen" or the earnest Christian who believes in the self-sustaining power of his religion; but, for our part, we have only to regard it from the politician's point of view. From this standpoint it seems very plain that the officer who could pen and defend that document, as we suppose Sir George is prepared to do, can never expect to hold any place in the Supreme Executive power either at Simla or Westminster.—*July* 10, 1873.

INDIA DOES NOT WANT HIM.

THE proposed appointment of the quondam Australian politician, Mr. Lowe, as Secretary of State for India, struck every one here as such an unlikely thing, and as implying, on the part of the Ministry, such an utter disregard, not to say contempt, for India, that the press in this country has justly treated the matter in somewhat corresponding spirit—that is, as an irremediable insult to be endured in silence. We were glad to see, however, that not only the *Overland* but the *Homeward Mail*, as an exponent of Indian opinion at home, spoke out whilst there was a chance of the mischief being averted. Happily, the revolutionary blast has blown over for the present; but we take advantage of the incident to quote from our home contemporary's article on the subject a passage which relates to a baneful declension in those political manners and in that official suavity which are as oil and wine to the constitution of States. . . . . .

Here is another view of the threatened intrusion into the India Office by the cantankerous Albino, which we may as well here quote from the *Spectator* in order to express our dissent thereto: "As for the departure of the Duke of Argyll and the nomination of Mr. Lowe as Great Mogul, both might be improvements, for the Duke is believed hardly to care for his official work, while Mr. Lowe understands India, and will spend his intellectual acerbity in snubbing his Council, who can bear it, and not in snubbing the Viceroy, who cannot." That daring phrase, "Mr. Lowe as Great Mogul," the irony of which is clearly unintentional, comprises as striking an antithesis as could well be devised. Mr. Whalley as Pope of Rome would scarcely be more congruous; and when the *Spectator* speaks of Mr. Lowe understanding India, we must suppose either our contemporary's memory or crave for effect has betrayed him. It is granting something that the Viceroy is not to be snubbed by this man, who, though humiliated before the House of Commons, confesses before the Sheffield Cutlers that he has no sense of shame—an Ishmael, and a Bohemian of acrid disposition and Mephistophelian type. Think of a man like that in charge of the India Office for six months! Think, too, of this returned Australian "snubbing" General Baker, the masterly accountant and engineer; or "chaffing" strong, ripe politicians like Sir George Clerk and Sir Robert Montgomery; or "sitting upon" the sagacious Sir Henry Maine! The very notion of such a possibility is detestable, and comes into the usually elevated arena of Anglo-Indian politics like a whiff from the Paris Commune. Surely, we are not coming to this! But it might as well here be said that, with a certain difference in colour and personality slightly in favour of that other insurgent presence, Mr. Ayrton, we should be inclined to write something in similar strain had there been persistence shown in the suggestion that he also might vault into the throne of the Great Mogul.

Let, then, these phantasmagoria pass like an evil dream; but what is the painful waking thought that follows? Why, this—the rising aristocracy of England, the governing class, born to rule, and furnished with every appliance that wealth, culture, and the tradition of public responsibility can confer, are deplorably indifferent as regards India, its politics, and possibilities. This is England's loss as much as India's—the transient personal gain arising from this unworthy abnegation, becomes that of political adventurers, keen-witted pretenders, and hungry, tenacious placemen.—*Sept.* 29, 1873.

MR. DISRAELI AS INDIA'S FRIEND.

MR. DISRAELI is one of those few English politicians who possess the gift of unexpectedness. True, he often exercises this faculty or privilege at the wrong time, and in such odd fashion, as in the case of the Bath letter, as raises the laugh at him all round. This, however, produces no effect on the imperturbable countenance of the Caucasian lord of Hughenden Manor, who knows that his next hit will obliterate all remembrance of his chance failures. This is the case in regard to this wholly unexpected manifesto on the Behar famine, and of which M. Reuter has given us a copious though not very skilfully compiled summary. It is not to be supposed that the farmers of Buckinghamshire cherish an anxiety for the salvation of the Bengal ryot stronger than that which is felt amongst the commercial and professional classes who do know a little of India. But, of course, Mr. Disraeli was speaking to the whole public and the press; and if we accept his utterance only on the low ground of its being a party

move, it is so well timed and skilfully calculated in its bearing on the contrast between his own and Mr. Gladstone's party, that it shows artistic and tactical skill of much pith and moment. No one will think that Mr. Gladstone is deficient in conscientious regard for India as compared with other portions of the British Empire; but he has been unfortunate in his Indian Secretaries. The Conservative leader, lest, perhaps, he should be thought to cherish any feeling about the alleged threatened recall of Lord Mayo in 1869, goes out of his way to express confidence in Lord Northbrook's personal capacity for dealing with the present crisis.

The course having thus been cleared, and the public feeling about the famine having risen to summer heat, Mr. Disraeli proceeds to show, by contrast, what a grave blunder and serious fault the Whig Under-Secretary committed when at Elgin, the other day, he dismissed the Behar distress in a cursory passage of his pretentious oration. From the financial bearing of portions of the Conservative leader's speech it is also highly probable that his attention had been drawn to some of the censures, in our own and other journals, passed on the political and intellectual callousness manifested by the Duke of Argyll's recent policy. We refer to his Grace continuing to draw, for months together, nearly a million and a half from India, whilst the ruling rate of exchange rendered that process unprecedentedly expensive, and when it was very uncertain what the pressure on the Indian Treasuries will be. . . . . .

We have alluded to Mr. Disraeli's chartered freedom in the way of political suggestion and prediction. It was only to be expected that he would take some means to discount the flattering financial programme of his opponents. But in doing this, it seems to us that he has, perhaps unconsciously, displayed a sweep of financial prevision which, if it can be corroborated in his administrative policy, may result in immense service to this country. But before specifying to what we refer, it will be convenient to quote here the following remarks made by our Calcutta contemporary, the *Englishman*, in noticing our recent criticisms on the financial policy of the present Secretary of State: "The *Times of India* seizes the Duke of Argyll's resolution to reduce the amount of his monthly drawings on this country as an occasion to descant on the cruelty of the policy which, in spite of unfavourable exchange, persists in draining India of funds for which it makes no material return, and hopes that some influential and thoughtful politician at home will be led to look into the subject. The remedy is not very easy to see. Our contemporary seems inclined to look for it in a division of the burthen. But what House of Commons would consent to this?" We shall be told, perhaps, that the Conservative leader was only speaking of the temporary necessity of meeting the charges likely to be incurred in relief of the famine; and that "the claimants of much more powerful character" for whose benefit Mr. Gladstone's proffered surplus may be reserved, are the perishing ryots. It may be so; but we give Mr. Disraeli credit for a more thorough knowledge of the financial relations between England and India than would be indicated by that superficial interpretation of his speech. If we read his utterance to imply that the surpluses on which secure and prosperous England can count should be made available for this long overdue claimant—not on her bounty and generosity, but on her justice—then two of our Calcutta contemporary's queries are already more than half answered. The remedy for the impoverishment of this country by that withdrawal of capital which is inevitable under the present one-sided financial arrangements, is "very easy" to see and state—England must share the burden, as she has always done with the colonies until their allegiance is almost thrown off.

As to the query, what House of Commons will consent to this? we should have been inclined to say the Parliament of 1880 or 1884. But now that Mr. Disraeli, with his fine audacity, has distanced every other statesman of the day by pointing to India "as a more powerful claimant" for spare surpluses than are any of the "comparatively miserable interests" which annually besiege the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we might even hope that the new House of Commons will live to break in upon the unmitigated selfish policy which has ever dominated the conduct of English politicians to this magnificent dependency of the Crown. Some figures which we give in another column suffice to show, in terms terribly clear for those who can read the handwriting on the wall, that it is high time a deliverer for India arose amongst English statesmen. Mr. Disraeli may be his herald, and we do not care on what side of the House he will sit.—*Feb.* 13, 1874.

MR. BRIGHT AND MR. FAWCETT.

IF anything could console the Liberal party for their signal defeat in the elections, it is the triumphant review of political progress in which, at his own unopposed election, Mr. Bright placed all the ameliorations of the last thirty years to the credit of those, of whom, like Mr. Gladstone, the famous tribune has been the chief stimulator and propeller. In like manner, too, we might say that if anything can compensate India for the loss, temporary we trust, of the "few though fit" of her steadfast friends in last Parliament, it is the telling declaration by Mr. Fawcett in regard to the Bengal famine. He sounds the alarm by hinting at what would be the dire consequences of the dearth if the case should turn out worse than now apprehended, and if the utmost possible exertions are not put forth to meet the occasion. He points with indignant scorn to what happened in Orissa in 1866, when 750,000 persons perished from want, and only 7½ lakhs—exactly one rupee per head, by the way—less than the cost of "a country house for a provincial Governor," was spent on the public efforts towards rescuing that starving population. . . . But extremes meet; and the philosophical Radical of Brighton would hail with delight the suggestion made a few days later by the Conservative leader, to the effect that it would be a far nobler course to devote the five million surplus to the salvation of the perishing claimants in Behar, instead of frittering it away on the "miserable interests" which clamour for fiscal relief at home. Possibly this keynote, struck by the defeated Brighton candidate, may have promoted that remarkably large and generous view of Indian necessities since expressed by the Premier nominate.

That the papers contain so few of the election speeches by Anglo-Indian candidates may be partly owing to the circumstance that most of them are before remote constituencies, a majority of them being in Scotland. Still, distance does not prevent the portion of Mr. Grant Duff's Elgin speech being reported, in which he vindicated the course adopted by Lord Northbrook and Sir Richard Temple. It would have been just as easy to report some notable passage from the speeches of Sir George Balfour at Kincardine, Mr. Farley Leith at Aberdeen, the Hon. Robert Bourke at King's Lynn, or, still more easy, Sir Charles Wingfield's at Gravesend. In this respect we think the two overland Indian weeklies have committed an oversight in their sub-editorial work of February 6.—*March* 2, 1874.

AN ABORTIVE MANIFESTO:

"GIVE UP—BE BLOWED!"

FROM the Harrow Dinner given in Government House, Calcutta, the proceedings at which have been reported during this week, will date the now rapidly-descending course of the Lytton Viceregal *regimé*. The friends of Lord Lytton can never complain that he has not had a fair chance to secure and retain public esteem. His address on being inducted into the splendid appointment of Governor-General of India, though it sounded as if pitched too high for this work-day world, was accepted as the fervid but sincere utterance of the poetic mind all but overwhelmed with the vast responsibilities which more commonplace men are slow to realise. The oratorical character of the new *regimé* was maintained in a series of ornate valedictory speeches with which his Lordship honoured various retiring Councillors, including such very sober folk as Sir Henry Norman and Sir William Muir. Whilst those of us who knew these old Indians well, felt gratified that their long-obscured merits should thus be blazoned abroad, it has been suggested that Lord Lytton was only disguising in poetic periods his secret satisfaction at getting rid of men whose experience and weight of character would have served to fetter him in the reckless political game he was bent on playing. This surmise has been notably confirmed by the emphatic protests which both the men just named—in company with all others who had held responsible office in India—have recorded against the disruption of the natural and political boundaries of this empire, which revolution, as is now disclosed, Lord Lytton came out to effect.

But it is of the Harrow speech we have now to speak. Seldom has any post-prandial oration been received with louder plaudits, never has politician's manifesto more signally

failed to provoke outside response. It is difficult at first sight to see why Lord Lytton should complain of having to tread the "thorny way of hostile criticism and obloquy." The aggressive policy, which he came out with secret instructions to put into operation, has been greeted with enthusiasm by the majority of the Indian Press—more than one daily journal having broken loose from its own traditions in order to support the wild-goose chase across the Suleiman. His Lordship has the delight of seeing the whole of a circus audience rise to him by way of political rather than personal demonstration. Still His Excellency is not happy, except as in the character of an injured and misunderstood politician, a martyr to public duty—on £24,000 per annum. And, as we have intimated, this last bold bid for public sympathy has missed its aim. Even in Calcutta, the daily there which has backslidden from its old standfast policy and allowed itself to become a convert to the destructive scheme of the day, seems to have been recalled to conservatism and common sense by this unhappy Harrovian oration. In reference to Viceregal complaints of hostile criticism, the journal in question thus corrects the inexperienced placeman: "It is scarcely accurate to say that there has been more criticism on Lord Lytton than on other Viceroys. The attacks on Lord Lawrence were more frequent, those on Lord Mayo more virulent, those on Lord Northbrook more elaborate. The difference is that the blame cast on the present Viceroy is more authoritative." Just so: almost every man whose antecedents give him a right to speak on behalf of India has condemned the revolutionary scheme to which, at one moment, Lord Lytton alludes in mysterious terms as being based on occult justification of which he holds the key, while at another time we are asked to exonerate him entirely, as he is only the humble and obedient servant of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury. But the criticism against which Lord Lytton chafes is far more comprehensive than that directed merely against this assiduously-sought Afghan war. As the Calcutta journal we have just quoted remarked, it was the leader of the Opposition who denounced Lord Lytton as "all that a Governor-General of India should not be." In that passage Lord Hartington, whatever was his incitement, surpassed his own usually half-hearted and halting temper. No one had given him credit for any close study of Indian needs: but this sudden stroke was one that went home; and, to every one who does realise what those needs are, it threw an electric light along Lord Lytton's brief career in India which revealed all its ominous, if not fatal errors. His Lordship's assertion, in that humiliating debate on revising the Vernacular Press Act, that "in India the only authentic source of information is the Government," was not only a note of inexperience, but betrayed an invincible incapacity for seeing below the surface of Indian affairs and conditions. . . . . .

In one passage of this ill-starred Calcutta speech, His Excellency affected to contemn "gentlemen who have no practical knowledge of the facts, or conditions, or principles of Indian finance, (and who) tell us that our financial prospects are desperate." Expressions like these rouse the scorn of men who only recognise in them the efflorescence of the veriest political griffinage; and it has long been plain that Lord Lytton will be a griffin to the end of the chapter. It is obvious that he does not possess the faculty to realise any of the essential facts of Indian finance and fiscal policy. . . . In spite of the veto recently put upon the design for building a Palace of Art on the remote mountain top of Simla, the local authorities, eager enough to foster the Viceregal whim, have succeeded in devoting many thousands of pounds to the construction of roads —over and above the now notorious pony carriage drive—which it is trusted will, by-and-bye, compel the building of the forbidden palace. And, since the present *regime* took possession, the long-repressed schemes of jobbery and lavish outlay have been proceeding at a merry pace—water works and drainage on plans suited only to wealthy urban districts have been pushed forward; and when it has been found that the petted R.E.'s and amateur architects have not the experience to grapple with the all but insuperable difficulties of these misplaced designs, they have been sent to Europe on deputation allowance and heavy public expense to learn their trade. It is the wantonness of these Sardanapalus-like projects that has evoked "hostile criticism;" but the general misdirection of public works policy elsewhere in India is only the natural counterpart of that flagitious extravagance devoted to narrow and personal purposes. Impetus is given to costly military works, and to big railways to be pushed through districts where they can never pay—like the Sinde desert—while urgently needed works for water storage are fumbled over and deferred, district roads, water-courses, and wells, though needed to

keep the ryots alive and save or distribute the crops, are peremptorily stopped or checked in the poorest and most arid tracts of the Deccan and Madras. . . . . .

In any case Lord Lytton will be unable to boast that he has not bequeathed so much as a financial difficulty for his successors. His monument will be a mountain of debt, "loss by exchange," and fiscal perplexity, such as Indian administrators have not had to contend with since James Wilson had to be sent out to assist even the strong men of those days to set right. Who the strong financier and the clear-headed statesman is whom fate has decreed to send to grapple with and subdue the difficulties that Lord Lytton has contributed to the Indian problem, no man can tell; but come he must. It will not be yet: for his jaunty Lordship, having taken his stand on the now classic declaration of Azy Smith, will see the coming man "blowed" first, rather than surrender a day sooner than April 12, 1881. Therefore things in India will be worse yet ere they are better.*—*Feb.* 8, 1879.

II.—His Excellency the Governor, having the important function to discharge of being the last in India to stand in the relation of host to Earl Lytton, has again visited his capital. He came on Thursday forenoon, taking up the quarters at the Secretariat, so as to place Parell fully at the disposal of the departing Viceroy, Countess Lytton, and suite—these last making up rather a numerous party. Every effort has been made by the local authorities—doubtless pursuant to Sir James Fergusson's wish—to elicit some semblance of a public demonstration; and, as the weather cleared up a little this forenoon, something like a decent semblance of modest valedictory ceremony was attained. Lord Lytton embarks in storm and cloud; but these atmospheric disturbances are trifles light as air compared with the storm, that as yet owns no ruler, which his gay lordship let loose in Afghanistan, and the heavy clouds, "rolling dun," which that storm is drifting over India and its future. But we are all human; and ere this the Earl of Lytton, Baron Knebworth, will be in a condition that must claim the deep commiseration of every one who can feel for a fellow-creature, be he king or kaiser. It is very hard on Lady Lytton—who leaves nothing but pleasant memories behind her—that she has to be sent through the monsoon waves.*—*July* 3, 1880.

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* These Extracts are from the *Bombay Review.*

2.—PUBLIC WORKS—IRRIGATION, RAILWAYS, ROADS, HARBOURS.

BARRACKS AND BAYONETS—OR, ROADS AND RESERVOIRS.

THE retrospect of seven years' Indian history blended with warnings as to our immediate future prospect, furnishes suitable topics for leisure thoughts. Were this not a subject of such permanent interest, it might seem out of date now to refer to the *Friend of India's* article on "The Lesson of Seven Years' Peace" which we reproduced a few days ago. With the statement of fact in the opening sentence of that article we fully coincide:—"The year closes in India in profound tranquillity and enjoying ever-growing prosperity." It is, however, scarcely needful to say that we widely differ from our contemporary in estimating the best means to secure for future years the tranquillity and prosperity of the present day. We cannot here follow him through such an historical retrospect as would be required in order fully to controvert the "lessons" drawn from his mere chronological and, as we should say, superficial review of events. Yet it is, we think, easy to see that the *Friend of India*, in seeking to draw ominous warnings from the Afghan War and the Mutiny, has overlooked the necessity of sequence between cause and effect, and has endeavoured somewhat hastily to graft upon the tree of Indian history events and occurrences the growth of which in our affairs was parasitical and abnormal. It will be remembered, for instance, that Colonel Pelly, in his comprehensive retrospect of Indian affairs that lately appeared in the *Fortnightly Review*, expressly speaks of the Afghan War (of 1839-42) as "marking the date of political disturbance in the British-Indian States, to be followed presently by disturbances not less vital in its social and commercial systems." The *Friend* may be verbally correct in adopting the familiar date here spoken of as marking an era of war following one of peace, but what has that to do with the origin of the Afghan War? . . . . . .

That wanton and, one may say, wicked interference with the even tenour and healthy progress of British India came entirely from without. It was forced through or upon the rulers of this country, in spite of the counsel and remonstrances of the best Indian statesmen. Now, if the *Friend of India* thinks it likely there may again be in power at home such a mad-cap Cabinet as any would be that should send our armies "across the wall of our garden of Hindostan," why, then, its warnings may be needed. . . . . .

Where, then, is the value of the warning so gravely put forward by the Serampore journal? The article, as usual, is well written, and as a summary of Indian social statics, it forms entertaining reading; but if the logic is so faulty, why should we take our lesson of the seven years from the *Friend of India?* Let us quote it again in a compact sentence:—"The twelve years of sound reform which were followed by the Afghan War, the four years of brilliant administration which were succeeded by the Mutiny, make the period of peace through which we are now passing speak to us with a warning voice." As we have endeavoured to show, it is not "the period of peace" which speaks to us with a warning voice, but it is the Afghan War and the Mutiny; and how any one could

so read history backwards as to make such a substitution as the *Friend* has done, passes comprehension. That journal refers with complacency to the maintenance of a force of 68,000 troops in this country; but fears that the English power is no more than safe with such a force "even when officered, equipped, and commanded on the very best system." Such fears, we quite agree, may be justifiably cherished by those who regard political strength and material force as synonymous terms. Indeed, there is no practical check to the warnings prompted by such fears, as was seen at home a few years ago, when the invasion panic could not be "medicined" until it ran itself out into absurd proposals worthy of the beaver-like intellect of the Chinese. The *Friend* puts its faith in "the best military system" as the sole guarantee of all that we comprehend under the term British civilisation in India, but trembles, after all, lest, when a few pins being loose in such a fragile machine, chaos should come again. There need, then, be no wonder at the chronic political hysteria displayed by our Calcutta contemporary; but without being "sciolists" in any wise, we confess to a more robust faith. If asked, what in our view is "more than sufficient for the defence of that splendid temple of civilisation which the English race has been slowly erecting in India during the past century and a half," we answer—more civilisation. The spectacle which was witnessed at Nagpore during the first week of the new year suggests a compendious commentary on our simple recipe for keeping the peace. To that we should wish to add—let the civilisation of India, if possible, be evoked from within and not induced from without.

The great objection to the bayonet-and-Armstrong recipe for securing "the peace and prosperity of the Empire" lies in its being so directly calculated to defeat the end desired. Referring again to the Nagpore Exhibition as an illustration, there can be no question that, broadly speaking, all other civilisation in India is at present waiting upon the progress of material improvement. Now whilst 70,000 European troops are maintained in India, no material improvement can go forward on a scale sufficiently large, or at a rate sufficiently rapid, to have any definite effect on the political fortunes of the country. Dispense with half of that incubus on the expansive forces of the Indian Empire, and during the next seven years such organic works of communication, irrigation, and harbours might be carried out as would cause this vast peninsula to teem with plenty, so that all races within our boundary would vie with each other in fervent attachment to the British rule, and India would be as impregnable and its government as secure as that of England. But we cannot have this prospect fulfilled so long as we maintain an army of anything like the present magnitude. To secure the best guarantee of political and social security, we must dispense with 30,000 or 40,000 troops, and before we do that it seems necessary that some people should get rid of their fears, and that may best be done by purging the political conscience.

There is one warning which we must heed in reference to this question. This costliest—and, as we think, most untrustworthy—guarantee for security is of such a nature, that it can only be retained at an ever-increasing expenditure of national forces. The sooner our statesmen begin to divest themselves of traditional and fanciful apprehensions, the safer it will be for India and the more satisfactory for the people at home. We cannot go on many years as we are doing in this respect. The following remarks on this topic, penned soon after the Mutiny, have only acquired additional force in each succeeding year:—

> We must not think of garrisoning India, but of governing her. A continent held against its unwilling and awakened inhabitants, by the physical force of foreign soldiers, even if the notion were not indeed the bloodiest of chimeras, could never be anything but a source of weakness and expense to the dominant nation. In England we cannot afford to *recruit*, in India we cannot afford to *pay*, a much larger force of English soldiers than that which was in India when the mutinies commenced.
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> *Jan.* 12, 1866.

IRRIGATION—WISE COUNSEL, PALTRY PERFORMANCE.

THE complete set of elaborate papers on Irrigation Works that were published about a year ago were welcomed, as marking a very definite stage of progress in regard to the oft-discussed question of how to supply India with adequate Public Works. The foremost Indian statesmen, and our most experienced officials, nearly all of whom contributed to the set of papers, had then arrived at a tolerably full agreement as to the

financial and political principles that ought to guide the Indian Government in planning great public improvements, and, more especially, irrigation works. The conclusions arrived at, and the maxims laid down, were so simple that it is easy to recall them without reference or quotation. These men, best fitted of any to pronounce on this vital question, agreed:—1. That irrigation works that should be adequate for the long-delayed necessities of India, cannot be constructed out of surplus revenue; 2. That public works generally—irrigation works forming a large proportion of the whole—being certain to increase the revenue, especially the land tax, are most suitable objects to be provided for by public loans; 3. That the income from irrigation works being inseparably connected with the land assessment, its collection from the cultivators could not safely be entrusted to any private companies who might be contracted with by Government to construct such works. On the point, whether public works could be better executed by private contractors or by a Government department, there was less unanimity of opinion, but the inclination of the writers seemed to be towards the existing organisation of the Public Works Department. In the minds of the writers, if they compared the comprehensive conception under discussion with the capabilities of the Public Works Department as it exists, they would merely regard that department as a basis, or perhaps as a controlling or revising power over the vast addition that the carrying out of their minutes would require to be made to the industrial sappers and miners of India. One of the writers, Sir Robert Napier, impressed with the practical urgency of the great works before them—probably, also, with commendable simplicity, expecting that the work would forthwith be set about—remarked, that some public intimation should be given at home as to the number of civil engineers, surveyors, and assistants who would shortly be wanted in India. Altogether, the perusal of those papers left an impression on the public mind that at length all preliminary difficulties had been set aside, and the new era had arrived when reproductive public works would be spread through the length and breadth of this half-cultivated but fertile realm. . . . . .

No one supposes that much, if anything, could have been done since last year to stave off famine from the parched fields of Lower Bengal, Orissa, and those parts of Madras where drought has prevailed; but announcements and preparations might have been made which would have inspired people with reasonable hope for another year, and would at least have kept our Indian statesmen in countenance. . . . . .

Had we an energetic and zealous Executive either in India or at home, something like this would have been done. Had the Supreme Government here only acted in the spirit of, and according to their own minutes on this subject, they might easily have wrung from the Home Government the permission to announce the needful loan. On the other hand, had we an energetic and zealous Indian Department at home, the Supreme Government would have been driven out of the old narrow ways in which—judging by the style and scope of Colonel Dickens's little circular—the Public Works Department is still to drag painfully along. But if our Indian Governments in their official and corporate form are inept and incapable of grappling with the greatest material want of India—if they, as Governments, shrink from taking the necessary step between established theory and practical action—there is no reason why all the individual members of our Councils should willingly remain as if under some spell of incapacity, and as if, for any practical issues, they shrink from revealing any trace of originality which gleamed here and there in some of their irrigation minutes. Sir Bartle Frere, as everyone knows, has the pen of a ready writer; and if he cherished high political self-respect like most of the public men at home, he could have expressed his own strong feeling against the conspicuous neglect of the State-papers to which he was so prominent a contributor, and he could have done this with an argumentative force which might have sufficed to dissipate the indifference in which this great question is again enveloped. Sir John Lawrence, too, has firmness enough to give effect to his own decisions—sometimes, indeed, for serious mischief, as in his vote for the overthrow of the Mysore kingdom—but even Sir John has not had the political manliness to re-assert the convictions of himself and his peers in regard to the question that, of all others on which agreement has been obtained during his Viceroyalty, has the most direct bearing on the permanent material welfare of India.

We are not unmindful, however, that there was "a lion in the way" of the writers of the irrigation minutes which none of them seemed disposed to face—one which will stand in the path of Indian material progress until a knot of statesmen arise here who, on Indian

questions, will prove themselves a match for the Cabinet and Indian Secretaries. The "lion in the way" to which we allude is, the denial by the Home authorities of the right of our Supreme Government to enter the loan markets of the world, and especially that of England. The experienced writers of these important minutes of last year all agreed that irrigation works, to be of any general service to India, must depend for their construction on funds obtained from public loans, and that any possible "surplus" revenue is quite inadequate for such a purpose. The writers all agreed that only by means of borrowed capital could the State accomplish the great work—in favour of which they gave such excellent reasons that the question of utility is finally settled—yet not one of these men, so far as we remember, dared to point out that such borrowed capital is artificially and perversely excluded from India. For some reasons or other—never adequately stated, much less justified—this country, rich in raw material and labour, but poor in capital, is denied access to the money markets of Western Europe, where the Supreme Government might obtain funds for judicious expenditure in reproductive public works. Such an outlay would change the face of immense tracts of this country; and the returns from it would, in a few years, alter the whole aspect of Indian finance. No Indian taxation that could possibly be devised would produce funds for this great work. . . . . .

It is possible, after all, that this little circular, so insignificant in its scope and so very "limited" in its terms, may be a blessing in disguise. The new Secretary of State, Lord Cranborne, may be harbouring the ambitious design of connecting his name with a comprehensive scheme of Indian irrigation works; and the Supreme Government, feeling it needful to check the extensive projects of the subordinate Governments, may have only adopted the "one-fourth of the present budget grant" restriction by way of a temporary device, soon to be withdrawn as the ground plan is disclosed. These things *may* be so; and if it should so turn out, all India will be greatly rejoiced, but still surprised.—*May* 17, 1866.

WATER STORAGE—LOCALITIES AND MODES.

CONSIDERABLE general agreement has of late been attained between influential public men, both here and at home, with regard to the leading principles under which public works in India must be promoted, regulated, and maintained. The imperative necessity that is ever felt throughout the length and breadth of the country for the construction of permanently useful and reproductive works is now admitted on all hands. There is also another advance in public opinion, one of far more practical importance than the attainment of any agreement on the abstract question. It is the admission that the investment of State or borrowed funds on reproductive or beneficial works, is an investment of capital which can be justified on grounds altogether irrespective of the chance amount of surplus revenue in any particular year. . . . . .

Thus it is that the terms of the great question are now understood; and, fortunately, it is at this stage in the discussion that by common consent all interested in the matter have come to regard water conservancy—both for purposes of irrigation and internal transit—as the first and most important of all public works in India. It is not that the great object of water conservancy is to stand in the way either of completing our main lines of railway or persevering with the construction of common roads, which are scarcely less necessary than irrigation for our tropical cultivation. We may be reminded that the Government of India have already executed and promoted some noble irrigational works; and certainly we are glad to acknowledge this, although we believe that only two small bunds have been constructed with Imperial funds in this presidency. The Ganges Canal, with nearly one thousand miles of main canals and great branches, and irrigating already some 600,000 acres, is a noble work,—notwithstanding that more than half a million sterling will have to be expended in correcting the miscalculations of the military engineers who planned its construction. The Eastern and Western Jumna Canals, with an aggregate course of 1,185 miles, are more successful than the leviathan canal, and yield a steadily-increasing if not a remunerative return. It is only needful to mention the Madras Presidency to be reminded how in the deltas of the Godavery, the Kistna, Coleroon, and Cauvery Rivers, water conservancy has attained a financial triumph, and its amazing reproductive value has been abundantly demonstrated. Nearly half a million has been expended or sanctioned on the project of making the upper courses of the

Godavery navigable in the cotton-producing districts of Berar, but none of this expenditure conduces to irrigation, though we believe this object is to be attained at the highest weir, according to the plan proposed by Major Haig. . . . . .

As yet scarcely anything has been done to control or utilise the impetuous floods of Indian rivers on their upper courses, or in their natural catchment basins. The rolling torrents that each monsoon scour down every nullah, are wasted more or less in every province of India, and countless millions of tons of water intended by Providence to compensate for the torrid heat of our climate are allowed to run to waste year after year. The heaviest rainfall is necessarily on the Ghats and in other mountainous districts; but at the scarps and on the declivities of all those ranges nature has formed the most wonderful *enceintes* and narrow gorges in which the surplus waters ought to be stored for gradual irrigation of the sublying plains, and for yielding a year-long supply to the nullahs at the foot of every hill range. To take a familiar instance: were this done even to a very partial extent on the western side of our Ghats, the narrow strip of the Konkan, flooded the other day like a sea, but usually parched to sterility during a large part of the year, might become a fertile agricultural district of incalculable service in providing food for Bombay. The rugged and high-lying district of Mairwarra in Rajpootana was transformed from a barren and poverty-stricken district into a well-irrigated and prosperous country by means of tanks of a very simple construction, such as might be readily adopted in numerous hilly districts throughout India. Each Local Government possesses abundant data on which plans might at once be drawn up for unambitious projects that might be undertaken by village communities, municipalities, or local public companies. The magnitude on which irrigation works have generally been planned or constructed, has rendered it impossible for the Local Governments to undertake them, it even our childish and subordinate system of administration would have permitted such action on their part. The mistaken financial policy of making the construction of such works wait upon the chance supplies of surplus revenue, together with the more serious engineering risk attendant on organic schemes, has effectually deterred the Supreme Government from fairly looking at the subject of irrigation. . . . . .

Something, however, must now be done to save India from these ever-recurring floods and famines, of which we are having so terrible an illustration in Orissa and Behar. The financial difficulty is in a fair way of being overcome; hence it seems very suitable just now to raise the question whether it is wise to continue the policy of regarding water conservancy as work to be carried out chiefly by means of gigantic schemes, which require a protracted series of years for their completion. Without disparaging the project for clearing the upper channels of the Godavery, we may use it by way of illustration, and ask,—Would not a similar expenditure have provided still more valuable results if it had been employed in the construction of fifty ordinary tanks in the Nagpore country, and in the Berar, Nassick, and Ahmednuggur districts, thereby bringing under wet cultivation an immense area of fertile land? . . . . . .

The practical man will say—"This is a glorious prospect, or rather a dream; but it is a question of capital after all, and that can be only obtained very gradually." Granted, that this universal water conservancy must be a work of time; it is not wholly a question of capital, but rather of the direction in which funds should be applied. Our plea is that, as a general principle, the new irrigation capital that is to be called up would be far more profitably employed in the direction we have indicated than, as has hitherto been the fashion, on huge canals and gigantic anicuts. Besides, there is a very practical consideration involved in our suggestion: it is this—the capital expended on the smaller class of works such as we have here advocated, would be in most cases reproductive within two years from calling it up; whilst the larger works require many years of unremunerative outlay, the interest for which must be drawn from the current revenue of the State.—*Sept.* 1, 1866.

IRRIGATION FOR THIRSTY SINDE.

BEING the proper season for so doing, we have recently drawn attention to the imperative necessity of every available effort being made to secure for this thirsty land that blessing—as yet offered us almost in vain—which Providence intends that India shall reap from its annual monsoon rain-fall. All public works have their special claim in

turn, and few bear comparison in practical value with country roads and bridges; but the demand on behalf of works for water conservancy—bunds, reservoirs, and canals—owing to the climatic circumstances of India, is more imperative than all the rest. In order of time, also, water conservancy should precede merely constructive undertakings, for in pursuing that great object we preserve what India already possesses in an annual offer of incalculable wealth, which to neglect and lose year by year is a standing national reproach. Practical illustrations, both of the paramount necessity of this great enterprise and the comparative facility with which it may be promoted, will occur to observant persons in every province of India. No more striking instance of the necessity of irrigational works can be found than that afforded by the arid province of Sinde; and there are certain special circumstances connected with its rain-fall and surface conformation that invite special attention as illustrating the value and striking necessity of water conservancy on the higher courses of streams.

The recent heavy rain-fall that has caused so much destruction in the neighbourhood of Kurrachee, and throughout the whole length of the Sinde Railway, most of which crosses the watershed of the country, has been an exceptional, though not unprecedented, event in the meteorological history of the province. All who travel by the Sinde Railway from Kurrachee to Kotree must be forcibly struck with the great number of dry *nullahs* (water-courses) that are crossed by the line. Two of these, at least, the Muleer and the Bahrun, the former about twelve miles from Kurrachee, the latter about the same distance on this side of Kotree, will be recognised as channels capable of holding large rivers. In ordinary years, when the rain-fall of Sinde has not exceeded the very small average which is usual in that province, the beds of the Muleer and the Bahrun, as well as all the smaller channels, are to be seen perfectly dry for eleven months of the twelve. This may be the case even for years in succession; but the greater width and well-defined banks of those two channels afford continuous evidence that any year a mighty volume of water may rush down them with an impetuosity sufficient to sweep anything before it, as is also indicated by the smoothness of the bed and the perpendicular overhanging banks, often many feet deep. The contrast between the average and exceptional rain-fall of Sinde will explain the usual anomalous appearance of these dry but deep torrent channels. The annual rain-fall at Kurrachee, as calculated by Mr. Glaisher, of the Royal Observatory, on the returns of nineteen consecutive years, is about 5¼ inches. Mr. John Brunton, C.E., in his pamphlet on the Sinde Railway, states the average rain-fall—we believe throughout the whole length of the line to Kotree—for the five years 1856-60 as 4·82 inches. This, it will be seen, is less rain for the whole year than falls sometimes in a single day in most other parts of India.

We have been speaking of the water-courses on the east and north-east of Kurrachee, but on the west of that town flows the river Hubb, in connection with which a very praiseworthy attempt at water conservancy has been made by a private individual—Moorad Khan. This enterprising and prescient man has spent a fortune in constructing a bund across the Hubb for irrigational purposes. We have no particulars before us of the result in this case. Probably individual enterprise and resources, totally unaided by the State, are inadequate for carrying out large irrigational works with success; but there can be no question that Moorad Khan deserves well of the Government for having in these modern days voluntarily acted as a pioneer in the great national work of water conservancy, and that, too, in a province which needs it so much. This exceptional case of private enterprise may be taken as a hint to show in how many varied forms the Government of India may find ways to carry out that grand task of water conservancy to which it now stands committed before the world. It may be taken also as a hint by our native capitalists of Bombay—though for the present the thought may only add bitterness to their cup of repentance—for had they, instead of sinking their cotton profits in ill-advised schemes for reclaiming land from the sea, devoted a large portion of the new capital to irrigational works for agricultural purposes, Bombay would have had a much more hopeful look-out than is the case now. It was indeed fairly to have been expected that the Government should invite efforts in this direction. In almost every collectorate, we believe, the departmental engineers have numerous plans and statistics which could be rendered available for irrigational projects and all kinds of agricultural development.—*Sept.* 17, 1866.

PRAYERS OR ROAD-MAKING FOR ORISSA.

TWO very different circumstances—the holding of a public prayer-meeting in Calcutta, and the occurrence of destructive inundations in Orissa—will have the effect of challenging attention to the original as well as the proximate causes of the dreadful famine now devastating Eastern India. This retrospect need not, especially on this side of India, interfere with the strenuous exertions which are being made to relieve the pressing distress and save alive some of the helpless victims of national neglect. So far as the immediate sufferers are concerned, the destitution under which they sicken and die may be regarded as a mysterious dispensation of Providence, and it is fitting enough to offer up public prayer on their behalf, so that the hearts of those who have abundance may be moved to give freely of their substance. On the other hand, it would but pervert the purposes of prayer, and would cause reverence to degenerate into superstition, if by that plausible method the public mind were to allow itself to be blinded as to the preventible causes which have induced this dreadful national calamity. It may be pious to acknowledge in formal and general phrases the hand of God in this wide-spreading disaster, but it would be irreligious to refuse to read the terms of the indictment which His finger is tracing so distinctly in Eastern India. The famine is the direct result of alternate causes—inundation and drought—and these acting upon a peasantry from whom legislative and artificial arrangements have taken away all beneficiary interest otherwise remaining in the long devasted soil. But those natural causes could have been guarded against, and the dire results avoided, by a proper use of "those means which God and nature have put into the hands" of the rulers of India. We do not now speak of the last few months, because all efforts since last October—when, through "newspaper accounts," the Supreme and Bengal Governments were duly warned of the impending calamity—have been of the nature of relief measures.

We allude to the long-continued and deliberate neglect, during the last fifty years, of those special precautions which are plainly demanded by the physical geography of Orissa. The great river Mahanudee and two other large streams flow through a vast expanse of level country, which necessarily becomes flooded at each heavy monsoon. Were not the volume of water in these rivers sufficient of itself to produce this calamity, the same result would follow from another cause—namely, the pressure up the channels of the high tides from the Bay of Bengal during the monsoon gales. The Chilka Lake also—which separates Pooree, the southern district of Orissa, from Ganjam, the northern district of Madras—is another source of devastating inundations. . . . . .

Meantime Sir Cecil Beadon, the chief ruler of Bengal, dances "at a public ball at Darjeeling," while all the cargo boats engaged in landing rice for the famishing people of Cuttack are destroyed by tempests, and thus the relief so tardily afforded by officialism is again indefinitely delayed. It will be said that the united force of the Supreme and Bengal Governments could not have diverted this storm from the coast of Orissa, any more than they could prevent the first cargoes of rice being blown over to the coast of Burmah. No, we suppose not; but if, instead of it being left for Mr. Secretary Chapman to write at the close of May that the Board of Revenue "did not intend to import rice" into the famine districts, grain had been dispatched a month before that time, the cargoes could then have been landed with comparative facility. Great exertions have undoubtedly been made during the last few weeks, and which are greatly to the personal credit of those officials and others who have put forth their strength. But these exertions have been comparatively futile, simply because the Bengal Government allowed the fine season to pass over; and now fifteen hundred bags of rice have been thrown overboard in the Bay of Bengal, and another five hundred have been swamped at the mouth of the Mahanudee in sight of the famine-stricken districts. Worse even than this actual loss, the whole of the cargo boats by which the grain was just about to be landed on the coast of Orissa have been destroyed by inundation on the river and by storm on the sea. Again, we acknowledge that neither the Board of Revenue, Sir Cecil Beadon, nor his diplomatic Secretary, Mr. Ashley Eden, could have done anything to avert the tempests from heaven which have scattered the fleet laden with relief for Cuttack and the wretched provinces in the south of Orissa. It is useless, however, even in respect of these mere details of the disaster, to speak of it as the visitation of Providence, seeing that in April and May the

Bay of Bengal was calm enough, and several cargoes of rice might then have been sent from Calcutta or imported from Burmah. . . . . .

If it be said, in apology for the Governments of Bengal and India, that they did not foresee the excessive pressure of destitution that was to befall Orissa and Lower Bengal, the reply is as self-evident as it is condemnatory—they *ought* to have foreseen it, and should have been prepared for the worst. Evidence can be culled in abundance from the Calcutta papers to show that ever since the early part of the year great destitution has been looked for. It is mentioned, as one instance of early and definite information, that so long since as last November, a European gentleman, thirty years a resident in Balasore, wrote to the Board of Revenue "again and again," warning that body that a great famine was impending. And it is in this Collectorate of Balasore that the lives of 24,000 attenuated wretches are now barely preserved by means of a scanty daily dole—for there have been one thousand deaths per week—and it is in Balasore where the springing crops have been destroyed by inundations, and yet that district "has yearly paid large sums to enable Government to prevent such inundations by engineering works." If official evidence is needed to prove that the authorities of Bengal were apprised of the danger in time, we must refer to the "official note" from the Public Works Department addressed to the Board of Revenue, and which is evidently intended to shield that body from the condemnation it has incurred. In it is stated that Sir Cecil Beadon, early in December, on the ground of approaching distress, applied to the Supreme Government for five lakhs extra, to be spent on public works. . . . . .

But the fact of sending all the supplies of food by sea, and now this destruction of the miserable appliances for landing the grain, will call public attention to the terribly condemnatory statement that there are *no roads* whereby grain could be conveyed from Bengal into Orissa by land. Calcutta—the City of Palaces, the centre of all the great power we have wielded for more than a century—is only some 150 miles from Balasore, the scene of the most dreadful suffering; and Pooree, at the extremity of Orissa, is less than 300 miles from the metropolis; and yet for lack of ordinary roads the common bullock carts of the country—simple and rude contrivances that have answered their purpose for a thousand years perhaps—could not be sent with supplies into the famishing districts. The starving inhabitants themselves have, without roads, found their way to Calcutta, where they now crowd in alarming density, while it is feared that the south-west monsoon, as it blows over from Balasore direct towards Calcutta, will soon be freighted with deadly pestilence. Notwithstanding this direct geographical contiguity of the famine districts to the oldest and richest province of British India, they are cut off from it for lack of the simplest form of public works—common roads. Can this neglect of our most evident duties be fathered upon a beneficent Providence? In what way is public prayer a remedy for the absence of roads and consequent starvation, unless our supplications take the form of humbling confession and faithful vows to remove the real causes which have invited the calamity?

Putting aside all question as to the causes of the famine and whether the catastrophe might have been averted, it is painfully evident that the Bengal Government and its Board of Revenue have been slow to comprehend the extent and depth of the calamity. Whatever position in argument and theory respecting the province of government it might in ordinary times be suitable for Indian officials to take up, it is very evident that in a time like this they ought to cast European notions of *laissez faire* to the wind. We have seen Lord Napier of Ettrick—who might be expected to incline much more strongly to those notions than would many Indian civilians—throwing aside all squeamish or affected fears as to "drying up the springs of local charity" and turning every agency, industrial, benevolent, and official, to the urgent purpose and relieving the present distress. He has appointed additional assistants, and has been to "see for himself," which he has done in a far more effectual way than Sir Cecil Beadon could do in his flying visit to Orissa, though the necessity is incomparably less in Gaujam than it is in the Bengal districts just within the boundary line between the two presidencies. . . . The best explanation and apology we can make is this: the provinces now devastated by famine—the result of inundation, drought, and isolation—are, of all India, those in which the faults and failings of the old Company's government are most apparent, and also are those where the longest period must elapse before that active sense of responsibility will take effect—which is the best result to be looked for from the transfer of India to the government of Crown and Parliament.—*Sept.* 6, 1866.

LORD CRANBORNE GIVES IRRIGATION WORKS A LIFT.

BEFORE the delivery of Mr. Massey's Budget speech it was sufficiently well understood that the Home Government had determined to promote, as speedily as may be, the construction of the larger class of irrigation works, and to do this—which is the gist of the whole matter—by means of loans raised in the cheap money market at home, instead of depending upon driblets of our surplus revenue. It is also well known that effective aid, either in the way of direct loan or guarantee, has been given by Government to two large Irrigation Companies in Madras and Orissa. In pursuance of the former resolve, we have a new constructive force in the Government of India, of which Colonel Strachey, as Special Commissioner for Irrigational Works, is at present the representative. In consequence of the practical assistance given to joint-stock enterprise—that old enemy of the Public Works Department—extensive canels and embankments are being constructed in Eastern India, works which will form permanent defence against famine, and are already the means of distributing subsistence money amongst the impoverished labourers of Orissa as wages for honest work—the most effective of all relief operations. These facts are well known, and they inspire in many of us a sort of exultation as from the feeling that an irreversible step forward has been taken, and that for India a new path of material development has been fairly entered on.

The letter of March, 1866, from the Governor-General in Council seemed to have taken the breath out of the India Office, for no reply was sent until the end of August—six precious months being lost. The Indian Government had shown its settled determination to carry out its long delayed duty, but the repressive and discouraging influence of the Whig Secretary still stopped the way, although Lord de Grey and Mr. Stansfeld had come in, and it fell to the lot of Lord Cranborne to give out practical effect to the long retarded and thwarted purpose of our best Indian statesmen. In this letter, dated August, 1866, his Lordship notices the objections entertained by Sir C. Wood, merely to brush them aside by fully accepting the refutation so amply supplied by the Indian Government's reply: "After full consideration in Council," he expresses his desire for "the rapid and effective prosecution of irrigational works," and promises concurrence in any well-considered proposals which will tend to promote that object. And yet, in spite of this earnest desire to attain the end, there still clings to the Secretary's letter the old official tone of hesitation about estimates and plans, and he repeats the dogged denial—which must have been foisted into the document by Lord Halifax—that "any delay had occurred in regard to works of irrigation from the want of funds"—although at that very time people were perishing in Orissa by thousands weekly, wholly for want of irrigation works. Nevertheless it is by means of this letter of Lord Cranborne's that at length the end is reached. He acknowledges—and this time to more practical purpose than Sir C. Wood had done—the "marked distinction between borrowing for the prosecution of reproductive works, and for the ordinary purposes of Government;" he then adds the pregnant words—"and keeping this distinction in view, I shall not object to a loan being raised for carrying on such works." And, after a few more official "ifs" and formal objections, his letter concludes thus: "I shall be prepared to authorise such steps as may be necessary for raising any sum that may be required." The Government of India, in their reply (dated Dec. 7), after again pointing out, in effect, that the objections and hesitation of the Home Government had been frivolous and perverse, gratefully acknowledge that Lord Cranborne's assurance "that such steps *as may be necessary shall be taken* to provide funds, removes the difficulties which beset the prospect of the speedy extension of irrigation works throughout India."

In the Governor-General's letter, after naming that £700,000 is set apart for irrigation works for 1867-68, he pointed out the inadequacy of that amount when compared with the sum set aside for barracks. This remark affords an opportunity for showing the parallel, and yet the difference between the work of providing barrack accommodation and that of a complete system of irrigation. The former work—necessitated by the increase of European troops in the country since 1858—is necessarily a limited one, and the greater part of it will be completed next year. When the barracks are all built, there will be more engineers, and funds to spare for irrigation works and all other permanent constructions. The last words of the Governor-General's letter thus state the relative position of these two very different classes of works:—

> But while the provision of improved barrack accommodation for the European troops may be completed at an outlay of 10 millions within a period of five or six years, the extension of works of irrigation will demand a much larger expenditure, and be the work of at least a generation.

It is not perhaps the most interesting task to study retrospectively the closing stage of a wearisome official discussion; but whilst everyone is rejoicing at Mr. Massey's formal inauguration of the greatest revolution in the Public Works system of India, it is well to remember the efforts it has cost to achieve it. Those protracted efforts have for several years been carried on out of sight of the public, but have not been the less earnest and commendable. They would not even now have succeeded in overcoming the *vis inertia* of the India Office had it not been—first, for the dread of an invasion of joint-stock enterprise, and, above all, the occurrence of the terrible calamity in Eastern India. One remark seems to be called for by way of criticism on the elaborate papers of Colonel Strachey and the members of the Indian Government. They appear to keep in view too prominently the circumstances of Hindustan and Northern India, where, although irrigation works may be much needed for distribution, there can seldom, if ever, be any absolute lack of water, as the rivers are all fed more or less from the eternal snows of the Himalayas. On the south of the Vindaya mountains we are wholly dependent on the monsoon rain-fall, and therefore on the south of that great ridge artificial provision for the storage of water is imperatively required—a consideration which, we trust, will be well borne in mind in the appropriation of Mr. Massey's coming two millions.—*March 11, 1867.*

SCAMPING ON RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION.

SOME months ago we endeavoured to trace the origin of the gross defects in construction which were then beginning to be revealed in the works of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway. After making some allowance for the scarcity of trustworthy native builders, and the inexperience of European engineers and contractors regarding the effects of a tropical climate, we showed that the defective state of the masonry works on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, if not on other lines also, is directly attributable to preventible causes. Whilst faults in design were mainly due to the overweening confidence reposed in one or two persons at the head office at Bombay, the faults in construction—incomparably more serious than the former—were traceable to the blind confidence displayed in the contractors by the Chief Engineers, and the lax system, or rather absence of supervision thereby induced throughout a great portion of the Great Indian Peninsular lines. The District Engineers whose office it was to supervise the construction in detail—though fairly competent, and many of them very zealous men—found themselves no match for the contractors, who were implicitly trusted in by the Agency and the Chief Engineers, whose desire was, above all, to get the line pushed through as rapidly as possible. In face of these tendencies it was vain to expect that adequate supervision could be kept up—more especially as the pestilent sub-contract system was soon in full swing—and thus responsibility for the actual work of construction was dissipated or evaded. The specifications, since shown to be loose and essentially faulty, were frequently disregarded, and all the care exercised was to secure an outside appearance that might be sufficient to satisfy the superficial survey of the Government Consulting Engineer. Vigilant and detailed supervision was not maintained, hence the work is rotten at the core; and bridges and viaducts that would only have lasted a dozen years in temperate climates, have here collapsed in a third of that time. We also pointed out that, notwithstanding the gross defects in construction, the contractors had frequently been able to set both the railway companies and the Government at defiance, and to exact enhanced rates and engagements for extras which run up the aggregate amount to figures as large as those for which tenders by firms of large capital and high standing had been refused. The most serious national aspect of these abuses, as we have often pointed out, is, that there has been lavishly expended on our railway system—outwardly imposing, but inwardly defective—a vast amount of capital which, to the material salvation of India, might have been spent on water conservancy and bridged country roads. As there are thousands of miles of railway yet to be made in India, it is as necessary as ever to call attention to the mistakes and errors that have beset the construction of existing lines, so that, if possible, any recurrence of such gross national waste may be peremptorily prevented.

It is easy to point out, as our correspondent does, that under the guarantee system neither shareholders nor directors have any effective motive for securing economy in construction or efficiency in management. It is putting the case in an extreme form, but it is the fact that an Indian railway "may go to wreck and ruin, and may yield not a single

rupee of profit, yet the shareholders will yearly draw their dividends." Although in the nature of the case a completed Indian railway ought to pay its 10 per cent., the shareholders repose supinely on their secured five, feeling that the whole business is beyond their reach. We trust it will not be always so. . . . There is another important party to the bargain, and that is the people of India, who contribute the portion of interest which the railways fail to earn. There is now a sum of £12,000,000 due to the Indian exchequer for the payment of guaranteed interest, over and above the scant profits made by the railways. The interest of this sum represents at least an annual charge of one million sterling, and though this does not appear in any budget or formal statement, it is really a charge on the earnings of the Indian people, and at the rate we are going on — the Mulla viaduct falling one year, and next year all the bridges on 200 miles of line, besides sundry other slips in Madras and Upper India—it will be A.D. 2000 before this drain ceases on the annual earnings of the people of India. Then, in addition to this interest on payments made in former years, there is the annual charge for interest in lieu of profit, which in 1866-7 amounted to £800,000. We do not dispute that even at this dear rate India is far better off with the railways than she would be without them; but we do contend that a large portion of this drain upon our resources ought to have been prevented, that it is referable to gross mismanagement, and that it is the result of inherent defects in our system of railway construction and management. Where then is the remedy? for we have admitted that none is likely to be provided spontaneously either by the shareholders, directors, or railway staff. We can only come to the conclusion that far more pains must be taken by those who are the legitimate guardians of the Indian tax-payers.—*Feb.* 5, 1868.

RAILWAYS—ECONOMY IN CONSTRUCTION.

IT has been resolved, and by those who have power to perform, that India shall have a large addition to the number and extent of her iron roads. It becomes, therefore, a question of great practical interest, how can this resolve be carried out with the best effect and with the most exact adaptation to the special circumstances of the country. Our railway projectors have hitherto been in almost constant antagonism with our financial authorities; but if engineers would take more pains than they generally have done, to realise the actual industrial condition and commercial requirements of India as it is, there is no necessity for a continuance of this antagonism. Consulting engineers have in almost every respect estimated for works in this country under impressions and maxims gathered in Europe and America. They have looked forward too intently to the time when "increasing traffic must pay," and have given too little heed to the actual minimum returns on which only safe calculations can be made. This attitude, maintained by nearly all engineers towards Indian railway questions, has been especially manifested in reference to the question of broad gauge and all that follows in the adoption of a heavy and costly character of railway works. Having been trained under that system, and finding it adopted on all the great trunk lines of India, they have, on the principle of "nothing like leather," stuck to the doctrines of broad gauge, heavy rails, and ponderous rolling stock, and have seldom, if ever, admitted the practicability of a less expensive policy. Now there is a fair opportunity to revise conclusions as to the style and method of railway construction, and, as intimated several times recently, we shall be glad to do our part to bring about an intelligent agreement between engineers and financiers. We do not suppose that many of the former class are bigoted to old maxims or pledged to the existing scale of lines and rolling stock, and if they frankly accept the present situation, there is in India an excellent prospect for their profession. The present Viceroy, Lord Mayo, starting from the safe ground taken up by his predecessor, is determined that India shall have additional railways somehow; but he is also in unison with his experienced Indian advisers, one of whom defines "somehow" to mean—"by strictly limiting the first cost." . . . . . .

At the time this Minute was penned in 1867, the question of light railways and narrow gauge for India had not been raised, or raised only to be contemptuously thrust aside by the men of the broad gauge school. Lord Lawrence, with all his anxiety to economise, does not advert to such an alternative; but if it can be shown that, of the two to five thousand miles of additional railway now desired in India, more than half can be

soundly constructed at fifty per cent. per mile less than former cost or present estimates, and yet may be made capable of providing for all the traffic they are likely to evoke,—then with what emphasis may these safe counsels of the late Viceroy be quoted on behalf of the great railway reform we are advocating! But there are some difficulties and many prejudices to be overcome; and we wish to proceed, if possible, in the light of experience and with the sanction of professional authority. . . . . .

With regard to the most promising and essential of all these railways, the Rajpootana line from Baroda to Delhi, the report from the Government Engineer, if that is to be accepted, forbids the expectation that the traffic secured will be "of sufficient importance to justify the cost of a first-class railway." If this be the case with one which would be really a trunk line of communication from Europe to Upper India, what chance is there for the revenue in guaranteeing interest on such schemes as the "loop line" for the Deccan; the romantic railway to Darjeeling, which is to give Calcutta another quarter of a century of decaying metropolitan pretensions; or the desolate line from Lahore to Peshawur?

Now, as one instance in which it would be desirable to adopt the present gauge of the Indian lines, we might cite Kattiawar. The case of that province—its hope long deferred, the willingness of its chiefs to co-operate, and the urgent necessities of its traffic—were well put by a correspondent, "X.," whose letter appeared in our paper yesterday. The Chamber of Commerce has more than once urged the local Government to promote the construction of the first section from Ahmedabad to Veerumgaum; and we believe both the Local and Supreme Governments would be glad to accord their sanction—on one condition, that is, that the B.B. and C.I. shall undertake to construct the line at one-fourth or at most one-third the rate per mile that has been absorbed in the main Baroda line. If the Board of that railway will lodge a guarantee with the Secretary of State that the Kattiawar extension shall not exceed the rate of cost just named, they might count upon immediate sanction to the work. If, then, the Consulting Engineer is willing to accept the principles laid down by Mr. Douglas Fox in the paper to which we have referred, supported as he was by several eminent engineers,—the Kattiawar line may be completed by the next monsoon.—*Aug.* 12, 1869.

JOHN LAWRENCE ON RAILWAY EXTENSION.

IN another column we publish copy of the despatch from the late Viceroy on the subject of Railway Extensions in India, written on the eve of his departure. It will be seen that the various topics included in this wide review are treated with a masterly hand, and the whole sketch of future railway progress is at last dealt with in imperial style. We have also good reason to believe that what Sir John Lawrence took so well in hand has been carried forward with intelligent vigour by the present administration. So well has this been responded to by the Secretary of State and his Council, that no time has been lost in coming to certain definite conclusions in regard to some of the lines first to be taken in hand. Not less difficult to decide than the question how much line, and what lines should first be undertaken, has been, Through what agency should the works be carried out? Are the existing companies to be entrusted with every extension that joins their own lines? Are such extensions to be made over to new companies on different terms, or to large contractors by special bargain? Or are they to be taken in hand, and kept under the close supervision of the Supreme Government? Whatever method be adopted, this last condition, we may depend upon it, will be maintained in a far closer degree than ever before. It is manifest that the decision as to the agency by which each particular extension or new line shall be carried out, will depend in great measure upon special circumstances in each case; but there is a strong tendency to supersede the clumsy device of London Boards. In the case of the projects that we now refer to, it is understood that they are to be carried out under the orders of Government engineers; but scarcely, we should think, according to the ordinary departmental routine. . . . . .

We regret to learn that (as regards Sinde) the authorities cannot as yet make up their minds to the best plan of all, that of continuing the line (but a narrow gauge one) from Kotree on the right bank. Colonel Strachey, as it seems to us, effectually demolished Mr. Andrew's desert line on the left bank; and the Canal from Roree to Hyderabad, with

an ordinary road thrown up by its side, would afford all the communication needed by that unprofitable country. The proposal to extend the Sinde line from Mooltan downwards—which involves the hauling of all the iron-work and rolling stock up the 1,500 miles of the Ganges Valley, to say nothing of the longer and more perilous voyage to the Hooghly for all the European materials—cannot, to us on this side of India, seem anything but turning Indian geography upside down. When our Colonel J. S. Trevor looked at the Baroda to Delhi project from his then stand-point in the Ganges plain, he seemed to forget that the entrance to India from Europe is from the west; but if the Supreme Government extend the Sinde line from Mooltan, they will be pushing the antiquated view of Indian communications to a *reductio ad absurdum*. To regard Calcutta as the port of entry for the material of a large public work, to be executed at a point 1,500 miles from the Hooghly, and only 400 or 500 miles from the western port, reveals how ingrained is the note of Bengal provincialism in the composition of even the stronger-minded members of the Supreme Government. It is not from local bias that we oppose this round-about plan of making the line downwards from Mooltan; for Kurrachee, and not Bombay, would be the port of entry for the Sinde line, and that harbour is quite capable of anything that would be required of it for such a purpose. Many years ago, when the *Friend of India* was much less local in its tone and leaning, it wrote: "From Meerut to the Suliman, the true outlet [and inlet] for Northern India is to be sought in Kurrachee"; and yet, at this time of day, the Supreme Government purposes to ignore that self-evident proposition. It is fit we should hand a word of comfort to the B. B. & C. I. Company, seeing they are to be shut out from Central India for an indefinite time. With more distinct assurance than we gave yesterday, we are now able to repeat that the making of the branch from Ahmedabad to Wudwan is in the hands of the Board. And if the directors do not see their way to accept the conditions imposed by the Government of India, that Government is prepared to undertake the line itself, and accordingly it may in that case be added to the list of State railways we have given above.—*Aug.* 13, 1869.

THROUGH TO CALCUTTA BY RAIL.

THE engineering work in the Nerbudda Valley goes on in gallant style. Though there is little fear but the Viceroy and the Duke of Edinburgh will be able to ride in a regular train all the way from Jubbulpore to Bhosawul at the time appointed early in March next, the match against time and nature will be a very stiff one. The struggle now going on is in every way worthy of that combined energy and skill which, when they have a fair chance given them, English civil engineers can put forth. That confident expectations have been held out of opening the line so much earlier than May, as at first announced, should in no wise be allowed to lessen the great credit due to the men who are now straining every nerve in that jungle region to keep the brave promises made on their behalf. The period at first allowed for completion of the through line having been, so to speak, voluntarily shortened by nearly three months, it is evident that a very great amount of energy and zeal has been thrown into the bargain by the Chief Engineer and his coadjutors on the spot; for we do not gather that much addition has been made to the skilled staff. Therefore, should the match be lost by a neck, the public will not be likely to undervalue the splendid running that is now being made. Any through passengers who may now go *via* Hurda, instead of round by Nagpore to Jubbulpore, or who come westward on the former route, would do well to take note of the magnitude and difficulty of the works now being carried through in the Upper Nerbudda Valley. It will be more easy now to realise the value of the engineering skill put forth than when all may be swept and garnished for the Viceroy's ceremonial opening of the through route. . . . . .

In noticing the energy and success with which these later works on the Great Indian Peninsular are being carried out, we may be permitted to remark, that it should not be necessary to go all the way to the Western Hemisphere to see or obtain the utmost results possible from Anglo-Saxon energy and modern engineering skill. It is quite right that the Government of India should gain what hints and personal aid it can from the rapid constructors of American railroads. India sadly needs cheap, efficient communication over long distances, and she requires to have this done rapidly, in proportion to the growth of debt on capital account. But it belongs to the profession of English engineers, Civil as well as Royal, to gather and test for themselves all new suggestions and novel devices

pertaining to their craft. Provided the Government of India grants to English or rather Indian engineers all the facilities it would do on behalf of specially imported American or continental engineers we do not see why the former should not be as successful as the latter possibly could be in rapidly extending the railway mileage of India. The Americans have pushed forward some of their long lines with amazing speed. Though slight, these lines answer their purpose long enough to admit of the traffic being developed sufficiently to pay for the relaying of a more permanent railway. But the route has been fixed in the first haste of inspection, and the advantages of the best "location" are necessarily lost. It is in "locating" a line that, under any system—broad or narrow, light or heavy—the greatest difference may be gained or lost as regards aggregate cost, traffic returns, and working expenses. This is being more clearly seen now in India; and if the Supreme Government, being free from financial let or hindrance, is willing to trust with generous confidence engineers already familar with this country and its requirements, there is no reason why our future railway extensions should not, *pari passu*, be as economical and as financially successful (though not nominally so cheap) as the average of American lines.—*Jan.* 17, 1870.

INDIAN RAILWAY FINANCE—PROSPECTIVE.

IN connection with the forthcoming Budget, so many details have to be considered, so many corrections of corrections will have to be made, so many explanations and apologies will be forthcoming, that it will be too much to expect the Finance Minister to bestow much attention on the higher branches of his art. Had Sir Richard Temple ever displayed any special aptitude for such topics as the development of currency facilities, the management of debt, and economy of public obligations, or the means of utilising and forecasting the resources of State credit, it would be unreasonable to look for his dealing with any of these difficult matters in the Financial Statement on which his pen is now employed. The public have no right to ask more from him just now than that he shall prove himself up to the mark in every detail of the Budget, that he shall produce evidence of complete reform in the Financial Secretariat, so that we shall have heard the last of the reproach that "Indians cannot count." With his hands full of ordinary work, we must be content if he does that tolerably well; but the weightier matters to which we have alluded press for attention, and amongst Sir Richard's colleagues there are men who are not likely to neglect them. Sir William Mansfield, with all his repute as an authority in monetary science, should not be content to leave India without striking another stroke on behalf of a gold currency and the revision of the note system. Sir Henry Durand has manfully confessed the great shortcomings of the Indian Government in regard to communications, and he will be expected to show the best method of providing funds for the more rapid development of public works. In reference to the economy of loans and interest charges, and regulations to meet the coming increase of national obligations, the Hon. John Strachey will have opportunity to manifest those comprehensive financial views for which he has, somehow, gained credit, without, as yet, having had the chance to put them before the public. Thus, if the Finance Minister will duly attend to his special business of looking after the odd thousands and marshalling the lakhs, there are plenty of statesmen at hand who will be at leisure to consider the millions. Some of them ought at this juncture to do what men can do towards defining the principles that must determine the financial fortunes of India during the rest of this century. . . . . .

Amongst proposals of permanent importance which should claim attention before the ground is occupied by the details that will be thrown up in course of the Budget discussions, is one developed in the pamphlet, "Indian Railways and Indian Finance," published in this city a few months back. No one now disputes the soundness of the decision, arrived at during the closing months of the late Viceroy's reign, that the funds for future Indian railways shall be obtained by direct loan from the home money market, so that the capital may be raised most economically, and all the profits from future traffic may accrue to the benefit of the State. The feasibility and advantage of Government purchasing the existing lines, are not quite so obvious, and the suggestion may be regarded in the light of a challenge to our official financiers. How is this to be done and wherein shall the State profit thereby? Let us state the case as it is put in the pamphlet

referred to. The writer points out the one-sided nature of the contracts between the railway companies and the Secretary of State. The Government is bound to make up from its general revenues the guaranteed interest of five per cent., though the profits shown—after a practically uncontrolled outlay on working expenses—may, as in the case of the Sinde and Baroda lines—only reach two or three per cent. Or, as in the case of the Calcutta and South Eastern line, the shareholders may compel Government to buy them out at par, though the traffic is so poor as barely to pay the cost of running the trains. He reminds us that one prominent result of the guaranteed system has been to cause a greater creation of railway capital than was needful. This, even in the case of the profitable lines, entails a permanent burden on the finances. The set-off to the sacrifices of Government in making up the amounts of guaranteed interest is the right to take half the profits that may be made in excess of five per cent. . . . Now the question is, what have our financial authorities got to propose in this matter? Looking to the fact that we are committed to a continuous increase of our interest charges during the remainder of this century, have they no plan whereby the annual charge for railway interest may be lessened, and a better share of future profits may be secured for the State? . . . . . .

The contracts with the companies, though adverse to the Government, do reserve to it the option of purchasing the lines at twenty-five, and again at fifty years after their opening. This is clogged with the condition that the rate of purchase shall be an average of the previous three years' market value of the several companies' shares. It is obvious that any well-founded expectation of Government buying out the lines would tend to expand the market rate indefinitely. The purchase of Indian railways would then become time-bargaining *in excelsis*. The conditions defeat themselves; moreover, the close of the first period of twenty-five years is too distant to make it worth while to begin to count upon any practical relief. It is just now that our financiers should show their skill in this matter, and before the State begins to raise railway capital directly. Possibly one of them may have in his bureau a scheme in all respects superior to the one broached in the Bombay pamphlet before us; but in the meantime this challenges attention. The writer points out that, as the Indian Government is formally liable for the debentures, which now represent one-fourth of the railway capital, and as it is virtually responsible for principal as well as interest on the rest, the transfer of the whole sum to our Great Book debt would in no way weaken our financial position. . . . . .

The writer has an easier task when he turns to show the great ultimate advantage which must accrue to the State in constructing future railways from the cheaper capital that will be attracted by its own direct credit. In an elaborate calculation (the details of which, however, require correction and adjustment) he shows that, by the year 1888, with 9,000 miles of railway open, representing a total obligation of 177½ millions, there will "be a nett surplus profit falling into the Treasury of 4½ millions sterling." We cannot do justice to this part of the writer's argument, and it is of less consequence to attempt to do so since his conclusions in reference to future railway finance had virtually been accepted by the authorities by the time the pamphlet appeared. We must give, at least, passing commendation to his broad reasoning, in which he shows the feasibility, safety, and duty of the Government of India expending freely on public works, and to his recognition of the fact—blundered over and misconstrued by our official financiers—that India on the average of the last decade "has yielded an annual surplus of five to six millions sterling, instead of being afflicted with a chronic deficit, according to the popular belief." Our present Finance Minister is, we fear, much too knowing to give heed to any anonymous pamphleteer; but in the preface the writer makes certain valuable suggestions as to the form in which it would be expedient to have the Budget accounts arranged. Briefly described, his proposals are to divide the Budget accounts into three distinct schedules —1. Ordinary revenue and expenditure, showing distinctly surplus or deficit; 2. Expenditure on non-productive works, such as barracks, &c., showing loans contracted, repaid, and remaining due; 3. Similar statement regarding productive and remunerative works, as railways and irrigation, showing current outlay on construction, charges for interest and maintenance, also the returns obtained. A comprehensive balance-sheet like this would vastly simplify all questions of Indian finance; and it is more than probable that even the Finance Minister himself might learn a good deal in course of its compilation.—*March* 10, 1870.

THE INDIA OFFICE'S SECRET, THEREFORE BLUNDERING, RAILWAY POLICY.

IT is high time the Government of India knew how far it can act, as master or not, over the vast railway system for the working and financial success of which it is responsible. When the new arrangement between the Secretary of State and the Railway Companies was first mentioned here, about a month since, every one supposed that the change in the contract had been agreed upon in consultation with the Viceroy in Council; but this, we now learn, was not the case. We may remind our readers that these changes consist of two main divisions, which do not, on the face of things, appear to be in any way inter-dependent. One is the agreement by which Government cancels the accumulating debt for guaranteed interest—debited for years past against the companies, now amounting to a total of nearly 20¾ millions sterling*—in return for which sacrifice, the State is to have a perpetual claim to half the profits over the five per cent., instead of crediting or surrendering all the excess profit to the companies after such time as the old debt for interest might have been repaid. The other concession, one which appears to be made without any equivalent, is that Government gives up the provision, embodied in its original contracts, which gives it power to take over the railways, on certain settled conditions, at the end of twenty-five years from the date of the deed. We do not propose to discuss the policy of this provision further than to remark that, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the probable success and economy that might result from Government directly undertaking the construction of railways, there can be little doubt that more efficiency and economy would be secured, in the traffic management and the maintenance of open lines, if under the direct ultimate control of the State, than, as now, under London Boards. . . As we are now given to understand, the Government of India had all but finally decided to take over the Great Indian Peninsular Railway at the term fixed by the contract, 1874-5, when, without consultation or question asked, out came the intimation from His Grace, that he had settled everything with the Companies concerned; the interest debts were written off, and the right to take over postponed for another quarter-century. It should be remarked, in passing, that in Mr. Danvers' annual report (dated May 20, to hand since the revision of contract was announced) it is stated that the proposal involving abandonment of interest arrears had been already made to all the Companies, and accepted by six, including both the Bombay lines. When the Secretary of State's off-hand proceeding in this great surrender was announced at home, the *Spectator* briefly but vigorously protested against it, and on constitutional grounds rather than from the Indian point of view, as we now desire to do. That paper seemed to think that the *quid pro quo* implied in accepting (problematical) future profits instead of gradual collection of an old debt, might be a fair and reasonable bargain, to which the Viceroy in Council would not object as one of the principals concerned. As to His Grace's surrender of the contract right to take over the lines, the *Spectator* very properly questioned the right of the India Office to make any such bargain without bringing the whole subject before Parliament. Our home contemporary's objection is not based merely on the ground of such relinquishment involving indirectly a money question, in its right over which the House is bound to be tenacious. It was pointed out as far more important that the granting of such a concession—the relinquishment, as the Government of India might think, of a possibly valuable option—really amounts to "the modification of a policy almost imperial." Not only almost, but altogether imperial, we should say. And yet the principal immediately concerned—the Government of India, which is charged with all the responsibility for the success or failure in this difficult problem of railway policy—was not aware, so far as we can learn, that any serious negotiation was going on in respect of this great surrender. Whatever right Parliament might have to exercise its indirect power over the Indian revenues and railway policy, it is clear that the claim to be consulted which the Viceroy in Council could put in would be incomparably stronger; yet His Grace virtually ignored both controlling authorities. We cannot in these days understand this secretive and autocratic style of dealing with huge financial and imperial interests. One might ask, Is Earl Mayo getting to like it? Sir Richard Temple prefers being ordered to do as Westminster bids; he is never so impressive in a Budget speech as when he affirms that it is by the Secretary of State's orders that this or the other piece of financial unreason is to be carried through.—*Aug.* 17, 1870.

* See Mr. Danvers's Report for 1869-70, page 21.

RAILWAY TRAFFIC CHARGES.

WE need not now do more than refer, in passing, to the high differential charges until recently maintained by the Great Indian Peninsular on cotton not full pressed, and the undue rate on all cotton as compared with charges on other railways. If we mistake not, considerable concessions have been made under this head. If we turn to the import trade, we find a striking instance of the extent to which one of the larger railways, like the East Indian, can "rule the roast," apparently without any practical check from the central authority, which professes to supervise and control impartially all our railway system, for the equal benefit of each province and presidency. Up to a recent date the rate charged on piece goods, destined for the North-west Provinces, was about one-fourth of that charged by the Great Indian Peninsular Railway to the same districts, *via* Jubbulpore. This company was, we believe, quite willing to lower its charges on this great branch of traffic, so important for financial convenience and profit of Bombay. They offered to carry piece goods at a special through rate to Jubbulpore or Allahabad; but here the East Indian Board of Agency interposed, and said, "No; you shall lower your rates all round, on both lines, whether you have inducement or not; or, if you carry at any special rate to Jubbulpore, we will lower ours to a ruinous figure." One may wonder how any railway could obtain this exacting power over another to the detriment of commerce; but reference is made to some mysterious provision in the contracts, on which the East Indian cabal relied to support its definite action against the Bombay trade and the rival railway. How this may be we do not know; but it is very plain that in railway matters, the Government of India is very far from being master in what should be virtually its own house. The piece goods dispute has, we hear, been compromised; but there is still the preposterous anomaly that Manchester bales sent round by Calcutta are carried up-country at half the rate charged on them from Bombay. This is a fact that ought to be borne in mind when boasts are being made of the larger import trade on the other side of India; for it is very certain that the wretched population of the Lower Provinces cannot compare in their consumption of English manufactures with the agricultural populations on this side of India. As to the passenger arrangements which have recently been made for next cold weather, the same imperious East Indian Board of Agency has drawn up its time-table solely to suit passengers from Calcutta to Upper India, as if the through route to Bombay were still to be completed. Some means will doubtless be found of overruling this downright stupidity on the part of the East Indian officials; but it is another proof that the time has come for their being brought to terms, and this is the juncture chosen by His Grace of Argyll for reducing the Government of India to cyphers in the matter of railway control.—*Aug.* 17, 1870.

II.—Mr. Arthur Helps, one of the popular authors of the day, and that, too, in the best sense, has in one respect set himself in opposition to the rising tide of popular opinion. Readers of his essays will remember that several times he remarks, apparently in all earnestness, on "the deplorable consequences that result from business being entrusted to women." Not only is this remark opposed to the prevailing sentiment in favour of allowing greater scope to the gentler sex in managing the ordinary affairs of life, but it is rather surprising as coming from one who has had very peculiar opportunities of witnessing that special aptitude possessed by the highest lady in the land for business of the greatest importance—to which talent we have recently had such emphatic testimony from the Conservative leader and the popular Court *padre* of the Barony Church. Possibly Mr. Helps, both from loyalty and conviction, might plead that Her Majesty's facility for disposing of affairs of State must be regarded as an exception which only serves to bring out the general correctness of his proposition. . . . Something of this sort might be noted a few weeks back in one of the lively letters of "Our Own" lady correspondent in the North-west Provinces. After guessing at the causes of the discouraging decline of traffic receipts on the East India line, she went on to make various remarks for the benefit of our merchants. . . . . .

Our Bombay merchants are scarcely likely to send "bagmen" to stump through the Doab country and the Punjab; but it is possible they are too much inclined to the

opposite, that of thinking if there be trade worth having, it is sure to "come of itself." And the "speculative" writer of the above could not be aware of the almost insuperable obstacle to trade between Bombay and Upper India, *via* Jubbulpore, which then existed, in the shape of excessive charges on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, and which, for a year past, our Chamber of Commerce had been striving to get reduced. Since November 1, a considerable remission has taken place; but the rates to Jubbulpore from Bombay are still much higher than those from Calcutta to Allahabad; and it is too soon to see what will be the result of the partial reduction obtained. It may be well, however, at this stage, to take special note of this subject of decline in the East Indian train returns, and the more favourable position recently occupied by the Great Indian Peninsular in this respect.—*Dec.* 20, 1871.

THE BATTLE OF THE GAUGES—BEGINNING.

IT has been said, we believe, with special reference to Mr. Gladstone's Budgets and his speeches in describing them, that "in modern politics finance is everything." Nowhere would this aphorism include a larger portion of the whole truth than in India. Few proposals could illustrate this better than the vast railway project to which the Indian Government has committed itself, and more so when considered, as it should be, in connection with the capital needed for the unmatured but scarcely less costly irrigation works which our statesmen desire to carry out within a period similar to that which must be occupied in constructing the railways already planned. . . . Therefore now, at this juncture, when proposals are made to introduce a narrow gauge and less costly style of railway, we are bound to look at the question as a whole. We must, in the first instance, lay aside our settled preferences in favour of the imposing system of the broad gauge, and suspend judgment in a case on the decision of which hangs a financial issue of all but the first magnitude. The various considerations in detail which arise on the mention of two gauges instead of one, are important in their place; but it may not be difficult to show that they are dwarfed into insignificance compared with the question—shall we have 4,000 miles of rail at £12,000 per mile, or 8,000 to 10,000 miles at £5,000? And there is besides a vast annual difference in working expense which may be claimed by the advocates of the cheaper and more extensive project.

Let us look at the splendid programme set forth in the schedules affixed to the great batch of Railway Minutes. There is a trait of modesty in the Government of India's manner of putting these forward which should not be lost sight of. The amalgamated group of 25 schemes, involving an outlay of £48,805,000, is entitled "Abstract of the Various Proposals submitted by Local Governments in 1868." We dare say the provincial authorities will sit tolerably easy under the responsibility of their proposals, but it should be borne in mind that amongst the most costly and unremunerative projects are those two favourite schemes of the Supreme Government—the Lahore and Peshawur (£5,100,000), and Khundwa to Indore (£1,500,000). Also that extraordinary proposal for a line from Nagpore to Etawah (£6,750,000) bears the mark of one of the Viceroy's colleagues—probably that somewhat imaginative projector, the Finance Minister. These three schemes, all ranked as for "first-class" lines, are to absorb one-fourth of the whole outlay so considerately entered as due to the "proposals of Local Governments in 1868."

We will now broadly apply to this magnificent project of twenty-five railways, great and small, the reduction in cost which would be secured by the general adoption of a 3½-foot gauge. The total length of line included in the "Abstract" of proposals is 4,046 miles. To these may be added from the "already sanctioned" list the Lahore and Rawulpindee, 173 miles, not yet touched, and the 661 of the Oude and Rohilcund, not yet in course of construction—giving a grand total of 4,880. . . . There are only two railways of 164 miles proposed as definitely light lines. For the "first-class" railways we will take the average of £12,000 per mile. . . . . .

Engineers who have been raised in the school of broad gauge and ponderous engines, are accustomed to speak of the Indian gauge of 5½ feet as being as near perfection as could be wished. But these engineers admit that the heavy rolling stock for which the broad gauge is intended involves great wear and tear of rails and permanent way, with continuous and heavy cost of working, for which nothing can compensate but a large and remunerative traffic, such as exists in the densely peopled manufacturing countries of Europe or Eastern

America. As the question at present stands in India, it may be granted that the broad gauge, with its great convenience and all its costly concomitants, should be maintained on an important imperial route like that which the Great Indian Peninsular and the East Indian will soon complete between Bombay and Calcutta—or rather between the western coast and Upper India *via* Allahabad, for the eastern "capital" must gradually decline in imperial importance. Beyond this one main line of communication, we think that on the advocates of the costlier system must be thrown the burden of proving its suitability for India. . . . . .

Probably the Indian Government, in its present confident temper, may see its way to prevent "incursions of the heavy rolling stock" on the lighter lines of the standard gauge; but its orders to that effect will have to be very peremptory. The last remark made by Mr. Hemans leads the way to mention another great advantage attending the adoption of the narrow gauge. Not only is the first cost per mile nearly 50 per cent. less, but the length of the route may often be considerably reduced where the narrow gauge is adopted. The shorter curves and the steeper gradients of a railway on this plan would make an immense difference in aggregate length of the lines now under consideration. In nearly all the longer lines now proposed, the nature of the country is such that the saving in length of line by the adoption of the narrow gauge would be very considerable. Engineers will recognize at once the similarity between several of our Indian districts, now virtually closed to commerce for want of railways, and those in Australia, where this economical and effective plan has been found to answer so well. We quote again from the Institute paper already laid under contribution :—

In Queensland, the gauge of 3 feet 6 inches was determined on the following reasons : First, there were already two gauges in Australia, so that uniformity was out of the question ; secondly, a curve of five chains radius on this gauge is nearly equal to a curve of eight chains radius on the 4 feet 8½ inches gauge ; and the country, on the Main and Little Liverpool ranges, is of so peculiar a character, with frequent ravines and spurs running out from the main range, that it was found, by a careful survey and estimate, if curves of eight chains radius were adopted, as upon the Blue Mountains, New South Wales, the cost would be increased more than threefold. In the item of viaducts alone, the cost would have been £35,040 per mile, as against £6,100—an amount quite beyond the means of the colony. The gauge was therefore fixed at 3 feet 6 inches, and the minimum radius of the curves was reduced to five chains.

We need not take further trouble to give point to this illustration when we cite, though for different reasons, the Carwar to Hooblee route, and that from Kotree to Mooltan right bank—more especially between Kotree and Sehwan, where the spurs of the mountains have afforded some excuse for preference of the extravagant left bank scheme. But we do not desire at present to go into detailed comparisons. Our object is to call immediate and serious attention to the possible prodigal sacrifice of many millions of the capital for which India hungers, by sinking it in a costly style of works for which the traffic of the country can never pay.—*Sept.* 14, 1869.

ENGINEERS FOR INDIA—ROYAL OR CIVIL.

IT is well that at this juncture the constitution of the Indian Public Works Department should be thoroughly overhauled. With a current deficit, caused in great measure by unauthorised expenditure in public works, the Government of India is about to launch into some of the most gigantic undertakings in civil works ever taken in hand by any Government, and the tools with which it works should be carefully chosen and well tempered. Some few months back it was remarked with surprise that in prospect of these vast civil engineering works, the Secretary of State was sending out an unprecedented number of Royal Engineers. The philosophy of thus selecting costly military men to carry out civil works is supposed to be, that "tone" is required, and that military habits of discipline and fidelity to duty are needed to bind together the vast and miscellaneous industrial army which the Government of India must soon have under its command. So far, there is, from an Indian point of view, much to be said for the importance of "tone"; but there has been exaggeration in this direction. Offence has been needlessly given to civil engineers by publicly warning the whole profession that when employed under Government they must, like soldiers, be content with their pay. But it has been shown through the press, both at home and in India, that the pay, promotion, and other provision offered by the Indian Government to civil engineers entering its service by competitive examination are insufficient, and glaringly unequal in comparison with the aggregate pay and influence

enjoyed by military engineers. This wide contrast cannot be permitted to endure, or the Royal Engineers will have to be much restricted in number compared with the whole strength of the department. India cannot afford public works the actual cost of which must be computed as including the military as well as civil pay of Royal Engineers. . . .

The time has come not only for a reconstitution in principle of the Public Works organisation, but for a thorough investigation of the abuses in detail so often alleged as overweighting every operation of the department. . . . These evils are remediable; but not without the exercise of firm determination and liberal encouragement of engineers and surveyors with practical knowledge of details, to which qualifications must be added familiar acquaintance with the vernaculars, long provincial experience, and settled contentedness with an Indian career. These conditions must be secured if the Indian Government is to go forward with its plans for the construction of larger works than ever. The correspondent already referred to concludes his letter as follows :—

> 'After an experience of twenty-five years I can safely say, you may leave your army alone *if you wish*—you may arm your coolies, and dhobees, and tailors,—if you will only look to your Department of Public Works. But no State can afford to build permanent bridges and macadamise 100 miles of road for Brinjara (pack) bullocks and hackery wheels, or to build refrigerators in the shape of double-storied barracks,—patent producers of asthma, lumbago, and rheumatism,—costing lakhs of rupees, or to pour coin into the hands of native and European contractors to simply carry out the departmental rule—of useless expenditure and wanton waste of money.

The break-down of the Financial Secretariat and the wrangle over the Budget estimates are not unimportant matters, but they are mere details compared with this question of the reorganisation of the Public Works Department, which demands the earnest attention of all the fast friends of India, whether here or at home.—*Nov.* 23, 1869.

II.—In another column we reprint the preface of the little *brochure* entitled "Public Works and the Public Service in India," which, as will be seen, is edited by Major Evans Bell, the second portion of the work being his own. As explained in the preface, it is the first portion, that on Public Works, which gives special interest to this publication at the present day. But it is more because of the position, the continuous and various Indian experience of the writer, Colonel F. Tyrrell, R.E., that his section of less than thirty pages is valuable at the present juncture. No good purpose is answered by journalists who, when public works are the topic, merely fume and fret against the amount of expenditure. So long as we raise half our revenue from land, the State must make communications—either promoting them by advances or guarantees, or carrying them out itself; it must store water and provide for its distribution; and, like all other Governments, it must erect buildings needful for the decent and effective conduct of administration. Of course, all these things must be done "in reason;" that is, with due regard to the funds and credit available. . . . Both these writers, the Royal Engineer most emphatically, support this popular estimate of the poor results attained by the Public Works Department agency; but, like reasonable men, one of them a tried and tested expert, they address themselves to the problem, how are the obligations to the people to be met, without the drawbacks which have hitherto beset the attempt? . . . . . .

It is in the emancipation of the Executive Engineer from the necessity of "reporting the childish minutiæ now insisted on" that the writer sees some hope for the future, so far as method is concerned. But he insists that there must be extensive reorganisation: "The Department should be opened, relieved from the domination of military engineers, and yet preserved from sinking, according to Indian custom and tradition, into a close and privileged service." . . . Therefore, though the salary of "an Engineer of great reputation and high standing"—one of the first of his class in Europe, we presume—would be as much as that of an Executive Councillor, our author would have such a Civil Engineer of weight and authority selected, and associated with the Viceroy, affirming that "such a man would save his own salary in the first year, and in ten years would reproduce it ten times over." . . . He then points out the painful contrast between the professions of our leading statesmen to the effect that the public services are open to the people of India, and the conspicuous absence of native names from the higher posts of the public service, entry to which by comparatively few of the people would fill the land with the firmest loyalty and productive emulation. Contrasting these sounding professions

at home, in Parliament and State papers, with the shabby, halting, and grudging practice in India, Major Bell remarks—

> The general result is this, that although there are no positive rules excluding natives from the better class of uncovenanted appointments in the Indian Public Works Department, somehow or other they are never appointed, simply, I believe, in consequence of that "social and sentimental bar," that "self-satisfied and supercilious spirit," of which Sir Bartle Frere speaks, and which the two most recent developments of India Office liberality which I have just noticed seem unhappily intended to pamper and perpetuate.

The "developments" referred to are the establishment of the College for "the sons of the British householder" and the elaborate canvassing for candidates for the Forest Department. It seems, the Duke of Argyll said in Parliament there is "one College in India for the education of Civil Engineers," thereby implying that His Grace knows only favoured Roorkee. The writer reminds him that there is an Engineering College at Poona, established purposely for native students, and also another at Madras; but whilst there are in this presidency only two native engineers in the higher branch of the Public Works Department, there is not one in Madras. In passing, we may ask, is there not in one of our Chief Secretary's pigeon-holes a memorial on this subject from the native engineers, and which has "been waiting reply" nearly six months? Incidents like this remind one how much force there is in Major Bell's simple remark—"To govern a great continent is a task very different, not only in scale, but in kind, from that of managing a large office. Administration is not government." Some strong, wise, independent Viceroy, who may "rise to the height of the great argument" underlying those apparently trite expressions, will immortalise himself and weld India to England for ever; but that "king of men" must come soon, or he may come too late and only break his own heart.—*April* 29, 1871.

SECRECY AND WASTE.

THE removal of the Military Finance Offices back from Poona to Bombay, if it ever takes place, will, we believe, prove to be a typical case of the mischief and waste of public money which result from the secretive method of Indian administration. Briefly, the present position of the matter may be thus stated: The removal has been talked of for three years past; nothing was allowed to transpire officially on the subject until within the last few weeks, when some formal but indirect notice of possible descent to Bombay in two or three months' time was circulated; certain repairs and alterations in the old Secretariat have been commenced, avowedly intended to accommodate the Controller and his establishment; but out of what funds the cost of these alterations is to be defrayed, or by what authority the work has been entered upon, has not, so far as we are aware, been made known anywhere. Now, waiving for the present any argument as to whether this charge is necessary or expedient, we ask, can this silent and hidden method of working up to and arranging for the change be considered as a business-like and sensible way of conducting public affairs? The removal of these offices from Bombay in 1865 might be a wise or a foolish step; and, very probably, a similar secretive course was followed in carrying it out, though in that case we can imagine prudential pecuniary reasons for the reticence. The first cost of the transaction was upwards of three and a half lakhs, and at least a lakh more must have been spent in repairs and additions to the buildings in which, for nine years, the Controller's establishment has had its home. That expenditure has already been incurred and sunk, and the advantages secured by it, though bought too dear, will, if the removal takes place, have to be sacrificed altogether along with the capital sunk.—*Jan.* 23, 1874.

SIR JOHN HAWKSHAW'S ROUGH-AND-READY CALCULATION.

TOUCHING the large and now emergent practical question—what style of construction shall be adopted for the new Indian railways?—it would generally be expected at home that the Indian authorities, together with the majority of the engineers concerned, both here and in England, would surrender at discretion on the publication of the elaborate but concise essay on the whole subject recently written by Mr. Hawkshaw. Though the

document is addressed by him to the Directors of the Eastern Bengal Railway Company, for whom he is Consulting Engineer, Mr. Hawkshaw avows that he expects the general principle laid down in his paper will be applicable in most or all of the provinces of India. . . . His characteristic manner of dealing with engineering projects is essentially British—he will have strength at any cost; massiveness he prefers almost for its own sake; and, though he always intends his work to secure a return, he has become accustomed to think capital was made for engineers, and that the supply of that material is unlimited. Because of these national characteristics, Mr. Hawkshaw's opinions strike the popular mind and find ready acceptance with English engineers—his contemporaries and competitors in the great Public Works undertakings of the last thirty years. All this tends to give a heavy advantage in this new battle of the gauges to the side which already claims great preponderance in general opinion. It might be objected *in limine* that the special circumstances of India and the peculiar difficulties—though mainly resolvable into financial terms—that have to be contended with in carrying out ten thousand miles of new railways, demand the professional skill of some consulting engineer not less eminent than Mr. Hawkshaw, but one trained in a different school. But we must take what we can get.

Those who wish to see this great financial and engineering problem fairly worked out will be interested in following the arguments of a professional contributor who now opens up the subject in another column. Although "C.E." travels over the same ground as the eminent engineer at home, some of whose conclusions he traverses, his paper should not be read as a formal reply to that of Mr. Hawkshaw.

Leaving the exact comparisons and professional considerations in the paper now being presented to our readers to claim such attention from "experts" as they fairly merit, we may just refer to one or two points in Mr. Hawkshaw's argument that are open to criticism on broad grounds which every one can appreciate. He undervalues the importance to India of the saving of capital outlay which, according to his own showing, would accrue from the adoption of 3½ instead of 5½ gauge, namely, £2,800 per mile—less whatever imaginative persons like to deduct for cost of transhipment. Supposing this were to cost as much as the amount saved in maintenance and renewals—a monstrous supposition—there would still be a saving of £1,800 to spend on additional length, feeder roads, or irrigation. If India can obtain and afford to pay interest on the full amount of capital required for the more costly style of railway, she can far better afford that charge by making, say, one-eighth of the capital subservient to different but cognate uses. The bearing of this consideration in the aggregate is of immense importance to this country—so rich in two of the three elements of production, so poor in the means of utilising them. The total saving by adopting the 3½ feet gauge for 5,000 miles is admitted by this adverse witness to be over £14,000,000 sterling—less cost of transhipment. As, however, the extensions put before the country by the late Viceroy and his colleagues amount to 10,000 miles, we can claim on behalf of the lighter system, even on Mr. Hawkshaw's calculation, an aggregate economy in first cost of nearly £30,000,000 sterling in that length of communications. . . . The history of certain portions of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, and that ricketty broad gauge line which serves as a sinking fund in Sinde, have given us a wholesome horror of any excuse for economy gained by slighter construction. And it should be remembered by those who favour this tempting method of trying to show there is "no essential connection between a light railway and a narrow gauge," that, if the same proportion of paring down strength and bulk were applied to the narrow gauge system, there would be exhibited a comparatively increased contrast in cost. Probably that part of Mr. Hawkshaw's paper which will produce most effect—an effect necessarily out of all proportion to its engineering or financial importance—is that in which he dilates on the difficulties that might arise, supposing military emergencies should require troops and munitions of war to be moved in every direction at once all over India. In reference to this, we may quote from a note received recently from a civil engineer of great Indian experience—but not the "C.E." of the other column. He writes: "I think Mr. Hawkshaw makes far too much of the objections to break of gauge on military grounds. . . . India is an immense continent—not an island, like Great Britain; and troops can only be moved 200 miles at a stretch—they must halt at times." No one could more fairly estimate than could Mr. Hawkshaw the bearing of these considerations as to the relative effects of break of gauge on a continental peninsula comprising 1,545,000 square miles, when compared with the narrow limits of the southern portion of an island of which the total surface measures only 89,000; but the eminent engineer had, for the moment, entirely overlooked

this all-important compaison when drawing up his memorandum concerning railways to Darjeeling and Gowhattr It is entirely an assumption to suppose that, with uniformity of gauge, troops could be sent, in time of war, up and down India with celerity similar to that with which bags of letters are transmitted by mail train. The break of gauge at half-a-dozen principal junctions in all India—and there would be very few more than that—would, at the worst, only add, say, one-tenth or one-twentieth to the inevitable impediments that have to be overcome in the moving of troops and stores in ordinary times.—*Oct.* 4, 1870.

BROAD VIEWS INSTEAD OF BROAD GAUGE.

SO it appears that the experts or professional referees, to whom the Secretary of State had, in the first instance, turned over the question of "What is the best gauge of the new Indian Railways?" have decided in favour of 2 feet 9 inches. This is meant, probably, as half the present "standard" gauge; but, in effect, and in order to utilise evenly the existing rails, it will be 2 feet 8 inches, as some time since proposed in our columns by a correspondent, and recently supported on professional grounds by "C.E.," whose pamphlet will prove opportune for familiarising the popular mind with all that is involved in the decision now reported from London. Mr. Fowler's dissent in favour of a 3½ feet gauge accords with the views on this subject which we have continuously advocated since it became certain that an enormous extension of Indian railways was definitively determined upon. But, as four or five of the most competent professional men at home consider 2¾ feet sufficient, and as "C.E.," with his long Indian experience, shows tangible reasons in favour of that system, we must, perforce, in behalf of uniformity, surrender our preference for the 3½ feet gauge. The great position of the battle is won. The present wasteful and cumbrous "standard" system of Indian railways has reached the term of its dominion; and though the Khangaum and Delhi to Rewaree "State Railways" are constructed on the *cutcha* broad gauge pattern, no one will seriously defend such hybrid constructions. . . .

Of late years it has been seen, not only that there are limits to Indian prosperity in rate of growth, but that those limits may be soon reached and overpassed by lavish expenditure on European constructed public works on a scale and in a style adapted for the wealthy, thickly-populated countries of Western Europe. This is especially the case in the matter of communications. The immense value of them to India is seen more clearly then ever. But it is also understood that by adapting our railways, our canels, our tramways, to the poor districts they have to traverse, and to the great distances that produce must be carried from seaboard to central territories, far more will be accomplished than by extending the present magnificent railways, which may have to pull against dead weight for a generation before they yield even a bare English rate of profit. Now that the jarring authorities have agreed to adopt the modern economical and manageable system, we trust no more time will be lost. As soon as surveys have determined that any line will yield its proper return, every effort should be made to carry out the work in the shortest possible time consistent with soundness of construction.—*Nov.* 15, 1870.

RAILWAYS AND MILITARY SCIOLISTS.

THOUGH the crisis in the battle of the Indian gauges may be considered to be now passed, there is much to be done before the *debris* can be cleared away, and each party shall be at liberty to retire to its cantonments, and work away at the ordinary business which both wish to push forward—that of multiplying communications throughout this country. . . . . .

Save with a few tenacious engineers who may have special fancies for some particular style and width of permanent way, there is, in respect of this question, now no hesitation anywhere, except as to the supposed peril that might be caused by break of gauge. It is assumed by some, and feared by others, that in some period of dire military exigency the British Empire in India might be lost in the single day or hour that would be occupied in transhipping a regiment of cavalry or a battery of artillery from one line to another. No matter that by dint of a new, sound system of economically designed railways, rapidly carried out and widely multiplied, the said cavalry or battery may have been transported

five hundred miles in the time it would now take them to travel fifty; we are asked to fasten our attention solely on the day or hour that might be occupied anywhere in passing from the old to the new rails. It is difficult to know how to deal with one-sided reasoning of this kind, which evades the real point at issue—which is, how to make the best use of materials *available*, and how to provide for circumstances which are *likely* to arise. Questions of a sternly practical nature like this are not to be decided with a sublime disregard of limitations of means at disposal; nor is it permitted to any nation, desiring to live for the next century, and discharge its obligations, to spend an extra £20,000,000 to £30,000,000 necessary only for providing against a problematical contingency. As to the subject of means available for providing India with 10,000 additional miles of railway, life is too short to permit of that beaten track being travelled over again. . . . Therefore, those who are (or were) responsible for the future as for the present welfare and safety of the Indian Empire, and who feel that responsibility as much as men can do, considered that it would be profligate folly—merely for the sake of convenient uniformity in a peninsula of 1,500,000 square miles—to spend £20,000,000 to £30,000,000 needlessly in a country which is pining for lack of capital. It is admitted that our preliminary statement of this gigantic public works question is "accurate"—namely, that "we are to consider not what we should *like* to do, but what we *can* do;" and, in view of the facts and history of the problem just briefly summarised, we affirm, without fear of refutation, that the Indian Government *cannot*, in any working tangible sense of that term, "complete the great trunk lines on the standard gauge." Though no one who has fairly tried to apprehend the subject in all its breadth will attempt to refute this statement, it may, perhaps, be contradicted, on the ground that the British Government *can* do anything it likes, even though India be ruined in the doing of it. But this is not a principle that can be proceeded upon by those who do realise their imperial responsibilities.

It must be borne in mind, all through, that the only substantial point at issue is, whether a huge capital shall be sunk, and ten more years' delay in construction endured, in order to secure railways of uniform plan for the purpose of exceptional military strategy that may, or may not, be required once in a century? . . . It is idle to consider the military bearing of the break-of-gauge question, except with those who can admit that it is a matter of proportion and degree, and one to be considered along with other circumstances; but we are again assured that, as the lawyers phrase it, the rule must be made absolute. The value of uniformity in the Indian railway system is "inestimable," because in the precious hours or moments of transhipment, a battle, a campaign, or even the Empire may be lost. Now where does this lead us? Why, far beyond the beggarly railway system altogether. Engineers can do anything with money; and money is of no object when possible, though remote, military contingencies are to be provided for. Therefore, as "in war, time is of inestimable value," and as invaders may come without notice, it is necessary to have constructed from each of our principal depôts to the ports and the North-west frontier a big pneumatic tube, through which, on receipt of a telegram, there can be instantly propelled a regiment or a battery, just as the Camden Town post office used to transmit its bags of letters to St. Martin's-le-Grand. There is another alternative: the enterprising firm of Cannon Street that recently offered to transport provisions by wholesale into Paris by means of a steering, navigable ærial fleet, might be induced to contract—expense being no object—for the prompt transmission of troops and munitions of war either to the frontiers or to any strategical point that may be designated by a committee of military experts. Thus the battle of the gauges could be forgotten, and the toiling locomotive would be superseded. . . . . .

It is of incomparably greater importance that we should have railways *soon*, and *many* of them, than that we should have a theoretically complete strategic system for which we should have to wait half as long again, and then have traffic saddled for all time, by making it sustain the burden of the "hideous waste of power" inseparable from any compromise with, or adaptation of the present standard gauge. Those who attach so exaggerated, not to say "inestimable," importance to break of gauge as affecting military transport and supply, do so, we believe, mainly because they vastly overrate the capabilities of any, even a uniform railway system in India. Let them work out in detail a few considerations affecting the despatch of troops of different arms in India for field service under any circumstances; then let them take into account the special facilities that

would be provided at all vital points of junctions by the third rail under Mr. Fowler's proposals, and the centre rail under the Strachey-*cum*-Dickens's proposition. If in this review they allow due scope to the sense of proportion and just comparison, they will soon cease to interrupt, by their impossible demand, the settlement of this too-long delayed public works question.—*Jan.* 13, 1871.

RAILWAY OUTLET FOR THE SOUTHERN DECCAN.

THE publication of the "Papers Relating to the Proposed Railway from Carwar" will bring to a head the long intermittent discussions on one of the most interesting public works projects in this Presidency. Not that these papers afford all the data required for a final decision; but they plainly lead up to what is yet wanting, and show the path in which the engineers must proceed to their closing investigations. It is also shown that one essential factor in the problem may have to be replaced, that is as to the point beyond the Ghauts to which the line should tend. We have, therefore, above purposely omitted the words "to Hooblee." Notwithstanding that Mr. Buchanan's and the other engineering reports are dominated by the foregone conclusion that it was imperative to aim, in the first instance, at that most important town of the Dharwar districts, a review of all the considerations advanced in these papers will lead the non-professional reader to hope that the destination of the line to Hooblee direct, or to Bunkapoor only in the first instance, may be regarded as an open question. We put this suggestion in the forefront of our notice of these papers, partly by way of redressing the balance as against the oft-reiterated assumption that it is necessary to climb the Ghauts towards Yellapoor—where all the proposed routes but one converge—instead of flanking them by way of Sirci and Hungul, as suggested in Major Goodfellow's brief but very significant memorandum. . .

Though scarcely mentioned in this report, it is probable further consideration will show that Bangalore and the Mysore country are at least as suitable and promising as a destination for the Carwar line as are Bellary and the Nizam's districts, and incomparably more important than turning northward to Dharwar and Sholapoor. All these extensions may eventually be made; but it appears to us that an extension south-east across the Toongbudra towards Bangalore would be the one most rapidly communicative, and of most value for military and political reasons. Here we may remark that it is quite unnecessary to overweight the mileage estimate of the Carwar line with the assumption that it could be allowed to stop short either at Hooblee or Bunkapore, or that it is to be made only for cotton. We cannot understand how Colonel Trevor should have been led by any doctrine of Dr. Forbes's to accept the opinion that the South Mahratta Country would have no grain for export. Our own information accords with the statement of the Collector, that there are generally very large stocks of grain in those districts, which by the cheap coast communication from Carwar could be landed at Bombay considerably to the relief of our food markets. The first conclusion is one depending entirely on practical engineering judgment, and we should be glad to accept Colonel Trevor's decision in favour of a wire rope lift, if the permanent way and other original appliances required on that principle would permit of being easily enlarged or altered for ordinary locomotives should the traffic increase beyond the capacities of so primitive a contrivance as the wire rope and stationary engine. As in his third conclusion Colonel Trevor admits that a narrow gauge line would carry the traffic, he throws up his special plea in favour of a hybrid system of broad gauge and *slight* lines. We hope hereafter to do full justice to his reasoning on this subject, which is connected with financial issues of the greatest moment; and we do not fear but it will be practicable to turn some of his arguments against the universal broad gauge system, which at present he defends. It is in respect of the final conclusion that we think Colonel Trevor's bias has a little got the better of his own logical skill and scientific judgment. According to his own showing in his report, the "circumbendibus line" could only be "a more remunerative undertaking for Government, and more advantageous to the general public," at the cost of the traffic itself; while such a patched and cumbrous scheme could only be brought into use at all by sacrificing all the multiform advantages that must follow from utilising the safe harbour of Carwar, and effecting an independent communication between the sea and all the Southern Deccan.—*Dec.* 1, 1869.

II.—It is wonderfully relieving to many minds to have a large and difficult question disposed of in a few lines. Such a feat was thus accomplished by our daily contemporary, by way of parenthesis, in course of many much better weighed remarks last Saturday on the Carwar Railway project :—

We are glad also to note that Colonel Trevor, showing his usual sound sense, is opposed to the foolish idea of a narrow gauge, although he points out that, considering the traffic, the line and the rolling stock might be lighter than the general run. We are convinced that a break of gauge would entail great loss and inconvenience, and would be a fine specimen of that penny wisdom and pound folly with which the teachings of the more-haste-less-speed school among our advanced progressionists abound.

This is a concise transcript of the popular opinion and prejudice which prevail on the subject that is so cavalierly brushed aside. It is by no means incompatible with the "usual sound sense" of Colonel Trevor that, in common with the majority of English and Indian engineers, he should be strongly dominated by his prepossessions in favour of that railway system which happens to be in possession of the Indian field. It is scarcely needful, however, to remark that Colonel Trevor's dictum, highly as we esteem his usually well-supported opinions, will be of little avail to settle the question whether the "pound folly" is to prevail, which would force over the whole of this wide and often poor country a railway system that is suited only to a coal and iron producing country like England, and which is scarcely a financial success amidst the comparatively short lines and highly lucrative traffic at home. It is at least highly desirable that this question should be fairly looked at before fresh railway ground is broken in India. The two sentences quoted from our contemporary do not even beg the question. To treat it in this fashion is an attempt to stamp out the discussion at starting. This method, as we have said, is very facile, and decidedly popular with the large numbers who can only read as they run; but our contemporary may rest assured that a great question of Public Works administration, involving a first expenditure of £20,000,000 and corresponding results as to profits and returns, will not be settled off-hand or on the principle that whatever is, is right. As to this Carwar line, Colonel Trevor admits that a narrow gauge will carry the traffic, and—besides that he has probably fixed the relative cost of the cheaper system far too high—he will have to adduce much stronger reasons than yet appear for adopting there the present heavy, costly system, or for introducing an imitation of it in a lighter style, which may invite insecurity and bring economical railway construction into undeserved disrepute.—*Dec.* 4, 1869.

III.—By chance coincidence, on the same day last week on which our article appeared relating to the South Mahratta Railway, an advertisement was drawn up calling for surveyors to aid in carrying forward investigations in respect of that project, from the stage at which last year's surveys were left, as described in Colonel Trevor's report and the other papers published therewith. It is satisfactory to have some evidence that new railway communications for this Presidency do not necessarily occupy a less prominent place in Viceregal solicitude than is obtained by projects in the Central Provinces, or those in the barren and remote regions beyond Lahore. . . . Should the South Mahratta Railway, as it must eventually, be carried eastwards and southwards, the land-locked and grain-producing districts of Mysore and the Nizam's territory will yield large supplies for this market.

The prospect of a future connection with Bellary and Bangalore should, if rightly regarded, put an end to any jealousy there may be of rivalry between Carwar and Bombay. That port, if the railways from it are economically constructed and judiciously planned, will bring to the western coast a large amount of new trade from the Madras Presidency and the two largest Native States of the Deccan. It will be the fault of the Bombay merchants themselves if they do not secure control over that new commerce, and also much profit from the import trade which, in connection with the small steamers of the Suez Canal, will seek the Malabar Coast when a far more productive country than behind Beypore shall be opened out by the Carwar Railway and its feeders. Far-seeing merchants amongst us quite understand that, so far as the cotton trade is concerned, the great object must be to create facilities for export as near to the great fields of production as possible. Bombay cannot resist this tendency, and need fear nothing from its ultimate results. With our unrivalled harbour and direct railway communication with Central India and Hindostan, we shall have all the traffic that can be conveniently accommodated in this little island and its vicinity. And when most of the "fair Dhollera" shall be shipped from Gogo, all the northern

Guzerat cotton from Broach, and all the Dharwar staple from Carwar, Bombay will then not be less, but more a city of merchant princes and traffickers of the earth. Special laws and regulations may be needed for our cotton trade whilst it is condemned to endure roundabout routes, and must depend on a long chain of middlemen; but when the producer and the exporter or European buyer stand on equal ground, the day of that tutelage will be over. That our staple trade is yet a long way from that stage of commercial civilisation is evident from the formidable nature of this Carwar Railway enterprise, which only serves one large cotton field; while the utilisation of Broach and Gogo as places of direct export is a design only beginning to be thought about.—*Jan.* 24, 1870.

IV.—We give more than due prominence to a letter entitled "Coompta *versus* Carwar." Its composition is unexceptionable; the meaning of the writer is plain enough; moreover, we know him to be fully competent to express an opinion on the general question raised in his letter. It is probable, also, that he has some special knowledge of the particular public work referred to—though that knowledge is, apparently, neither recent nor full. Notwithstanding many advantages on the side of the writer, the letter is one of a class which makes us sometimes despair of anything effectual being done towards supplying the country with communications which will really touch its productive powers. Under this term we include, besides railways and roads of all kinds, canals and ports. As a general proposition, though subject to qualifications in every instance, it is, as our correspondent remarks, most expedient and equitable to provide communications in the first instance for centres and routes of trade that already exist. It is to neglect of this elementary and obvious principle that we must attribute a considerable portion of the ruinous deficiency in our present railway traffic returns. But in applying or deviating from that principle, the special circumstances of each case have to be carefully considered. In regard to alternative railway routes and similar matters, we have strenuously insisted on the necessity of full and exact examination, aided by the indispensable assistance of public and extra-professional discussion. . . . . .

It is utterly undesirable to waste time in reviewing the question, if ever there could be one, as to the relative merits of Carwar and Coompta as ports. Perhaps we may be asked to cite evidence on the subject. In the first instance, we would refer to our own columns, wherein at various times during years past the special advantages of the port of Carwar, in connection with the land-locked position of the Dharwar collectorate and its export products, have been set forth in every point of view. But as these references may seem wholly vain to the much-regulated Public Works Department mind—and on the will of that all but irresponsible department this and all similar decisions rest—we would therefore point to its own shelves, where in divers minutes, letters, and reports all that could be said on behalf of the open roadstead of Coompta is duly recorded. . .. . We have steadily maintained that the railway must be located so that it will intercept the greater portion of the Coompta traffic, and directly serve all the southern portion of the Dharwar collectorate. . . . This remark brings us back to the important letter on this part of the subject which appeared in our Wednesday's paper. Every portion of that letter demands the careful attention of all who are responsible for making the Carwar Railway a remunerative undertaking—and such it can be made by professional skill, common sense, and local knowledge, each applied in due proportion. . . . But whilst they see the "State surveyors" making a pleasant field parade on the plateau in the latitude of Hooblee, or even further north, as if with the object of making some ornamental roundabout land line, the Coompta men can do no other than stand by their open roadstead, rude godowns, and lumbering bullock-carts. All this time the cotton, both the saw-ginned (utterly neglected by the Cotton Department) and the indigenous Coompta, is "bunded up" in the districts until next November.—*April* 28, 1871.

POPULAR SIDE OF PUBLIC WORKS QUESTIONS.

IN the recent Railway discussion which is now closing, and, we trust, in the right direction—that of a wise economy and scientific adaptation of means to ends—there was good reason and ample scope for a previous question to be raised. It was open to any one, either in the Executive Government or outside it, to argue that there was much

more to be taken into account than the simple problem, whether 10,000 miles or all future Indian railways should be made on broad or narrow gauge—immensely important though that problem was. Only brave Sir Arthur Cotton, of all our public men, had the force and clear-sightedness to raise the wider and older, but perhaps yet more urgent question, whether water was not better than iron. We have presented the people of India with 5,000 miles of railway, costing from £14,000 to £21,000 per mile, and leaving an annual deficit to be paid from their pockets.

'One would think that any man of common sense, looking back on the history and traditions of India, surveying far and wide over her extensive plains, and noticing in her hilly tracts and her deepest jungles the presence of fertilising tanks or ruined bunds, would have suggested that canals or irrigation channels might be more productive or more in accordance with the wants of the people and the clime. Perhaps these mistakes arise because the people at large have no voice, no strong public opinion, brought to bear on these questions, and that in reference to all these matters, supremely affecting them, they are thrust, perhaps, into the background, or their views disregarded. That may be the reason why they have railways given them rather than navigable canals, why iron is brought from Europe in English ships, and English engineers and surveyors plot and plan expensive railways and magnificent bridges for which the masses pay, instead of their fields being fed with water, now poured on the land in vain; while India's iron is unutilised, and indigenous intellect and talents are not trained for the people's own advancement. . . . . .

The natives of India, as compared with us, are not fools because they are vegetarians of the tropics and we beef-eating denizens of the temperate zone. They are as intellectual and clear-brained as are our own race. The people of India have their own opinion as to why we make railways and not canals, why we bring iron from England and do not work the iron of India. As a matter of politics, there never was a more short-sighted policy than to run counter to those practical convictions which the people have cherished from of old. Unless we have really the good-will and just feeling of the majority of the people on our side, no railway or no army would save us in an extremity.

We have hitherto, in many of our public works schemes, commenced at the wrong end. Because railways answered in our own little flat island of the West, therefore it was too readily assumed they must do so in India. The first requisite that must be secured for a people is a certain and sure supply of wholesome food; this comes before clothing, before locomotion. Since 1837, the year of the Guntoor famine, up to 1868, the period of the Orissa famine, seven millions are calculated to have died of hunger. The figure is overwhelming—let us say five. Have we been so carried away by our egotism, by the show and apparent dignity of railways, that we have been led to thrust that expensive luxury on a country whose first want was water—water for her life—water, her cheapest mode of transit? Having given her this, in the first instance, she would soon have demanded—indeed, required—the other blessings. With a fertile soil and extended irrigation, with carefully developed manufactures and well worked mines, the people might then have afforded quick and expensive carriage. Thus we should have acted, if in our pride and haste we had allowed ourselves to consult the natives of the land and consider their needs. If we had but allowed common sense to guide us, we should, looking back on the historical traditions and on the visible memorials of the country, have seen her greatest and paramount wants, and we should then have sought out the wishes and wants of the native rulers and chiefs, asking them to point out and help us in giving effect to the removal of those wants. Common sense would have dictated that the resources at our feet and the bright intellects around us should at once be brought into active operation to do that which our imperative duty pointed out. This we have not done. We have allowed our political arrogance, our anxiety about military power, to interfere with our clearly defined duty. Not, certainly, that this has arisen from any individual want of honesty in our statesmen, for what would appear dishonesty in the individual may seem but clever policy in a nation. It may, nevertheless, appear dishonest in the sight of the people. . . . . .

The people in India are entitled to be asked to decide what they want in the matter of public works, and also to have some say as to how the money shall be spent. Unless the natives of India and the Indian public make their voice heard, and insist upon taking their share in the development of the country, and unless they obtain a position which shall enable them to have a powerful control over Indian expenditure, our financial difficulties must thicken in the future.—*Sept.* 17, 1873.

MERCHANTS' JUDGMENT ON PUBLIC WORKS QUESTIONS NOT INFALLIBLE.

AS if the cause of the opponents of the Carwar line had not been damaged enough by the assertion that the Dharwar districts do not produce surplus grain, and by the organic blunder made in taking Colonel Kennedy's maximum and exaggerated working expenses to set against Colonel Trevor's traffic returns as erroneously reduced by his critic, our daily contemporary has done these gentlemen the ill-service of reproducing the romantic memorial of July, 1869, wherein it was proposed to "utilise the Bhore Ghaut" by bringing Coompta cotton over it, thus subjecting produce to land carriage of five or six hundred miles when one hundred would suffice. . . . . .

The ludicrous reference to the "utilisation of the Bhore Ghaut," if it were not a random shot entirely, can only have come from one interested in the increase of Great Indian Peninsular Railway returns, or utilisation of its "surplus stock," as no one unconnected with this company could possibly have dreamt of using such an argument in favour of dragging the produce of the Dharwar districts round by Poona. Experience, that remorseless leveller of theories and prejudices, has already proved that there is no occasion for transhipment of cotton at Carwar. The bulk of the shipments go thence to England direct, so that the supposed advantage of the "uninterrupted communication" during the whole year *via* Sholapore need not now be considered even in regard to the bugbear of transhipment. . . . . .

The determined opposition to this useful public project by a few ill-informed partisans, and the reproduction of the ill-advised petition of a portion of the Chamber of Commerce, are not calculated to retard the progress of the Carwar line—by a single day. And as Government is not likely to consult either the Chamber or our contemporary as to the political merits of the two lines, nothing need be said on that head.

This question has been so often before our readers that those who are well satisfied with good reasons when they get them, must be heartily tired of it; but we should be failing in our duty to one of the most promising public works projects of our time were we to allow to pass without notice reiterated statements which have been successfully refuted in years gone by, or to see brought forward without rebuke forgotten documents which many of the 1869 men would now wish to consign to oblivion. That this railway must be a success, no one who looks into its conditions, and who takes note that it will unite the Malabar Coast directly with some of the most fertile districts of India, can doubt. Seldom has a railway been proposed in India which has been so favourably reported on by the professional advisers of Government, nor has any similar project been laid before the Secretary of State with so high recommendation from the Supreme Government.—*June* 22, 1872.

II.—During the last fortnight several of our active mercantile men have given more attention to questions of communications and to railway economics than they have ever done before, except just at the points where these matters affected their immediate interest; and we sincerely trust this new bent to their attention and spare energies will continue long after the passing away of the extraneous and, in great measure, factitious stimulation which has in this instance roused the Chamber to an extraordinary though tardy effort. Many times have we observed with surprise and regret the continuous neglect with which our commercial community, both here and at Calcutta, have treated this weighty national subject—their obliviousness of its grave financial aspect—their indifference to the now demonstrated fact that the railway system hitherto carried out in India is unsuited to the geographical and commercial conditions of the country, and the utter absence, on their part, of any effort to support the Government of India in its well conceived but somewhat halting steps towards a thorough reform of the present ruinous broad and heavy style of railway construction. . . . As to Mr. Kittredge, who is nothing if not combative, and, on this subject, little else besides, we shall at once have to claim him as an ally, involuntary and unconscious of course, but still a serviceable ally in pushing on the light and reformed system of Indian railways. . . . . .

The present moderate estimate of this line from coast to plateau is a fair exemplification of what can be done on the metre gauge by men whose hearts are in their work, and

who are willing to cast off the shackles of habit and professional prepossessions. We may venture, from some little acquaintance with the subject, to predict that when the Arbyle Ghaut works are so far advanced as to permit of exact professional description, the reading of that description at the Institute of Civil Engineers will mark an era in railway enterprise. Perhaps we ought to say "in India;" for in Norway, in Ceylon, and Australia, this lighter, more manageable, and incomparably more economical method of locomotion has long been naturalised; and, if we mistake not, Mr. Kittredge will find that its advantages are rapidly being recognised in the United States. . . . . .

And now one word as to Mr. Kittredge's innocent question—what advantage has the Carwar over the Indore line? We must, it seems, once more remind him and his friends that Carwar is on *the sea*. They can surely understand that some considerable additional cost must accrue on all the ironwork of the Holkar's line, the base of which has 400 miles of railway carriage between it and the sea, while the Hooblee line has its own terminal port as a base. . . . . .

With regard to the question of carrying fuel and stores over existing railways, we have often been surprised by men who ought to know better expressing the half-view embodied in a remark by Mr. Graham to the effect that "if some expense is incurred in carrying material (300 miles), to Sholapore, it is so much gain to the country through the Great Indian Peninsular Railway." Mr. Graham is by no means singular in laying hold of this delusive notion. . . . Persons who look only on the surface say the extra sum goes into the coffers of the State, and *pro tanto* saves the revenue, forgetting that it is only the narrow margin of excess over working expenses which is so available, while the sum that would be dispensed by road, river, or canal, goes much more rapidly back into the hands of the people, and that, where you have the sea for a base, as at Carwar or Kurrachee, by far the larger part of the outlay might be saved altogether. Mr. Kittredge declares that merchants do not want cheap carriage, but speedy, regular carriage, and adds, "we are willing to pay for it." There he unconsciously exhibited the hard, stern selfishness of the mere trading spirit. Who are "we" that are "willing to pay"? Will any firm or set of merchants pay a single rupee per bale more than the cotton is worth in this market at the time of buying? And is not the price here ruled by the supply in Liverpool and the Manchester demand, wholly irrespective of the cheap or dear carriage that the bales cost in coming to Bombay? On whom, then, does the loss fall that is represented by the *fifteen rupees* per ton of avoidable cost which a section of the Chamber is proposing to fasten for a generation longer on all the export produce of the Dharwar districts? Certainly that fifteen rupees will not be lost by the merchants, but by the cultivators, by the dealers, and by the State which represents the permanent interests of the country. . . . . .—*July* 13, 1872.

III.—Men of better engineering capacities than the vivacious speaker at last Wednesday's meeting have also regarded the estimates for the construction of the Carwar to Hooblee line with interest and surprise, but for reasons altogether different from those which sufficed the said orator, who thought fit to denounce those estimates as "absolutely absurd." Just now, when the estimates for so many of the metre-gauge lines are being revised, or are awaiting final sanction, it is only likely that the Government of India should desire to test the estimates of the engineers more immediately under its own supervision by these very moderate figures for a railway which was supposed to present special difficulties. It will be found on consideration—which, of course, Mr. Molesworth has satisfied himself about by actual examination—that these difficulties are really much less formidable than appeared until the latest surveys. Yet even taking into account the natural peculiarities which, in one way or other, afford facilities on these Carwar Ghauts, very much credit is due to the engineers concerned. Their moderate estimates are one proof of engineering success; and though their figures scandalise Mr. Kittredge, the Government of India are attracted by them in the hope that on similar principles modifications may be introduced into other State railway estimates of first cost. . . . These men of commerce are bewildered and perplexed with an estimate of 145 miles of railway built sound and strong for less than a million of money; but the cause of the perplexity and absurdity is in themselves, not in the engineers. . . . . .

We can understand the Carwar to Hooblee line being opposed by men who take

their stand on the proposition that no more railways should be made until a few millions have been spent on cart-roads and tanks; but whilst simple arithmetic and plain logic hold their sway, we cannot understand men denouncing the line from the port to the cotton-fields, while they advocate another railway from Belgaum to near Poona, a line that must cross the upper courses of the whole watershed of the Western Ghauts, a line which could in no appreciable degree lessen charges on any export products whatever. Still less can those persons be understood who, while denouncing the Carwar line, advocate, in priority to that railway from the coast, an extension from Sholapore, after the crushing demonstration afforded by Mr. Forde's letter of the profligate waste that would be involved in such a course. Let us add, the two-and-twenty merchants may soon find out that they have been playing into the hands of the old Bengal party, which, as long as it could, grudged and refused to Western India that proportion of public works funds which is due to the large *pro rata* revenue contributed by our population.—*July* 17, 1872.

FINAL REPORT IN FAVOUR OF THE CARWAR, HOOBLEE, AND GUDDUCK LINE.

THE Report of the Committee appointed by the Bombay Government to revise the estimates—including those of first cost, working expenses and traffic returns—pertaining to the Carwar and South Mahratta Railway system generally, being now before the public, there should be an end of controversy. . . . As will be seen from the Government Resolution which we publish as introduction to the Report, His Excellency in Council feels no difficulty in deciding as to the practical result of the Committee's investigations: "he now feels in a position to recommend in the strongest manner the construction of the line from Carwar to Bellary, with a branch to Bunkapur." He discards decimal calculations of profits, being fully convinced that there is every prospect of the railway "yielding a direct return sufficient to make good the interest" on the capital outlay. His Excellency also is made to say that the Report goes to "disprove the vehement assertions made some time since to the prejudice of the Carwar Railway scheme." . . . The total figure for cost of the whole line stood, as finally settled with Mr. Molesworth's revision, at Rs.81,62,350; but the Committee have piled up additional and varied estimates that would make the total first cost amount to Rs.1,10,00,000, or say a million in round numbers. It is this addition of £40,000 which brings down the anticipated profits to 4 per cent. or under. . . . . .

The great defect of the Report, as it seems to us, is that it affects to ignore the palpable consideration, that in this light railway project it had to do with an organisation and conditions widely different from that of the existing lines. If the Committee were of opinion that the advantages of the new system are not so great as is alleged by its supporters, they should have said so; but as it is, while—very unwillingly, as it would seem, from the tone of the Report—they carry to the credit of the project the favourable estimates that cannot be suppressed, they carefully avoid attributing that credit where it is due—namely, to the lessened outlay and the greatly superior facilities which are gained by the new and lighter system. The route is a difficult one, as all are agreed. We have never forgotten that primary consideration during all the seven years in which we have steadily advocated the examination and, if possible, the prosecution of these much-needed public works. It is the metre-gauge and the lighter system which have at last sufficed to overcome those natural obstacles which seemed at one time to overbalance the one great physical advantage—a short cut direct from the sea into districts favoured above the average in fertility and thriving population. These broad considerations as to the special engineering interest which attaches to the Carwar project, ought to have found place either in the Report or in such a vigorous "dissent" as at least one of the members could have written. But, let us rest and be thankful, the end is gained.—*Feb.* 6, 1873.

II.—For an instance of "tearing a passion to tatters," commend us to the leading column of our contemporary yesterday, in which the Carwar Railway Report, and all concerned, from the unfortunate printer to the unlucky but, we trust, not overwhelmed Sir Philip Wodehouse, are soundly rated and treated to a renewed explosion of

"vehement assertions." . . . Having thus very inadequately referred to the scandalous insinuations with which it is thought fit to back up the local partisan opposition to one of the best railway schemes ever matured for India, we must cull two or three flowers of invective with which this "destructive exposure" is garnished. The public are told that the Resolution—in one place described as "this insane Resolution"—makes "sweeping erroneous assertions, and assertions which find no support in the Report," and that it "is eminently calculated to deceive." Again, the oracle declares: "We say the Resolution of the Bombay Government on the Report is grossly untrue in almost every paragraph." The hardihood of thus giving the lie direct to the authorities who bear rule over us is matched by the absurdity of the proposal comprised in the same sentence—to wit, that the Reports, the Resolution, and (it follows) the evidence and witnesses, should be sent before "a Judge of the Supreme Court at Calcutta." Surely we have reached a climax here; though, to give a finishing touch to this artistic and elegant criticism of a plain public works project, it is needful to glance at the concluding paragraph, where His Excellency Sir Philip Wodehouse is snubbed for his presumption in giving his opinion in favour of the Bellary extension as well as the Carwar line. This may all be very amusing, but it is high time the public at a distance were fully warned not to connect this "style of tactics" with the mercantile community of Bombay. . . . . .

One more accusation of partiality we must notice, though it also is palpably absurd to those acquainted with the facts. We are told that Messrs. Shaw and Forde, "who have been identified from the commencement (?) with the interests [sinister imputation again] of the Carwar Railway, were the only civil engineers examined." What about Mr. Le Messurier? We find not only that he was examined, but that he had the start of other witnesses, and that his evidence occupies about half-a-dozen of the large folio pages. And then what about Mr. Currey himself, who, though not an engineer, is intimately acquainted with the working, and strongly inclined in favour of the big and heavy system of railway communication? These influential witnesses (we class Mr. Currey as such here) were manifestly matched against Messrs. Shaw and Forde. They would necessarily feel that the existing system and the standard gauge were on their trial. Their strenuous efforts to bear hardly (not unfairly) against the new and lighter system were to be expected; and we anticipate that when the evidence comes to be scrutinised from an impartial professional standpoint, it will be seen that the failing of the Committee is in not having given as full effect as it might fairly have done to those strong points of superiority—facility in overcoming physical obstacles, economy in working, reduction in dead weight—which the new system, as represented by Messrs. Shaw and Forde's evidence, undoubtedly shows. . . . . .—*Feb.* 7, 1873.

THE DUKE STOPS THE WAY.

IT is very plain that the present Secretary of State (Duke of Argyll) is a very lukewarm follower of his predecessor (Lord Cranborne), who inaugurated his tenure of office by describing the present time as the era for India of "peace and public works." It was, we believe, irrigation projects which Lord Cranborne had chiefly in mind; but few of these have been accomplished or even undertaken in the arid tracts where they are most required. We are thinking of railways; and, in regard to these, it is evident from the evasive and shuffling reply of the Duke of Argyll in putting off the Carwar line indefinitely, that the India Office in its present mood will not sanction a single mile of railway if it can find an excuse for postponement—always excepting if the district can get up a famine and institute a claim for relief works. Tried by the rigid standard set up in the despatch of November 6th, the Northern Bengal Railway, but for the present scarcity, would have had a very slender chance indeed; and the Rajpootana line, which our merchants desire so much, has no chance whatever until there be again a famine in those arid districts—as in 1868-69, when the line, if already constructed, would have furnished the means of keeping alive many thousands of souls who perished from want.

It is true that the decided antagonism to further railway extension which we trace in His Grace's despatch, does not logically follow from the very reasonable proposition thus laid down—"and no purely commercial railway can, consistently with the principle prescribed for the expenditure of loan funds in public works in India, be undertaken, unless

its estimated nett revenue be, at the very least, equal to the interest payable on the capital proposed to be invested in it." What we affirm is that this condition—"estimated nett revenue be, at the very least, equal to the interest payable"—is fully fulfilled in the case of the Carwar, Hooblee, and Gudduck project, and that if the India Office cannot "see this," then it is hopeless to expect that it will see any other railway project that comes within the prescribed condition. . . . . .

But neither the Duke of Argyll nor Mr. Grant Duff have time or patience to look closely into the circumstances of the most fertile district, in the Bombay Presidency, which in this despatch they condemn to prolonged exclusion from the modern facilities which its export trade demands. At the time when the despatch of August, 1872, appeared, we pointed out the absurdity of the position taken up—namely, that the increasing cotton production of America would supersede the Indian export of the staple; but it appears the India Office is still ignorant of the conditions of Indian cotton cultivation. It does not seem to have occurred to those eminent men, that if the market price of Indian cotton is depressed by competition—a rivalry which is aided by all available machinery and locomotion—there is, therefore, all the more need to lessen the cost and facilitate the early delivery of the Indian staple. If the great men at the India Office can only instruct the Collector of Dharwar and the cultivators of the South Mahratta Country how to produce some export less bulky and more valuable than cotton, everyone will be delighted; and the clumsy cart of the period, or even pack bullocks, might suffice to remove the new export from Dharwar to the coast. But, unfortunately, it appears that if those districts cease to grow cotton as their staple, it can only be replaced by some equally bulky article, or one which will have to be collected from a wider area. . . . .

The little project to make a line from Bellary to Gudduck may "take" at the India Office, where the dynamics of communication are so ill understood that it may be deemed expedient to arrange for bulky produce to be hauled 380 miles to the more distant coast of Coromandel, instead of 120 to the more accessible coast of Malabar. Thus, His Grace of Argyll seems willing to help on to the due *reductio ad absurdum* that patriotic effort of twenty Bombay firms in 1872, by which a large part of the cotton trade of Western India will be transferred to Madras—just in time, by the way, for the new harbour that Mr. Parkes is going to provide for that port.—*Jan.* 1, 1874.

LISBON WISER THAN THE DUKE.

LAST week we gave some of the later information obtainable regarding the project popularly spoken of as the Goa Railway. Let us now take a brief retrospect of the larger questions of which that project is, for the present, the outcome. The public work most urgently needed for Western India we have long considered to be some facile mode of communication between the Malabar Coast and the Southern districts of the Deccan. . . . It may safely be affirmed that no district of this Presidency is more fertile or enjoys a better agricultural climate than the Collectorate of Dharwar, but no district is so much shut out from efficient communication with the outer world of trade. Let this exclusion be overcome, and the enhancement in value of produce and property which would accrue not only to the Dharwar Collectorate, but indirectly to forlorn Kaladghi, the southern taluks of Belgaum, and the extreme western districts of the Madras Presidency, would be such as to exceed any similar improvement that has been witnessed of late years in any other part of India. All this may be taken as proved: though it is only merchants who have attempted to trade with these southern districts of our Presidency, and a few well-informed revenue officers, who can fairly realise the immense improvement that would arise in the condition of the now land-locked southern districts which we have just indicated, were they placed in direct, safe, and cheap communication with the Malabar Coast. . . . And it must be remembered that even the cautious Government of Lord Northbrook admitted that claim, and, years ago, advised the construction of the Carwar-Hooblee Railway. It was the India Office which thwarted the carrying out of that beneficial project—when both iron and silver were cheap—thereby bringing on the officials concerned a heavy responsibility for the serious loss of life and great destruction of property which that railway would have wholly averted had it been made by 1877-8, as but for them, it would have been. We do not think it is possible to put the case more

strongly, nor is it needful, as everyone concerned will now admit the force of it. This is done by implication, in our Chamber of Commerce's letter published a fortnight ago; but we wish that influential body could see its way to speak out more emphatically on this subject of large practical importance. . . . . .

But it will be said this great public work is already well in hand under the form of the Marmagao to Belgaum and Dharwar Railway. Well: we are not kicking against the pricks, and are ready to acknowledge that, in principle and leading features, that scheme will subserve the essential purpose which ought to have been attained years ago by a Carwar to Hooblee and Bellary Railway. We cannot, however, refrain from contrasting the public spirit and prevision shown by the impecunious and straitened Portuguese Government in promoting that undertaking, which should, by comparison, throw lasting shame on the doctrinaires of the India Office, who so wantonly sacrificed British interests to their own purblind notions. It may be said that the Portuguese Government does not itself find funds for this work. Neither would the Government of India have to do that. The Lisbon Government did all that could be expected; and, like business-men, made the best of the chance that offered for securing the execution of the public work so as to benefit their own territory as much as possible. Have they not devoted to this purpose the whole of the four lakhs of annual compensation awarded them under their hardly contested treaty with the Government of India? They have also, under the same instrument, placed the future railway under as close control, on occasion, as are the guaranteed lines in British territory. And if the Duke of Sutherland and other British capitalists have been induced to find funds for the Portuguese Government instead of for our Secretary of State, so much the worse for financiers of the India Office.—*June* 12, 1880.*

THE GUARANTEED SINKING FUND: THE RUINOUS SINDE AND PUNJAB RAILWAY.

WE have been favoured with an early slip containing the full report of proceedings at the annual meeting of the "Sinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railway Company"—with the ever-sanguine Mr. W. P. Andrew in the chair. . . . As the chief object of pushing their publication appears to be the dissemination of Mr. Bidder's and the Chairman's anathemas against the light railway system for India, we are unwilling to exclude what is opposed to the position which we have so long taken up in this question. . . . Mr. Bidder, it must be admitted, is a man of heavy metal; but he is so intent on fanning the popular prejudice against break of gauge that he fails to perceive that his "logic of facts," drawn from experience in the former battle of the gauges, tells strikingly in favour of pushing forward the metre-gauge in India, and adapting to it the present financially hopeless system as far as that can be done. The report is not very clear at the point to which we refer, and perhaps this is because it had suddenly flashed on the too-confident Mr. Bidder that his arguments, from experience, cut both ways. He seems to forget, as too many other persons do, that the battle at home was decided in favour of the narrower gauge, itself one-fifth smaller than the "standard" forced on this country, which it is sought, vainly we trust, to make obligatory on all India. . . . . .

It is all very well to exult over slight increases in the gross traffic receipts; but nothing can be hoped from a railway the working expenses of which are from 75 to 90 per cent. of its gross returns. . . . Moreover, from the table of "General Results of all Indian Railways, up to June 30, 1872," we publish in another column, it will be seen that on an outlay in working expenses of 22½ lakhs, this line in that period only realised a net return of 6½. And as the "rain damage repairs" for the same period will amount to 7½ lakhs, it is plain that the whole 5 per cent. dividend will have to come out of the general revenues of India.

There are a few remarks in the report—though not so full and explicit as could have been desired—which go to throw some light on the disasters which have befallen the Punjab line, and the probable effect of these deplorable occurrences. . . . Mr. Bidder's apparently clear and consistent statement throws on the Government of India the financial responsibility for the disastrous failure of the Sutlej and other Punjab bridges.

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

In case any of our readers, in perusing the ingenious speeches we reproduce, feel themselves drawn into a feeling of opposition to the thorough railway reform which the Government of India has taken in hand, and are inclined to desire the extension of the present costly system in one direction or other, we would mention a compilation that has just come in our way which might serve as an antidote. It is a volume intended only for private or professional circulation, put together by Mr. T. W. Armstrong, M.I.C.E., Public Works Secretary, Central Provinces, aided by Messrs. O'Callaghan and Binnie, of the same Department. . . . . .

In those two factors—"constructed at reduced cost," and "can at a lower rate for working expenses do the same work as the original lines,"—lies the secret of the enormous financial and industrial superiority which, *for India*, the metre-gauge and lighter rolling stock offer, in comparison with the present line of sixty-six inches broad, with its ponderous engines, and trucks, and carriages, involving the haulage of an enormous surplus of dead weight. It may be that the vested London interests of the powerful guaranteed companies, or silly fears about the possibility of invasion from the north-west, or both combined, may result in preventing the thorough carrying out of the more economical and serviceable system; but it is certain as arithmetic can make it that any authorities who now bend before the clamour of London boards and the popular cry of Russophobists will have to answer to the next generation for a grievous and irremediable addition to India's financial burdens. There is yet time to adhere to the economical and independent course of retracing that false step which was taken in establishing the present system.—*Jan.* 22, 1873.

THE LIGHT RAILWAY SYSTEM VINDICATED: WORKING EXPENSES AND THE MILITARY BUGBEAR.

WE print a letter from Mr. Robert Fairlie, whose name is associated with the most modern and finished description of locomotive, though long known under other forms as the "bogie" engine. This make of locomotive is being adapted for use on lines of any gauge; but as its chief advantages—facility for twisting round sharp curves, for overcoming steep gradients, and yielding greater available power in proportion to weight of the engine—all tell with more perceptible effect in conjunction with light railways and narrow gauges, it is with these that the Fairlie engines are mainly associated; and it is as an advocate of this enormous aid to railway extension that Mr. Fairlie appears in our columns. He is, of course, a partisan, as George Stephenson once was, but he has now overwhelming evidence on his side, and cannot be put aside as a theorist. . . . . .

The only "lion in the way" of the radical change in our railway system—if its growl be not already silenced—is prompted by the notion that the Indian Empire might be lost because of an hour or two being occupied in the transhipment of a regiment or a battery. Mr. Fairlie treats apprehensions of this kind very unceremoniously—with much less deference than we have done—but he has good reason for brushing them aside. The adoption of this Livny line in Russia is a case which, as regards break of gauge, may serve to point the moral for India, apart from the rapidity with which it was constructed; offering in this respect a painful contrast, when we consider the snail's pace and interest-consuming rate at which many of our Indian lines have been carried out. The Russian line in question runs from the south-eastward to a station on the Orel and Karkoff (Charkov) broad-gauge line, which is a portion of the through route since completed from Petersburg to Odessa. . . . It is thus more formidable as "a disjunction and interpolation" than any that has been proposed for India, and, as such, it was, for a while, stoutly opposed both on commercial and military grounds; but what was the upshot of the discussion after looking at the whole case? The result is stated in Mr. Fairlie's letter, but we understand the terms of the decision were much more emphatic than there appears. The Muscovite Minister of Public Works said: "I care not for change of gauge if we can have two miles of railway or one-and-a-half at the cost of one we now have, always provided that you can guarantee I shall be able to transport as many goods and persons [in the same time] as I can now do on the broad gauge." We do not quite know whether the new gauge finally adopted in Russia was 3 or 3½ feet; but in either case, that condition laid down by the Minister could be met, and—as shown by "C.E." and others—with a considerable economy in working expenses. This line was "decreed"

last June: our word is "sanctioned," which marks often the last but protracted stage of delay; but the Livny line was to be opened on the 13th of last month, fully equipped for public traffic. This is how will becomes deed at the hand of the "barbaric power" that studies "how to do it." Such an example may fairly be considered applicable to this country, when in the following sentence from the *Petersburg Journal* "Indian" is read instead of "Russian": "On account of the great extent of Russian territory and the absence of capital, the question of railway cost [and speedy extension] becomes predominating and all-important. To find a possibility of constructing them cheaper, signifies to provide means to construct them to a vastly larger extent." Now, we have had "precept" enough, in all conscience; is it not high time we had some substantial "practice" in railway matters?

Yet one is ready to despair in noticing such incidents as the appointment and journey to Sinde of a high and talented Committee, to examine and report on the question, whether the Indus Valley line should be carried up the left or right bank! We beg pardon: the central bureau, with its upside-down geography of India, may yet dream of constructing the railway *down* from Mooltan or even from Sukkur. But as to this ancient question of right or left bank, it must be fully four years since Major Bonus, R.E., and two or three other men, who knew at first-hand the facts with which they had to deal, reported that on the right bank it was possible the railway would pay, where there is some cultivated country, labour, materials, and fair prospect of local traffic; but that, on financial grounds, the left bank was out of the question. . . . . .—*March* 23, 1871.

II.—The battle of the gauges in India is now narrowed to one point—that is, the difficulties and possible danger arising from necessity of transhipment under the pressure of some urgent military exigence. . . . It seems to be assumed that if there be throughout India only one uniform class of railway, engines, and carriages—for, be it noted, uniform gauge alone is not sufficient—then all other difficulties would be of no account. It is said, in effect,—"Let there be no break of gauge, then, troops of all arms, equipments and supplies of every description, ordnance and ammunition of all kinds, will always be ready, can be despatched in a moment from our arsenals and chief camps to the vulnerable point, and the transfer can always be effected within just the number of hours required for the transit of special trains." Those who insist on the imperative necessity of uniform gauge do not say this in so many words; but that is the impression their absolute form of argument is intended to convey. The Government of India is given to understand that if it declines to comply with this imperious demand for ten thousand additional miles of "standard" railway, it will do so at peril of the Empire. . . . . .

There was no break-of-gauge excuse between Meerut and Delhi in May, 1857; but a tremendous revolt, that eventually shook the Empire, gained head solely because of half a day's delay in pursuing a troop of cowardly miscreants who, once within the walls of the Mogul's city, became formidable military and political antagonists. If it be said, this remark is travelling out of the strict line of argument, we reply it is needful in order to restore the sense of proportion, which is lost sight of by those who, for sake of an imaginary military emergency that may arise once in a century, would tax every ton of traffic, and inflict a permanent and all but unendurable burden on the country. If in any military emergency that Fate has in store for us, or that the possible folly of our rulers (as from 1852 to 1857) can invite, our Empire in India, or any considerable province of it, can be lost in the time that might be required to tranship a regiment of cavalry or a park of artillery, then the sooner we begin to make arrangements to retire the better, or also make the avowal (wholly contrary to fact as it is) that we only stay in India for an indefinite but perceptibly limited period, or as long as we can, and whilst we make anything out of the country.

In one sentence occurring between those we have quoted, our contemporary puts the practical issue which has to be debated—"if there were no break of gauge, men and material would reach the point of concentration in *less* time." Just so; and the question is —how much less, how often is the obstacle likely to arise; and is it worth while, for the sake of the uncertain, exceptional, and limited advantage, to incur a certain and ever present evil? It is, we repeat, a question of proportion, and is scarcely touched by the very general proposition, "that in war, time is of inestimable value"—a remark which itself requires the

very large qualification supplied by the word "occasionally." . . . Would the detention at the "point of disjunction" enhance these difficulties by one-tenth? He would consider this carelessly, we say, who should put down the artificial impediment at one-twentieth. Then there is to set against that the substantial credit we claim, namely, that for the price of this occasional delay the country gets several hundred more lines of rail, and in half the time, compared with what would be the case were we to defer to those who insist on uniformity, and who would make ten thousand miles of communication subject to the conditions that obtain on the present five. Although it is alleged that "the gallant engineers have missed the point at issue," it is germane to the point we are now considering, when they remark that goods (say, military stores) would scarcely "under any circumstances be exposed to transfer more than once," and that not more "than a small fraction of the total weight (of men and artillery) carried would be exposed to transfer at all." It is not for us to volunteer a defence of the Secretary of State's Committee from the criticism just mentioned; but, we presume, they considered the military emergency and break-of-gauge objections are fairly turned in flank, when they commit themselves, financially, to "the extreme hypothesis" that it might be necessary to lay down a third rail on the existing 5,000 miles of railway. . . . . .

The real cause of hesitation in the minds of the public arises from the assumption that, given uniformity of gauge, then all obstacles to the transport of an army and its *impedimenta* would be removed. The ruler who has beguiled France to its ruin is pre-eminent as a theorist, and accordingly he held to that assumption with characteristically blind tenacity. In his melancholy review of the causes proximate to the catastrophes of Rezonville and Sedan, he assigns a prominent place to the utter break-down in practice of the theory that the railway system of uniform gauge is equal to any military emergency. Those passages in the imperial *apologia*, as also certain others in the earlier letters of M. Edmond About, written before the reverses, are well worth the notice of those who, in this very practical question, would not be led away by too wide generalisations. . . . The metaphor of an "artificial defile" between Lahore and Peshawur, invented to discredit the adoption of the new gauge in that direction, is well adapted to strike the popular apprehension, but it fails as an argument. The defile is there now in the unbridged road, and in the project for an extravagant broad-gauge railway, which cannot be accepted by any authorities cherishing due regard for the financial interests of India. "Facilities for the concentration and supply of troops" to the frontier can at once be "augmented" by setting about the construction of a line financially practicable, and which, as exact calculations in these reports demonstrate, would be sufficient for any conceivable emergency.—*Jan.* 3, 1871.

III.—The frequent changes in the higher administrative ranks of Indian rulers have often been remarked upon as the cause of wasteful changes in policy, which, somehow, in the majority of cases tend steadily to the increase of expenditure and increase of India's financial burdens. Never could the unhappy tendency of frequent personal changes receive a more striking illustration than if, as surmised by some, the present Viceroy should be induced to reverse the decisions of the two last Governors-General in respect of thorough railway reform. We may be told, it is only the Lahore to Peshawur line that is now at stake; but that is really the key of the position. If the Government of India should now weakly give way to the clamour raised at home—prompted partly by the nothing-like-leather cry of the engineers, and partly by silly fears about the remote possibility of invasion on our North-west Frontier—the Indus Valley line will follow next, and thus, piece by piece, will be surrendered all of the Lawrence-Mayo policy which promised to secure for India efficient and general communication, while checking, once for all, the rapidly advancing figures of ruinous loss from the present railway system. Lord Northbrook has done inestimable service to India by curbing the disposition to enlarge the ever-widening area of taxation, imperial and local; but all that good would be utterly obliterated were he to become instrumental in saddling India with a system of communication thrice too expensive for the country. . . . . .

For those who are inclined to bestow a little study on the subject, and who sincerely desire to come to a conclusion on the merits of the case, we offer an explanatory and semi-technical paper by "C. E." (a former professional contributor of ours, who this time appears under his own signature), in which is brought out the terrible waste of the present system compared with the enormous constant economy that would accrue in the working

of lighter railways more nearly adapted to the circumstances of this country. These less costly lines—as is palpable to any one who may have seen the Indore Railway stock made in Bombay—would be equal, so far as railways go, to cope with any military or other exigency. . . . . .

Then as to the invasion bugbear: this is how we find that topic touched upon by our Allahabad contemporary, and we hope our readers will make the best they can of the sentence: "But however the financial aspects of the question may stand at the present moment, its political and strategic aspects have been modified *pari passu*, but inversely with those bearing on economy." We take this to mean that the prospect of the British Empire being overthrown in some odd hour that might be occupied in the transhipment of a few guns and stores at Lahore, has become more probable and portentous as the dread vision is pondered upon. There is some talk in another sentence about "practical men" backing up these gloomy "aspects;" but we find that persons who take a practical view of the course of affairs in actual warfare are not much influenced by apocalyptic arguments of that sort. Sundry military lecturers of the period have dilated on the facilities which the virtually unopposed and, after Saarbruck, ever victorious Prussians derived from the uniformity of gauge in the two territories. Granted; but let any impartial man set himself to perceive the totally different circumstances presented by the Punjab and Lorraine. Place an outline map of Eastern France and Western Germany on the north-western division of British India, and make Metz stand for Lahore. But where in Germany or where in Alsace is the terrible pass of the Khyber? . . . . . .

Would not Lahore be near enough to the frontier as a base "for concentrating troops and means"? That is, of course, in addition to the gradual and well-considered strengthening of all our present posts west of that city. Including the garrisons of Lahore and Mooltan, we have always 20,000 cavalry and infantry, with 15 batteries of artillery, stationed on or within easy marches of the frontier. And reinforcements could be carried forward by the metre-gauge far more speedily than our Quartermaster-General's, Ordnance, and Commissariat Departments could concentrate the "troops and men" at Lahore on the boasted standard gauge. Meantime the Sinde Frontier could be provided for, within a week, by sea from Bombay.

Some of our amateur strategists who so frantically demanded a uniform gauge every yard of the way to the foot of the Khyber or Bolan, seem to forget they are making this display of apprehension and weakness in the presence of "practical men" still amongst us, who won the Punjab and Sinde, and re-conquered all Hindustan and Central India, under facilities of locomotion represented by slow pacing elephants, by lumbering camels and baggage animals, by the bullock-cart of the period, and by artillery and cavalry that marched to the scene of action over hundreds of miles of country roads. Shall we, impelled by a mere sentimental craving for theoretic military perfection, inflict on the dumb, impoverished millions of India an intolerable financial burden which there is no human prospect of their ever being able to shake off? We sadly mistake Lord Northbrook if he can be induced to favour so short-sighted and oppressive a policy.—*April* 17, 1873.

IV.—That men of Indian experience, and who have any comprehension of relative distances, should allow inferences about break of gauge drawn from traffic exigencies within the compass of small busy England, to be put forward as applicable to this country, passes comprehension, except that it is one more illustration of the blinding influence of foregone conclusions. Our Calcutta contemporary puts the case sensibly, but all too coolly, thus: "The question is whether the total inconveniences of the break are not compensated by the total financial saving. It is not a question of which is the best plan, but of whether India can afford to pay for the best plan." To those who, by impartial examination, can estimate how small is the sum of "total inconvenience" that will be caused by transhipment at the few points of junction between the standard and metre lines, there will be no question at all on this head. The financial saving is so enormous that no data of comparison can be set up. Of course the real difficulty is one of imagination. Boasting ourselves the most practical people on the face of the earth, we are moved more by fancies and apprehension than any other. It is to the bugbear invasion that India is again to be sacrificed. The *Englishman*, after alluding to Lord Napier saying that if the choice lay between no railway and a metre gauge, he should be

glad to have the latter, proceeds: "But we understand that since then a calculation has been made which shows that for a specified distance, say of not more than a hundred and sixty miles, a body of ten thousand troops, with its munitions of war, could be more rapidly marched on foot than sent by railway, if a break of gauge occurred on the line."

Now, if the Supreme Government is deliberating upon, or at all likely to be influenced by, preposterous comparisons of this kind, the public has every right to demand that such papers should be published, and their authors made known. If the above proposition is stated fairly, and we have no reason to suppose that our Calcutta contemporary would do otherwise by it, we feel free to say that the "authority" who has conceived this "calculation" knows little about the marching of troops in India, and knows nothing at all about railway traffic working. Yet upon precious evidence of this sort the Government of India may be deliberating for a decision in the ultimate consequences of which thirty millions are at stake.—*June* 6, 1873.

THE RAJPOOTANA RAILWAY: PROFITABLE, OR WORKED AT A LOSS?

MUCH satisfaction would be felt at sight, in our yesterday's issue, of the papers on the Rajpootana Railway, which seem to promise that progress northward may soon be reported. But there is yet time to consider whether this progress shall be real and not sham, whether we are to pay twenty-five or only twenty shillings for our sovereign. . . . The cost of the 24 miles of the Raipur line is Rs. 9,66,959, including contingencies at 10 *per cent.*, instead of 5 per cent. in the other estimate, or Rs. 40,289 per mile, being as near as possible *one-half that of the broad-gauge line.* . . . We have it on the Consulting Engineer's authority that even on the exceptionally favourable country traversed by the Pahlunpore extension, the metre line would cost from one-fifth to one-fourth less than if made in the present gigantic style. Here, then, is a margin of extra profit which can be applied either to the fair payment of interest or to the diminution of traffic rates.

But this is only the smallest portion of the advantage that would accrue to the merchant and the country from the adoption of the more compendious system of locomotion, and one which is more in accordance with the wants and capabilities of India. If there is any province that demands that its railway rates shall be kept down to the lowest limit, it is Rajpootana. In the facility which the lighter railway gives for keeping down the otherwise ruinous working expenses, lies the strongest argument for the adoption of that system north of Ahmedabad. It is only needful to look at one of our present railway trains to see that there is great waste of power, and enormous proportion of deadweight to the work done. When these factors are duly set in array under the heads of "maintenance and renewals" of permanent way, cost of fuel and "locomotive expenses," and repairs of rolling stock, the grave financial aspect of the present inevitably wasteful working of our lines becomes strikingly apparent. The saving under these heads was calculated, in comparison with the standard lines, for the 3 feet 6 inch gauge as Rs. 2,140 per mile per annum; which sum, if capitalised, is considerably more than the saving in first cost, when, as on almost any other route, that saving is twice what would be gained by the metre-gauge in Northern Guzerat. And it must be remembered that if the first cost of the two classes of line were the same—which is no more likely than that a 500 and 1,000 ton steamer should cost alike—this constant and perpetual saving in working expenses would all go the credit of the smaller and handier system. Are there none of our merchants who can see that a metre-gauge line would carry their goods scores, if not hundreds, of miles further than the merchandise could, for the same money, travel on the more costly and expensively worked standard railways? . . . . . .

It is in this matter as in so many others of primary financial and economical importance, that the nearest object, that which "is seen," fills the field of vision, while the far greater portion of the whole is "not seen." At present the temporary and occasional inconvenience of translading is regarded with absurdly exaggerated concern; and it will require another swingeing income-tax to open the eyes of our public men and journalists to the incubus of debt, the tax on trade, and the grievous diversion of funds from productive purposes, which are being entailed on this country by the extension of the present extravagant railway system. . . . . .

II.—The question is whether, seeing that Rajpootana is to have a railway, it should be a possibly remunerative, or a certainly losing line? When a writer sits down to demolish a proposal he dislikes, but in doing so takes little or no notice of what his opponent has said, the result of his lucubrations can scarcely be of much assistance towards informing the public mind on the subject. This appears to be very much the position of the writer of Thursday's plea for forcing the losing railway system up to Pahlunpore. Though assuring us that he had been reading our article (politely termed "wading through"), it is made very plain that our columns had been read with blinkers on. There are two special signs of this—first, we are said to be "capable of taking in nothing more than the first cost of the line." What, then, is the bearing of the passage in our article, where, after speaking of the minimum saving in first cost of one-fifth or one-fourth as affording a margin of extra profit, applicable either for making up interest or diminishing traffic rates, we commenced the next paragraph with these words—"But this is only the smallest portion of the advantage that would accrue to the merchant and the country from the adoption of the more compendious system of locomotion. . . . As none of the considerations we advanced against the proposal to inflict on Gujerat and Marwar a railway that cannot pay, have been met, we may leave the matter until we hear the fate of the Bombay Government's retrograde resolution."

Here we would take the opportunity of trying a long shot at that ostensible friend, but dire enemy of Indian railway reform, the Stores Branch of the India Office. The State Railway Department in this country is bad enough, with its red tape, its checks, its changes, and its perpetual shifting of employés; but, on the principle of "by their fruits ye shall know them," the Indian Office Stores Department, in its relation to railway extension in India, has proved one of the most muddling, inept, wearisome, and therefore wasteful institutions of these latter days. All the world is before the Secretary of State and Council from which to choose the simplest, best, and most economical permanent way and rolling stock materials; but the failure to hit this mark appears, at present, to be complete.—*Jan.* 21, 1874.

MR. R. H. ELLIOT ON BRIDGE BUILDING, AND REVENUE IN KIND.

MR. R. H. ELLIOT'S evidence before the Indian Finance Committee, a considerable portion of which appeared in our paper of last Thursday, is of considerable practical interest. The public at home, and many persons here, look with suspicion on witnesses from the Services. Those disposed to a pessimist view of Indian affairs, and who are ready to think its administrators generally in the wrong, have little faith in the evidence tendered by Covenanted Servants. They regard them as "paid men." Little account is taken of the consideration that experienced civilians, politicals, and staff officers have identified themselves with the country and people amongst whom their lines have been cast. They are supposed to have a vested interest in things as they are, and that this gives a bias to all their statements and proposals. To Mr. Elliot, the planter of Mysore, no such objection can be taken. If biassed at all, it must be the other way. In reviewing his very readable book, we had occasion to point this out. His severe criticisms on Indian administration were scarcely consistent with the high opinion he expressed regarding some of the administrators. His experience is of very long date, and his acquaintance with the people very intimate; but it must be remembered he has spent all his Indian life in one province, of which the physical geography is somewhat peculiar, and the people different in many respects both from the Hindu and Mussulman population elsewhere. Still, the leading economical and social conditions are similar to those in the rest of India, and Mr. Elliot's evidence being that of a shrewd practical observer, who has bought much of his knowledge at the cost of direct personal experience and much persevering exertion, it is well worth while for us to take note of some of his conclusions and suggestions. . . . . .

It was scarcely likely that the planter of Mysore could throw much new light on the vexed question of the Public Works Department organisation, and its methods of construction; though it was to be expected he would express, in forcible terms, the popular distrust and dislike of the department, and offer some sweeping suggestions for its reform. . . . When we remember the long-settled design of the Public Works Secretary in this Presidency to abolish or absorb the Local Funds Engineers and all their

contemptibly small, cheap, and useful works, it is rather amusing to see an influential witness before the Select Committee recommending that the great Public Works Department itself, its captains and colonels, shall be brought down from its loftiness, and made even like unto the despised institution of Local Funds Engineers. There is no danger of any such revolutionary measure being carried; but in any revision of Public Works Department organisation, very much weight will have to be given to the conclusion come to by many besides Mr. Elliot, namely, that the Collector of the district understands its interests and wants with regard to public works much better than the builders thereof can be expected to do.

The planter is very decidedly of opinion that native engineers have built more durable bridges than those which rise and fall so frequently under the present department. We need not attempt to go into particulars on this practical question of pontine architecture; but when it is mentioned that the native engineers in Mysore contrive to place their piers in such a fashion as to present little resistance to the force of the stream, while the Public Works Department engineers aim at challenging as much of flood force as possible—a course which two years since proved eminently suitable to invite disaster in the case of the Sherwell bridge over the Neera, now being replaced on a different principle —we begin to wish that some Mysoreans would come further north. Unfortunately, it seems doubtful whether the southern race of bridge builders may not have died out; for one of their first-class works, which Mr. Elliot points to as an illustration, is a bridge over a-wide river, which has stood the shocks of the stream and time for 150 years. One other remark on this evidence in reference to bridge building should be mentioned for general guidance. Mr. Elliot complains that the department build bridges where they are not wanted. He mentions instances where these structures act as impediments to traffic; for whereas the river bed serves very well for country carts during all the dry months of the year, during the wet season there are no carts on the move at all. The impediment is, of course, not in the bridge itself, but in the toll or extra local rate which the costly structure necessitates. Are there not several superfluous works of this kind in the Berars?

The portion of the Mysore Planter's evidence that will be regarded as most original and striking, whatever may be thought as to the soundness of the view expressed, are those passages in which he contends that the old system of collecting the revenue in kind ought to be reverted to in connection with systematic arrangements for the storing of grain as a safeguard against famines. Mr. Elliot's explanation of the custom of hoarding grain instead of rupees is somewhat similar to one given in our columns three or four years since, by a contributor who thoroughly knew the Deccan and all its ways of life. . . The members of the Committee put several queries to Mr. Elliot, that served tolerably well to indicate the leading objections to the primitive and artificial system of "forestalling and regrating" which he would re-introduce to India. But none of these gentlemen (unless it be Mr. Fawcett) seem to have perceived the portentous significance of the Mysore Planter's convictions on this point, or of those stern facts of Indian finance which, though imperfectly recognised by him, have driven him to that position. Here is a shrewd business man, knowing that the ryot, like himself, is moved to select his crops according to the market price they will fetch as measured in the currency of his province, yet who deplores that the half-civilised cultivators do not grow the less remunerative crops.

The remedy proposed is no doubt a very effectual one. Instead of the State landlord taking his rents in silver currency, which is the measure of all products, the rent is to be paid in kind, but only in one of those products. No doubt the first effect of this would be to increase the proportion of grain crops, and so far the plan would answer in increasing the total food supply in the country; but we cannot readily see the next step beyond this. The supply of exportable product would, *pari passu*, be lessened; but whilst the price of cotton, jute, and seeds would not necessarily be enhanced, the money yielded to the cultivator would on the whole be considerably less; and thus, though both the private and public granaries of his district might be full, he would find himself deficient of every resource but bare grain. It is, however, of little use to consider the probable economical consequences that would follow were the Government of British India to resolve to accept any considerable portion of its land revenue in kind. The proposal, so far as we can see, is an utterly impracticable one.

But what are the causes which have led to that disturbance of the safe balance between food and export crops which many close observers of Indian affairs regard with much apprehension? Mr. Fawcett, as reported, makes rather an odd guess at these causes. He puts it: "At present, owing to many national peculiarities among the people, there is a tendency to export food and not to import food in return . . . because the imports do not consist of food, you diminish the resources left to the people to live upon." There are no "national peculiarities" in the case, that we are aware of, except such as the Hindu shares in common with every son of Adam—a desire to get the best price for his produce, and a design to turn his small farm to as good account as is possible with his limited resources. There is a demand for cotton and other non-edible products in Europe; the State must have its dues in silver, which can only (in the end) be obtained by the export of non-edibles; while, over and above these inducements, there is a steady propulsion to swell the exports, because only through them can the Indian Government meet the demands made on it by the Secretary of State. This last influence is the one which is most difficult to trace; but our fiddling Nero at present in charge of the Finances seems determined to make plain to the narrowest capacity the operation of this injurious pecuniary force. Thirteen millions sterling of revenue have to be transferred from India to England during the present financial year; and though the supply of available exports is manifestly insufficient to provide the current remittance without severe depreciation in values, Sir Richard Temple—having neither practical knowledge nor inventiveness—is determined that the depletion shall go on, even though the very silver itself shall be hauled out of the country. The effect of this will be to depreciate prices even more rapidly than at the ratio of decline which fairly set in about three years since; but, as exports must go forward, the depreciation will tell most on grain. Then, it may be said, "so much the better," food will be cheaper. Yes, is the reply; but the breadth cultivated will therefore be less, and thus the masses may be anew exposed to that dire peril against which Mr. Elliot would guard by the extraordinary expedient of reverting to the customs of the Dewan Joseph or of the Emperor Akbar. Neither that gentleman nor his questioners had distinctly recognised that "skeleton in the closet" of which India has to take account; but Mr. Elliot indicates its existence in the terse remark, "if it were not for the opium revenue the country could not go on."

One more point in the Mysore Planter's evidence we must briefly refer to, namely, his subtle remarks about the difficulty of obtaining frank and genuine statement of native opinion. There is, indeed, every difficulty if the attempt be made through the ordinary methods of public interrogation; but invaluable information as to what the Lion thinks of the Man may be obtained by going the right way about it. The following is the method suggested by Mr. Elliot; it is one applicable to all parts of India, and to political, still more than to financial topics: "It is simply by sending a man who has a considerable acquaintance with the Chiefs and Ministers of the Native States, and he will be able to obtain their opinion exactly as to the resources and constitution of the country. But these men will not give you their opinions unless you send to them a man in whom they have confidence, who has some acquaintances among them, and who would tell you the general opinions of these people without their names being published to the country."—*May* 9, 1872.

INDIAN RAILWAY REFORM: AN IRATE R.E. AND LAVISH C.E.'s.

OUR citizen, "J. M. M.," who contributes his weekly London letter to a local contemporary, appears to have thrown himself into the light or heavy railway controversy with considerable warmth. And just now that the maintenance of the existing system can be represented as necessary to the protection of our frontier, and likely to be serviceable some day in "laying the proud invader low," we are not surprised to find that his well-known British patriotism combines readily with that taste for large schemes and lavish expenditure which finds a congenial atmosphere on high days in the Civil Engineers' Institute, when its members have thrown before them some big national project of construction. . . . . .

Engineers, as a class, Civil as well as Royal, have a professional leaning towards lavish expenditure; and that class feeling must have been very strong to allow such a platform trick to pass as when Mr. Douglas Fox pointed to the map of India and its

present five thousand miles of line as sufficient to outbalance the considerations connected with the ten thousand yet to be made. Was there no one to point out that from the true engineer's point of view the present system is a failure? As Sir Arthur Cotton has shown, it fails to carry the produce of the country, and, comparatively speaking, has done little or nothing to evoke greater production; while from the financier's point of view it is doubtful whether its admitted military and political value is not counterbalanced by the drain that its maintenance causes on the revenues of the country. From the last aggregate statement published of traffic receipts, it appears that since this year came in the falling off, as compared with the last—and it was less than 1871—must be equal to 12 lakhs of rupees. . . . . .

We have been chidden for steadfastly opposing the desperate effort which has been made to force the "standard gauge" on the north-west and western frontier lines. We maintained this stand, however, not only on the merits of that particular case, but from a conviction that if the reformed system were driven back from the frontier, it would be resisted *elsewhere*, and thus the *last chance* of escaping from the railway incubus would be lost. . . . . .

It seems an odd misuse of language to speak of "fortifying Native States against us," when, at their own invitation and pecuniary risk, we are piercing their territories with means of communication that give us fifty times more control than ever we had before. The military aspect of the new system was treated effectually, so far as the frontier question is concerned, by Mr. Thornton in his paper, read before the Institute. The general question of the capabilities for military purposes of the light railway system was well treated of in Part III. of the pamphlet, "Ten Thousand Miles against Five Thousand," a brochure in which are embodied careful and irrefutable calculations that are alone sufficient to vindicate the thorough reform of our Indian railway system on the basis of the metre gauge. But the Government of India has been too negligent or disdainful in regard to its own vindication. Had its officers, with all their appliances, taken half the pains to explain and justify its measures that were taken to that end in 1870 by our volunteer correspondent, "C. E.," there would now have been no occasion to allow General Strachey to go down to the Institute, and by his imperious manner give opponents a temporary advantage.—*March* 15, 1873.

BREAK OF GAUGE AND TRANSLADING.

MR. W. T. THORNTON, the [late] talented Secretary in the India Office, must be more hypercritical—and in that, too, as against himself—than was the police constable whom Mr. Anstey rallied the other day on his very exact rendering of the vernacular. Mr. Thornton has been induced to make a correction in one passage of the very able speech which he delivered in reply to the "engineering giants" and others, who, in the recent discussion before the Institute of Civil Engineers, raised such a din against the adoption of the light railway system for India. Their chief *cheval de bataille* was break of gauge; and it was in combating the prejudices and random assertions on this subject that the remark occurs which Mr. Thornton has taken such elaborate, and, as it seems to us, wholly unnecessary, pains to correct and modify. The method taken is that the Institute printers send out a new leaf marked "corrected page 157." The remark withdrawn and its correction have a significance quite apart from the dispute about the aggregate cost of translading (we have to thank Mr. Thornton for that word); hence we are glad the subject has been again brought forward. . . . . .

It appears to us that Mr. Thornton's over-statement is merely one of expression, not one of fact; while his correction does himself an injustice, and a little confuses the public apprehension as to the position of Indian railway progress. . . . . .

To those who believe in the practicability and value of railway communication, it will seem but a moderate estimate to assume that two miles are wanted for one that was already laid in 1869. But there was no more occasion for the Indian Government to "mark out" all possible or even probable extensions that may be required during the current thirty years, than there was for Mr. Thornton to bind himself to that phrase just now. The tentative estimate drawn up by the Government of India (which, in tabular form, may be referred to in our "Calendar" for 1870) proceeded, as will be seen, only on the basis of 'lines proposed by Local Governments in 1868," which amount to nearly

5,000 miles, though these include some really pertaining to the old system. Some of those projected then, as the Hooblee to Patus, and another spoken of since that period, a foolish scheme for a coast line from Madras to Calcutta, will be relegated to the far future, or abandoned; but others of equal or greater length, piercing from the sea to the interior, will be taken up instead. . . . . .

But even supposing Mr. Thornton had been compelled to restrict the future railways of India to the 3,000 "actually marked out," we cannot see how this would interfere with the argument he is maintaining on page 157. It was on this wise. After showing from Indian evidence which is incontestable, that fourpence per ton is the utmost cost that would be involved in translading, he proceeds on an estimate of the total amount of traffic on the future lines—an estimate extravagantly overweighted against himself—to show that the extreme aggregate extra cost incurred by break of gauge is utterly trivial compared with the economy in first construction of the new lines, as admitted by the most adverse opponents of the light system. But, as Mr. Thornton calculates the probable traffic passing the junctions in proportion to the extent of the new lines, the quantity of the transladen goods and the aggregate cost of shifting them will also be in proportion; therefore his argument stands as it did. And, because of the irresistible force of this argument on pages 158-9, which to an unprejudiced mind demolishes the bugbear of the English engineers, we are glad the corrected page has been re-circulated. . . . . .

Though not pertaining to the present branch of the subject, we must again express regret that Mr. Thornton should have passed over the strongest argument on his own side—the economy in working expenses that must accrue from the adoption of the light system. But the Government of India during its present deliberations has all these calculations within its reach. If they are overlooked, or from any cause the present ruinous system is reverted to, the Government of Lord Northbrook will, ten years hence, have bestowed on it the dire anathemas of our successors, who will then most assuredly be subject to a swingeing income-tax to make up the railway deficit.—*July* 12, 1873.

THE BLUNDER OF THE DAY: STOPPAGE OF PUBLIC WORKS.

WE have hoped against hope that the deplorably mistaken policy might be deferred or abandoned of checking the construction of productive public works—except the most expensive class, that is Railways—and of raising such loan funds as are still needed for public works in India instead of in England.

The publication in the official *Gazettes* this week of the Resolution prescribing the method and terms under which a large number of officers and employés on the Public Works Department are to be compulsorily retired, destroys the lingering hope that, at the eleventh hour, common sense might arrest this heavy blow to the industrial and financial interests of India. . . . Now, when it is a question of hastily stopping outlay, that is or might be made productive, hundreds of experienced men, well acquainted with the country, the people, and their work, find their careers cut short, but in most instances with a personal *solatium* on a very liberal scale. . . . Of course, we are right glad, seeing this foolish policy is to be carried out, that it will not be embittered by the infliction of personal wrongs; but, nevertheless, the people's money is, so far, being needlessly and unproductively squandered. And for what? In order to check, in the most summary manner possible, the only branch of public expenditure that directly promotes the material welfare of the people and the industrial progress of the country! And not only is this directly beneficial service to cease *pro tanto;* but, as our readers well understand, the indirect effect of this cessation of productive expenditure is still further to cripple the already weak industrial forces of India. This is done in two ways: first, by cessation of disbursement on material and labour; second, by the collateral influence on finance whereby "loss by exchange" is increased and prices are abnormally depressed. . . . . .

But the money thus wastefully, if generously, dispensed is only the lesser part of the wanton waste incurred in thus discharging hundreds of acclimatised and experienced men. Their skill, their capacity for coping with special difficulties, their knowledge of the country and of the people are all lost during the period wherein they would otherwise have served. But to this wholesale sacrifice of seasoned skill there are at least a few

exceptions. . . . We are all aware that the Public Works system urgently needs reform. It is, and has been, far too expensive. But the measures now adopted must make the Public Works Department that remains, ten, twenty, or, perhaps, thirty per cent. more expensive than before. The *relative* cost of superintendence and establishments must be enormously increased. . . . The rising uneasiness at home about Indian finance—the misappropriation of the Famine Fund and "loss by exchange," &c.—to which at length form was given in the threatened motions of Mr. Fawcett and others intended to be brought forward on occasion of the Financial Statement, warned the party in power that something must be done to stave off not only popular but Parliamentary censure. Hence loud promises of retrenchment must be made; and as it was impossible to cut down military and other much patronised unproductive outlay, the ready but ruinous course of stopping public works, as far as possible, was hit upon. By ready aid of the "loyal and unhesitating obedience," now the fashion at Simla, this ukase against productive public works was formulated, and another party difficulty was overcome.

Unfortunately for India, there are strong popular prejudices, both here and at home, which serve to support any outcry against the Public Works Department, however ignorant or misdirected such clamour may be. Into the value of these prejudices we need not enter now, having done that at other times. We are always ready to support the other strongest criticisms on particular works or methods of the department that can be fairly supported; and we would go as far as any one who may have fairly qualified himself for the task, in promoting some thorough reform of the system likely to result in economy and efficiency. The question now is the broad one of policy—whether productive public works in India should be pushed forward as rapidly as the surplus revenues or credit of its Government can permit? In putting it thus, we assume that the labour supply available is to be fully taken into account, and that no work shall be undertaken without its design, purposes, and methods of construction having been subject not only to the closest professional scrutiny, but opened out to the fullest possible public discussion.

Granted, then, an honest and efficient system, the question of productive public works becomes one of funds only. And as the idle capital of Europe is hungry for employment, it is the veriest quackery of financial administration to put forward the absurd pretence that India is compelled to undergo the present disastrous check to provident public works exploitation. In presence of this blind and grudging measure, what are all the protestations worth about insurance against famine? Again, we say, let us know who is responsible for this clumsy and senseless course? Is it the India Office, or Simla, or both? Let us have names. It cannot be General Strachey this time. Is it Sir Lewis Mallet or Sir Thomas Seccombe? Is it Sir John Strachey or Sir Alexander Arbuthnot? If so, let us have their written justification for thus spending several lakhs in "getting rid" of engineers who could be and ought to be profitably employed. . . . So far, the British Indian and other native Associations have done more harm than good in this matter. They have run in the popular groove of clamouring against the extravagance and mistakes of the Public Works Department, instead of uniting in an earnest effort to secure beneficial reorganisation and thorough reform. The Chambers of Commerce, at least this of Bombay, have been on the side of productive outlay, though leaning a trifle too much to railways at any cost, and other forms of public works which take the European fancy. But the Bombay Chamber is, we believe, fully convinced of the disastrous mistake, in a financial point of view, that is being made by this extravagant retrenchment of which the Government Resolution published this week is almost the only manifesto yet given to the public. . . . Where are our young European merchants? Where are our patient and thoughtful native politicians? India needs them both to aid in the mastering of this urgent and far-reaching question.*—*Aug.* 9, 1879.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF 1879: ITS CONCLUSIONS DEMOLISHED.

SIR ARTHUR COTTON has issued a memorandum (republished in the *Home News*) in which he gives a crushing reply to the Report presented to Parliament by Lord George Hamilton's Committee on Public Works. It will be remembered that, as the

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

proceedings of that Committee were reported, the superficial and fallacious method in which its inquiry was conducted was exposed in our columns. By greater part of the Indian press the deductions and conclusions of the Committee were accepted as the outcome of practical wisdom. The *Pioneer*, however, in this instance did good service, at a later date, in an article on the Report which showed up the inconsistency and narrowness of the line taken by the Chairman and the India Office witnesses. General Cotton's reply on the whole question is, of course, a far more comprehensive treatise. Seldom has the contrast been more striking than that afforded by this masterly review compared with the purblind groping of the Committee and its pottering conclusions. Sir Arthur is, indeed, a Triton amongst such minnows as the past and present Under-Secretaries for India and the head book-keeper of the India Office, Sir Thomas Seccombe, who treated the finance of the Public Works question as one might the retail transactions of a chandler's shop. Sir Arthur Cotton justifies his undertaking the examination of the Report—"first, because it does not make the slightest mention of the main point of the whole question, but is wholly occupied with minor and comparatively insignificant ones. And secondly, because it entirely excludes one side of the question, even in respect of the minor points with which it assumes to deal." The "main point" thus ignored is "the effect of the public works on India"; and the "side of the question excluded" is the result attained by such irrigation works and canals as we have, partial and unfinished though most of them are. But it is impossible to summarise in a paragraph this comprehensive and telling essay. We would ask thoughtful men to read it for themselves; and here we will only quote the first and last of the eleven propositions with which he sums up: these are they—1. The direct return in money to Government by these works is not the main point, but their effects upon the country. 11. That, therefore, what both the finances and the general welfare of India require is the most liberal prosecution of public works, both of transit and irrigation; and, especially, that irrigation and navigation are the only works that can possibly secure it from famine.*—*Nov.* 29, 1879.

II.—Last week the *Pioneer* had a good, if somewhat laborious, article on the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Works. As our readers are aware, we have tracked the history and deliverances of this Committee rather closely; but we had not been able to discover the "object and reason" for its existence which is alleged by our Allahabad contemporary—to wit, "the huge machinery of this Committee was notoriously constructed with the view of keeping certain members of Parliament quiet." We still consider—indeed, we have special reason to know—that our own diagnosis is much nearer the mark—namely, that the Committee was appointed, coached by Lord George Hamilton, its Chairman, and Mr. Under-Secretary Stanhope, its reports adjusted and carried, in order to back up and confirm certain intensely perverse and narrow views that are tenaciously cherished of late years by the departmental doctrinaires of the India Office. The *Pioneer* speaks again and again of the "Fawcett Committee," apparently because the trenchant Indian reformer's name is unpopular in this connection, but we do not remember that Professor Fawcett had anything to do with the appointment of the Committee; and, though he was a member, he did not take any very active part in the examination of the witnesses. Sir George Campbell and Mr. Childers were much more prominent in that work. If the latter, in dealing with Indian affairs, could have trusted more to his own strong sense, or if Sir George Campbell could have risen above his Bengali prejudices as to the supposed inevitable wastefulness of the Public Works Department, something might have been done to stem the India Office's reactionary policy instead of endorsing it. Having ourselves shown, from several points of view, how this "ponderous Committee" has gone "blundering about amid the facts of the subject" and come out of the wrong port-hole at last, we need not go over the same ground. It is some satisfaction to see the Allahabad paper taking a similar line—with a difference we will presently mention—so that, when these days of delirium shall be overpast, we may hope that rational views on public works finance will prevail. From the much detailed Allahabad article we cull the following: "There is no limit to the desirability of constructing works that will pay, and it is an advantage to India if European investors, either through Government or directly, find the capital for the purpose;" "if the country

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

is unprosperous, that is an additional reason for public improvements adapted to cause prosperity;" "only on the assumption that exchange will be worse, can it be wise to curtail loans for public works; if silver is likely to rise, India will gain by getting as much from Europe as we can whilst it is cheap. India has a capacity of absorbing silver sufficient to take in all the German surplus." These points we have here put more tersely than in the article; but to our readers the opinions they embody are trite, as also are the following propositions of the *Pioneer's* summary, which, however, are worth quoting as indicating the existence of common sense in official quarters here, in spite of the dense dogmatism of the India Office in these matters:—

India wants the capital which Germany is prepared to let loose in the form of silver bullion; applied to industrial development here, the capital would fructify: absorbed here, that capital would no longer impend in a menacing manner over the British silver market: if the German silver were transferred to India, in fact, exchange would recover, and Indian finances would be relieved of the fearful drain at present occasioned by loss by exchange: true policy would thus dictate a great augmentation of borrowing by India at this crisis for industrial purposes.

It may be noted, in passing, that the term "capital" is here used somewhat inaccurately, but that is of little consequence. . . .*—*Sept.* 27, 1879.

TWO WITNESSES OF OUR OWN: R. WIGRAM CRAWFORD AND EARL MAYO.

It is a pleasant and easy pastime to paddle your own canoe when the course is down the river all the way; but it is a very different affair to have to row against the tide or to swim against the stream. These latter conditions represent that under which we have to work just now in respect of what we believe to be . . . *the* most pressing question of the day in India. That is the rapid and energetic carrying out of well considered, equally distributed reproductive public works—first, as an investment on capital account, for the sake of the conserving and beneficial nature of the works themselves; second, as provident disbursements in rescue of the destitute masses from the destructive poverty which now besets them, and to stimulate industry generally; third, as an expedient of urgent financial necessity, in order to set off the exhausting drain of revenue from India, to secure the advantages offered by the present low price and abundance of silver, and to check the abnormal "loss by exchange" under which the State, the import trade, and private remitters now hopelessly groan. In advocating this large, and, as we believe, eminently salutary policy, we find ranged on the other side all the strongest forces that control Indian affairs. There is the popular prejudice—popular even in the widest and most influential aspect of that term—against the Public Works Department of India. We are not careful to contend that there are not some grounds for that prejudice; but it is part of our argument that, by vigorous prosecution of the policy advocated, many defects and much of the inordinate expensiveness of public works administration would be obviated or reduced to a minimum. But that popular prejudice against the Public Works Department would avail nothing to prevent the adoption of a bolder and more productive policy, if only the executive authorities who autocratically control the destinies of India—Mr. Bright's eight men in the twelve-feet-square room at Simla, and three or four more in the palace built out of Indian revenues at Westminster—could be brought to see this great question outside the fog in which, since Lord Northbrook's time, they have been obscuring the whole subject. . . . . .

The gist of our argument is comprised in that letter by Mr. R. W. Crawford to the *Times* on the Railway Finance question which came out by the mail of last week. Though we consider that public works funds, whether borrowed or taken from revenue, may be spent with much better effect for the country at large on water than on iron, that is not the general opinion. Mr. Crawford, in common with most Anglo-Indians, thinks, "there is nothing like leather," that is, Railways; but his argument, being a purely financial one, will serve us very well as an illustration. . . . Mr. Crawford points out that "the substitution of the State Railway for the guarantee Railway system" is one cause of the recent high rates of exchange and low exchange value of the rupee. How and why? Because, whereas the capital for the guaranteed Railways was raised in England, thereby keeping down the Secretary of State's drafts, "India in later times has had to furnish, through the additional drawings of the Secretary of State, not only the interest on the capital borrowed for State Railways, but a very large portion of the capital also." . . . Mr. Crawford

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

boldly says: "Is it too late to revert with retrospective effect to the policy of former years? Why not replace in the Home Treasury by borrowing in this (London) market the capital expended in the construction and equipment of the State Railways?" This is only the plain common sense of the business. The puerile, perverse—idiotic is scarcely too strong a term for the—method now followed, is thus denounced in the concluding sentence of the member for London's letter: "To go on supplying the Home Secretary with the proceeds of bills drawn at 1s. 7d. per rupee, against money raised in India at an equivalent of 4¾ per cent. interest per annum, is simply ruinous to the finances and the mercantile interests of this country and India"—aye, and destructive to the people and the industry of India.

Let us now call another witness on behalf of our unpopular policy—one who may carry more weight than the London merchant in official estimation: we refer to Lord Mayo. Our plea in his name ought to "fetch," some influential support. The demi-official articles, both in India and the home press, in which the willing pens of "rising men" elucidated and advocated that popular Viceroy's energetic public works policy cannot be already forgotten. And that policy had substantial ground to go upon. Every one admits that because of his intimate knowledge of Ireland—much of it, on the practical side, gained through the eminent Sir Thomas Larcom, the great surveyor—and with his own correct appreciation of agricultural conditions, Lord Mayo was peculiarly fitted to estimate the value of productive public works in India, and to decide as the class of works most urgently required. In this latter respect he was perhaps somewhat overborne by the engineers, who—leaning to the easier and more taking branch of their profession—spent millions on railways and grudged lakhs to the fertilising and more reproductive waterworks and canals. Had that ill-fated trip to the Andamans not been taken, it is highly probable, judging from the agricultural bent of his mind to which we have alluded, that Lord Mayo would soon have reversed that proportion. There is little doubt he would have striven to fulfil some such grand programme as that sketched about two years ago by the great tribune of Birmingham, when he said that thirty millions worth of irrigation works ought to be carried out in India within the space of a very few years. As his biographer remarks regarding his irrigation policy, "Lord Mayo's sudden death left many of his plans unfulfilled." From that record of the lamented Viceroy's Indian career by Dr. W. Hunter, we may suitably cull a few excerpts that will serve to show how violent—and, as we consider, ignorant and short-sighted—is the reaction at present prevailing in high quarters against an enlightened and energetic public works policy. . . . . .

No one dare say that Lord Mayo was lavish or loose in his efforts towards this vast enterprise for the renovation of India and the rescue of its people from famine and poverty. Quite the reverse: reference to the record we have quoted from will show that there was no sterner reformer of public works administration than Lord Mayo. And this is what one might expect. It is those who are most firmly convinced of the paramount necessity of providing reproductive works for India who are also, when they have studied the subject, most determined to secure trustworthy estimates, honest work, and cheaper funds from Europe, by which alone this vast reform can be carried forward to productive results. . . . It was with matured conviction that Lord Mayo wrote—

> The alternative as regards India is this, *cheap railways, or none.* . . . Therefore, I say, let us have railways that will pay, or nearly pay; or no railway at all, if their effect will be to add £100,000 or £150,000 every year to the permanent burdens of the State.

That the public mind is in danger of losing sight of this essential principle of limitation—even while under the cold fit that induces this stinting of public works—is just now rendered plain in the very ably-written document which our local Chamber of Commerce has issued this week, after laying it before the Famine Commission. Although the arguments are trite that go to prove India's need for immensely increased facilities of communication, it was well for our mercantile friends to repeat them; and we trust their appeal will have its influence in support of the flank movement that we desire to promote in order to the reduction of Fort Stupidity described above. Yet it seems to us the Chamber has needlessly damaged its just influence in this respect by setting itself against the more economical system of railway construction, and allowing its Committee to write as if its members had break of gauge on the brain. Such passages as this—"experience, however, has already proved that the difference in the first cost of broad and narrow gauge railways is insignificant, and that the cost of work-

ing a railway on the narrow gauge, where there is a heavy traffic, is much greater than the cost of working one on the broad gauge; &c."—only serve to show that the Committee have never thoroughly investigated the subject. Assertions of such hardihood may go down with the general public, but, with the experienced men before whom this report will be placed, the only effect of these passages must be to remind them that Bombay merchants, like too many other folk, think lightly of spending "other people's money." It was well to urge the importance of opening out the remote regions beyond Nagpore; but it was only to clog and overweight their appeal to couple with it the demand that the railway should be made on the standard gauge. This is, so far as lies in their power, directly to raise that obstacle of high rates which they complain of in the case of the Grand Indian Peninsular Railway. By insisting on the luxury of a big and costly railway—more expensive, both in construction and working by from one-fourth to one-third than it need be—they *pro tanto* "prevent Western India from reaping all the benefits which might be expected" from an extension of railway communication beyond Nagpore. And there is another drawback that may arise from this extravagant way of putting the matter. The Government of India, which has to consider the interests of each province impartially, may bethink itself that it is somewhat against the course of nature to bring the heavy produce of the upper valley of the Mahanudi over an expensive railway down to this distant Western Coast, instead of arranging for it to be taken to its natural outlet to Kuttack on the Bay of Bengal.

This reminds us that the Chamber or its Committee, notwithstanding its earnest desire to multiply internal railway communications, appears to miss mention of the chief condition that confers imperial value on those inland communications. That is, they must reach the sea by the shortest or easiest route. Allusion is, indeed, made to the circumstance that Bombay is, at present, "the port nearest to the great producing districts of Upper India and to England." But this position will be altered, and 300 miles of railway carriage saved, when, the right principle of communication being applied—"get your burden on the water as soon as possible"—a port to admit European vessels shall be established at Dejhbara, near the mouth of the Nerbudda. Then, with regard to the South Mahratta country, for the Committee to ask for a railway to drag the cotton of southern Dharwar some five hundred miles over an expensive railway, when the same commodity might be taken direct to the sea over a line little more than one hundred miles in length, is a modern instance of the old saw about the foolish man "who cut off his nose to be revenged on his face." . . . . . .

Though just now the prospects of any liberal, enlightened public works policy, like that we have illustrated by reference to Lord Mayo's earnest efforts, appears far off, the subject is attractive, and we have far exceeded our proper limits. Whilst we are glad to see the Chamber delivering "another blow for life," we could wish it had been somewhat better planted. We have felt it desirable to bring in these criticisms by way of showing that, while we would move heaven and earth—were such feat possible and needed—in order to bring about a truly imperial outlay on productive public works in India, we have as strong and sincere a regard for true economy and restriction of means to ends as can be cherished by any of the pharasaical cheese-paring retrenchers of Simla and Westminster. These official economists—save the mark!—strain at the gnat of a few years' interest on productive reservoirs, canals, and light railways, and swallow the camel of huge military expenditure, touching not, even with the little finger of the License tax, their own princely emoluments.*—*May* 10, 1879.

ONE WORD MORE FOR WATER.

PERHAPS it is only in the deltas of the great Madras rivers that the case on behalf of irrigation is triumphant in the domain of arithmetic, and sufficiently strong to confound its foes, always excepting the scoffing and scurrilous Mr. Smollet. But the great and costly canals of the north in the upper Ganges Valley are gradually establishing their vindication. We propose here to take a few notes of the present financial position of the irrigation works in that great plain. In doing so we largely avail ourselves of a summary of the leading figures bearing on the subject as collected by our Agra contemporary:—

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

In these provinces there are six complete canal systems and three under construction. Of the former scheme, the Ganges canal is by far the largest. The idea of constructing this canal was entertained as early as 1836. . . . The various branches of this canal, which begins its course at Hardwar, irrigate the entire tract of the Doab or country lying between the Ganges and the Jumna as far as Cawnpore on the former river, and Hamirpur on the latter. Up to April last year the total outlay on the canal was £3,080,000. To that must be added £2,670,000, the accumulated interest charge on outlay during construction. The nett earnings of the canal from the beginning have amounted to £1,650,000.

The nett income of the year 1878 was £224,000 against an annual interest charge of £130. Including the interest debt, the Government has spent four millions on this canal with its subsidiary works. In return for this the State receives £224,000 per annum. During the year 1877-78 the Ganges Canal had sufficed to place over a million of acres under irrigation, the value for the crops on which is reported at £4,110,000. . . . The next canal that deserves our notice is the Agra Canal. Only in the fourth year of its existence it earned a nett income of £248,000 on its capital of £800,000. It irrigated 163,000 acres during the year 1877-78, and the crops raised under it are estimated at £580,000. The canal gives protection to the tract of country on the right of the Jumna from Delhi to Agra. The Eastern Jumna canal performs the same service for the country on the left bank from near Saharanpur to Delhi.

If some of our mercantile friends would study these facts a little more steadily, the truth might dawn upon them that it is of infinitely greater importance to secure perennial crops for the service of man and beast than to multiply costly railways that can only pay their way in years of surplus harvests. In connection with Mr. Bythell's remark, we may remind him that it was not "hundreds of millions," but thirty millions that Mr. Bright urged ought to be expended on irrigation in India during the course of a few years; and the history of these canals in Hindustan alone might suffice to vindicate the liberal project of the Member for Birmingham.—*May* 17, 1879.

II.—Those who followed our notices of the Public Works Committee will remember what a dead set against Irrigation seemed to be made all through by the official managers of that conclave. As if in quiet, but overwhelming, refutation of the sciolism and dogged prejudices prevailing in the India Office on this great subject, the last leaf of the printed proceedings of the Committee contains the following item of evidence; it is by Colonel Fisher, a well-known officer of Madras Engineers, and relates the combined results of canal navigation and irrigation in the Godavery district:—

The number of passengers is not given, but 120 boats took out licenses, and these carry on an average fifty a day. I beg further to add, that during this most awful season of famine, the worst probably ever known in India, when the districts of this Presidency through which the railways run lost over 85 per cent of their revenues, two-thirds of the population, and the whole of their products—for not an acre of land can be made to yield any product by a railway when the rains fail—the Godavery district, by means of its canals, paid double the revenue it had yielded in the most prosperous years before the works were constructed, carried on a trade nearly forty-fold in value to what this was when these works were undertaken, and came out of the trial strengthened in all its resources, whilst India has been brought to bankruptcy in spite of all endeavours to bolster up the railway system. If the condition of industry in India had been at all considered and compared with that existing at home, this waste of money and time and life would never have been allowed; but now, I fear, it will be long before India recovers, if she ever does at all, for it is appalling to see the state of these districts.

From the recent returns we gather the following particulars of the Madras irrigation works:—The area of land irrigated in the Eastern, Central, and Western deltas was 593,095 in 1877-78 as against 541,192 acres in the previous year. The water rate proceeds increased from Rs. 15,54,655 to Rs. 17,20,967. The income from the land irrigated was chiefly in the Western delta, being Rs. 8,60,919 against Rs. 7,61,211. The irrigation revenue returns for the entire Presidency, including Canara, give a total of Rs. 2,07,08,603 for "Fusly" year, 1287, against Rs. 1,55,80,362 in F., 1286. The land cultivated with dry and wet crops yielded Rs. 2,05,77,035, the remissions amounting to Rs. 15,62,903, leaving nett revenue of Rs. 1,90,14,132. The irrigation revenue in Tanjore alone amounted to Rs. 37,65,018 for 946,992 acres. The Godavery district gave an irrigation revenue of 27 lakhs, and Tinnevelly 14. . . . . .*—*Oct.* 11, 1879.

CRYING FOR THE MOON: THE KANDAHAR RAILWAY.

. . . Now that the Bolan is abandoned as the route to Kandahar, it becomes an interesting question in engineering and physical geography, what other way can a steam-worked broad gauge railway be taken? Our sanguine friends in both dailies say the "Sibi route's the thing." They seem to think nothing can be easier than to turn the

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* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

flank of the mass—for it is no mere range of mountains—through which the Bolan is only a rift. Well, we shall be interested in hearing how the 4,500 feet in altitude is to be surmounted without going a very long way round. This seems to us to involve either "fetching a compass," or proceeding along two sides, instead of one, of the triangle indicated by Dadur-Sibi, Daki (or some station thereabout on the Smalan-Tul route), and, say, Haidarzai, a station well beyond Quetta. Instead of the seventy miles along the base of the triangle from Dadur to Quetta, this route through Sewestan would require railway work of at least 150 miles. This might be well worth while if the mountain mass of 4,500 were thereby avoided or outflanked. But we cannot see that this would be gained. Pishin itself is 5,000 feet above sea-level, only one hundred, or so, lower than Quetta. So that the whole gain to be obtained by the detour or long angle from Sibi would consist in rather better gradients, and, presumably, protection from torrents. Against these advantages are to be set the cost and time of making, say, seventy extra miles of line. Possibly this may be the better of the two alternatives; but, in either case, it is heart-breaking to contemplate national resources and energy thus sacrificed by wholesale to meet a temporary military exigency, and for an utterly unproductive purpose. This Sibi or Sewestan project is one of Major Sandemann's swans; but we opine that scheme is already shrinking to the proportions of a very ungainly goose. Sibi itself—written Seebee and Sewee in 1842, when occupied by one of our detachments—is the *fons et origo* of the dreadful proverb, since applied too freely in Sinde, "O God! when Thou hadst Sewee, why needst Thou have made hell?" We do not lay too much stress on this very warm objection to the base of the Sewestan "diversion," for no one need stay there long; but the waterless condition of the whole of that arid mountainous district would, in itself, we believe, be fatal to any railway work therein, if physical geography did not decisively show the recklessness and extravagance of the scheme. . .

If our comparatively slight investigation of these routes should make it appear that this popular dream of "pushing a railway through to Kandahar in a few months," is little more rational than crying for the moon, we cannot help that. Our review of this crude and inchoate project, necessarily cursory though it be, is much fuller than any other we have seen; and we feel persuaded that further inquiry will only reveal a multiplicity of physical difficulties which neither bellicose furore nor patriotic sentiment will avail to lessen. No doubt the railway could be made. Engineers who are equal to boring Alps, to scaling Andes, and piercing isthmuses that have bound continents together since the dawn of time, could, within two years' time, send the locomotive on a big railway into Kandahar. But there is one condition precedent—they must not be stinted for funds; they must only ask and have. No one has attempted to show whence and when the 72 lakhs, spoken of as voted for this work, are to come. As to that amount, if proposed as an estimate, it can only be taken as a bad joke, unless it be meant for the lesser half length that on the plain only from Sakkur to Dadur. The British Treasury is alone competent to sustain the condition precedent for the carrying out of this huge, but at best vulnerable and precarious military work. If that illimitable fountain is to be tapped, let us go ahead. The disbursements on earthwork and masonry will be as water in the desert to Upper Sinde, while the expenditure on iron rails and rolling stock will do something to revive trade at home. But to propose that this extravagant railway project should be carried out from the funds or credit of India, is one of the most heartless, not to say wicked, things in all the dreary story of this most causeless war of modern times.*—*Nov.* 8, 1879.

WET DOCKS FOR BOMBAY: FIRST DEFINITE PROPOSAL.

THE publication of a letter to Government from the Municipal Commissioner, setting forth a proposal for the construction on the Moodee Bay site of docks for European shipping, may prove to be an event of the greatest importance to Bombay. It comes at a time when joint-stock enterprise is in such a state of collapse that not only does any new project fall flat on the public mind, but many shareholders in good sound schemes are ready to sacrifice the capital they have already spent rather than persevere at a small further outlay towards the advantages that are within their reach. The Municipal Commissioner

* This Extract is from the *Bombay Review*.

now appears on the scene in the character of a *Deus ex machina*. Dispensing with the cumbrous organisation of a joint-stock company, he shows how Bombay may obtain the long-needed wet docks by the simple process of Government modifying or abandoning part of their expensive reclamation project—one which seems to drag on interminably—and adopting at even less cost a scheme "for the construction of first-class docks sufficient to accommodate double and treble the present trade of the port." Moreover, the site of this great public work is contiguous to the present habitat of our trade, and may be made to join on to the old ruts of commerce. The Commissioner would also connect the undertaking and its future management with the Municipality and the commercial community, through the medium of a fairly constituted Harbour and Dock Trust. This is really a grand scheme in its outline as we have sketched it, and if anything could revive the general public spirit of Bombay, this proposal ought to do so—if on examination it prove to be sound and feasible.

The tempting prospect of being provided with a commercial dock of forty-six acres in extent—nearly equal to the united areas of the import and export West India Docks at home—ought to excite enthusiasm amongst our merchants; more especially as, according to the present plan, they are not to have the arduous task of "financing" to obtain the capital. All they will have to do is to pay their dock dues instead of bunderboat hire, and to take their turn in sitting as members of the Harbour Trust. On Mr. Aitken's diminutive coloured plan, the Docks, that are to be, look magnificent. We have indicated what further information is yet needed on engineering points; and no doubt Mr. Aitken, or some other professional man whom Government may specially appoint, will soon furnish all further particulars that can be obtained before the work shall be actually commenced. We trust there will be no paltering delay in doing this, and that some suitable means will be taken for eliciting the opinion of the public as soon as ample materials are before them on which a judgment may be safely formed. As to the bearing of the proposal on the future position of the Municipality, much might be said; and we should rejoice to see a special meeting of the Justices called in order that the city might assert that rightful claim to its foreshores which has been so long ignored. It would be better still to have a public meeting in the Town Hall as soon as the project is so far matured and approved that a memorial on behalf of it can be agreed upon. But before that can be, Mr. Aitken must produce more measurements and soundings.—*Dec.* 18, 1866.

DOCKS OR PIERS FOR BOMBAY.

IN the various discussions as to the respective merits of docks and piers for Bombay Harbour, we have always sought to subordinate the rival claims of the two classes of structure to the one pressing consideration—that we must have ships "brought alongside" somehow. We do not advocate docks against piers, or piers against docks. The merchants of Bombay would be glad to get either, or both. There is no necessary financial rivalry between the two appliances. Engineers competent to express a well-grounded opinion on this subject—and amongst these, of course we include Mr. Ormiston—affirm that there would not be much difference between the cost of piers and docks for Bombay Harbour. That is, to "bring ships alongside" so as to accommodate the whole square-rigged shipping of Bombay would cost as much by one appliance as the other; and, for general guidance, the sum likely to be required for either purpose, as the harbour side stands now, may be roughly but safely estimated at thirty-five lakhs, or £350,000. But whilst this is a clear and simple way of stating the case, and will serve as a basis to start from for the advocates of either class of structure, it manifestly pre-supposes the exclusion of one in favour of the other.

This policy we have always regarded as essentially a mistaken one; and the Port Trust promoters, after putting forward one or two pier projects with a very apparent bias against that method of serving the shipping, have bound up their future with docks or basins. This is a misfortune for the port and its trade; for, as must be evident, the trade being various, so should the appliances to serve it be varied both in character and situation. If the Port Trust, or, rather, the coming Trustees, give their vote for docks, then the foreign commerce of Bombay will be shut up to that means of shipping and landing cargo; for every other pier, jetty, or basin is virtually forbidden by the imposition of bunder fees on the traffic that would pass over them. . . . Again, as to the fallacy

about a pier necessarily providing for the whole trade: Mr. Mathew's report, we observe, states that "the pier is not designed for a considerable traffic, but it may at moderate cost be extended on the same design to meet any requirements." The pier would be certainly light as compared with some other of the piers proposed; but this remark applies also to the cost; the estimate for Mr. Ormiston's pier, for instance, having, as stated by the *Gazette*, been thirty-five lakhs when iron was much cheaper than at present. . . . . .

Here it may be well to recall how the present discussion arose, so far as we are concerned. The reference to the proposed Colaba pier occurred in the final paragraph of an article in which we described the measures taken to repair the three bridges on the Baroda line, which fell before the great floods of September, 1872. The flood was successfully resisted by the Nerbudda Bridge, proving, we trust, that the structure is incomparably safer and stronger than in the period before the large additions we have alluded to. Our chief object in that article was to raise the old question whether similar measures might not suffice to avert any repetition of the terrible destruction of the tax-payers' money that has been witnessed so often on the Sutlej and the Beas. This topic is of more moment to India at large than the question, Shall Bombay have a pier?—*May* 16, 1863.

LIGHTING BOMBAY HARBOUR.

WHEN, some months ago, the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-ship *Jeddo* was wrecked near Kennery Island, nearly every one of the witnesses who gave evidence about the occurrence in the Marine Court of Inquiry expressed an opinion that had there been a lighthouse on that Island the disaster would not have occurred. That opinion has been re-echoed again and again by the most experienced seamen of the port, and the general feeling among them seems to be that a lighthouse should be erected on Kennery Island without delay. This opinion, it should be remembered, is not a mere transient ebullition caused by the wreck of a valuable vessel, but it is the result of deliberate conviction—of a conviction arrived at long ago after several years' experience of the navigation of the coast, and especially of the dangers attendant on entering the port of Bombay. This necessity was most emphatically expressed by Captain Barker, the Master Attendant, who said that ever since he commanded a vessel he had felt the want of a lighthouse at that spot. But not content with merely experiencing the necessity for a lighthouse being erected on Kennery Island, Captain Barker has written strongly in favour of the project for the last six years. Had the matter rested with him and the other members of the Harbour Board, the matter would have been settled long ago, and disasters to shipping would have been reduced to a minimum; but, unfortunately, the Board had no power to do so; the Government of Bombay was equally helpless; and as the Supreme Government has thought fit to exercise a "most masterly inactivity" on the subject, nothing has been done excepting in the way of a voluminous and useful correspondence. . . . . .

Only recently the Government took from the surplus funds of the Board as much money as would have paid for the erection of a lighthouse at Kennery twice over, and devoted it to reclamation purposes; and now, when a lighthouse is more imperatively required than ever, Government will neither lend its money nor give its consent to the Harbour Board erecting one at its own expense. Large numbers of wrecks have already taken place in consequence of the absence of proper lights at the entrance to the harbour, and we need only mention the fate of the *Jeddo*, the *Glensannox*, the *Sydenham*—to say nothing of the numerous other vessels which have sustained damage by grounding—to demonstrate the necessity for having the harbour better lighted. The Harbour Board has already done its part towards accomplishing this object, and until its recommendations are carried into effect, the responsibility of adding to the already long list of casualties to the shipping of Bombay will rest with the Supreme Government.—*May* 11, 1866.

II.—In its letter dated November 25, the Government of India "desired" the Government of Bombay to reconsider its opinion regarding the reduction of the Public Works grant of the year, and the lecturing authority further took occasion to remark, that other Governments had already done as they were bid. It was further announced in that peremptory epistle—an admirable model for administration by way of centralising dictation—that it was,

therefore, "manifestly impossible that the Presidency of Bombay should be exempted from the sacrifices which other Governments are about to make." The whole discussion, of which this remark forms a part, has beforetime been commented upon in these columns. We need only here refer to the tolerably effective rejoinder to the invidious comparison just quoted, contained in this Government's suggestion (para. 12), that the circumstances of other provinces might be very different from those in which the Bombay Government found itself placed, on receipt of the undiscriminating and destructive retrenchment orders comprised in that letter in the last week of November from the Supreme Government. It is not in regard to the principles according to which Public Works expenditure is dispensed and regulated under the antagonistic action of the Local and Supreme Governments that we care to say anything at present. There are two particular items of outlay in this Presidency that, amidst all the wordy war, have held their own, and to which we would once more call attention in the forlorn hope of arresting further waste of public funds. . . . These works are the Hydraulic Lift Dock at Hog Island, and the half-way Lighthouse on the Prongs, the foundations for which are being put in. At that time—as the public has little chance of knowing in what proportions its money is being spent until it may have been wasted—we were not aware of the great relative importance of these two items in the sums and works with which the Bombay Government had to deal in its struggles to comply with orders from superior authority. . . . . .

While the Lighthouse, though not unduly costly, will fail to answer the purpose for which it is intended, the Hydraulic Lift may just serve its special object—that of cradling the troopships whilst being cleaned or under repairs, but at a cost three times the sum for which the end might have been accomplished. But it is better to put the case the other way; for the quarter of a million sterling which the Lift is to cost, there might be constructed on the same site *three* good masonry graving docks with a depth on cill sufficient for the heaviest vessels. The Lift will accommodate one troopship at a time; and while it will scarcely suffice for more than taking those three vessels on in turn, there will require to be planted on Hog Island an establishment and workshops all but sufficient to keep work going in all the three masonry docks that might be erected for the accommodation of the merchant shipping. . . . But it is clear that after the 25 lakhs are spent on the Lift, there may require four or five more lakhs to set up factories and colonise workmen. We are quite aware that this project is one of those which the Government of India was compelled to "exclude from its proposals of reduction" as being under specific contract, the withdrawal from which would involve an adjustment by compensation. But it is probable that even now there would be a clear saving in stopping the work and giving the contractors all the profits they could make by the completion of the undertaking. And it is very certain that this first loss would be trifling, compared with what has been voluntarily incurred in this Presidency by the Supreme Government forcing on its peremptory and indiscriminate arrest of much-needed works.

There is in this topic a very suggestive moral which should be duly considered on budget day. In no item of the national balance-sheet has the advance of expenditure been so rapid as in that of Home charges. It appears that the payments for this Lift Dock are made out of the Bombay Treasury; but the whole scheme was got up at home without, we believe, even the semblance of consultation with those persons in Bombay who should be best able to form a good practical judgment on a question of this nature. Now who and what are the people at home who thus commit India to expensive schemes ill adapted to her circumstances? If an inquiry were promoted as to the origin of the Hydraulic Lift Dock, it is possible a good deal of light might be also thrown upon several heavy items of current expenditure which India has to defray in a distant country, but which neither the Local nor the Supreme Government has any chance to check or control.—*March* 21, 18-0.

THE NATURAL PORT OF GUJERAT.

NO bar at the mouth of the Nerbudda, and European vessels can be navigated nearly up to the ancient port of Barygaza, the modern Broach—such is the discovery to which we have to call attention. It may seem scarcely admissible to apply the term discovery to the announcement of a fact which, if really such, must always have been so, though the perception of it has been prevented by a settled assumption to the contrary. Public opinion

is omnipotent now-a-days in its own domain; but it says little for the perceptive faculties of the present generation, and is not a little absurd, that such "opinion" should deter every one concerned from testing the assumption that the Nerbudda is unnavigable for modern ocean-going ships. Those of us who, travelling on the Baroda Railway, may have crossed the Nerbudda and its muddy banks, when the tide was out, or visitors to the town who have become familiarised with the sight of the wide expanse of water, more like a shallow lake than a river, and revealing unmistakable sand-banks and shoals, may be forgiven for tamely acquiescing in the supposition that it was no more possible to re-open the silted estuary for the merchant navies of Europe than to restore the ancient fame, as in Arrian's time, of the pilgrims' mighty banian tree on the island in the same river a few miles above Broach. But what were the Public Works Department about before and since the time when Mackay, the Manchester Commissioner in 1844, brought to notice the disgracefully neglected condition of the Gujerat ports? And what have the Revenue officers to say, who slumbered on the "opinion" that their districts—the exports of which are, with certain special exceptions, of more value and bulk than from any equal area in India—are necessarily dependent on costly railway carriage or tedious coast navigation and transhipment at Bombay? Probably some who, years ago, ought to have made the discovery, may dispute its value now, and the statements we have now to record must be closely tested; although such as may alter the whole course of export trade in Gujerat, they are not inconsistent with Thornton's account of the Nerbudda. He says: "At Broach, about thirty miles from its (the Nerbudda's) mouth, it is a noble sheet of water two miles wide, even when the tide is out. Ships of burthen can proceed up the river to Broach; but skilful pilotage is necessary, as the navigation is very difficult, in consequence of a bar at the entrance of the river, and numerous sand-banks in its channel."

Some of the new information which must bring about a revision of this accepted description was in two letters which appeared in our Friday's paper, more particularly in one signed "X." Of the statements therein contained we have had confirmation, and can recapitulate them with considerable confidence. These new opinions of the Nerbudda's capabilities have been acquired in connection with making the tardily completed arrangements for the navigation of the unlucky Gogo ferry. All the buoys have recently been laid and beacons erected by Mr. W. Sowerby, the Local Funds Engineer for Surat and Broach. In his operations on the river he was accompanied, and no doubt aided, by Captain Murray, of the Peninsular and Oriental Service, who, being agreeably surprised by the depth in the channels marked out for the course to the gulf, proceeded to take several lists of soundings, all the way from Broach to the open sea. These tests convinced this practical navigator that the bar of the Nerbudda is little better than a myth, there being 15 feet at low water at the entrance, over which the tide is said to rise 30 feet, and the channel is fully one mile wide. Near Dejh, or Deijbara, on the northern shore of the river's mouth, is a large pool where scores of European vessels might lie safely at anchor. At four miles from the entrance there are four to six fathoms, say 30 feet, at low water; and at Umbheta, a little further up, there is a still greater depth. . . . The two limits of draught which we get in these statements, 15 feet at low water at the mouth of the river, and 15 feet at high water between Umbheta and Broach, leave a good deal still uncertain as to the navigable capacities of the river. These soundings are taken before all the monsoon flood has been drained away from the 800 miles of watercourse through which the Nerbudda flows from the far-off shrine of Amerakantak, beyond Jubbulpore. The water of the river has yet to subside during seven months of drought; and being within reach of the tide, the fall of the river alone need not cause any insuperable impediments to navigation. . . . It is impossible for us now to indicate the developments which might follow on the re-opening of the Nerbudda to European commerce. If a few Bombay merchants tremble at the possible rivalry of little and distant Carwar, they must be filled with dismay at thoughts of the day when the bulk of Gujerat cotton may be shipped from Broach instead of Bombay. If it should come to this, we have no fear but Bombay will even then have as much trade left as it could provide for; but these vaticinations need not disturb us yet. The restoration of Broach as a mart of foreign trade would compel that opening out by modern railway of the ancient route through Rajpootana to Delhi, which the Bengalised Supreme Government perversely denies, alike to the well-sustained remonstrances of our Chamber of Commerce, and the mortal wail from a famine-wasted region, wherein thousands have perished for lack of easy communication with the granaries of Gujerat. The prospect of obtaining another large port for foreign commerce in Western India will also help to

drive our hesitating financiers towards the common-sense policy of abolishing for ever all our export duties, and reducing the import tariff to the simplest form and the lowest rates compatible with the solvency of our exchequer.—*Dec.* 7, 1869.

HARBOUR SURVEYS.—EXPERIENCE NEEDED.

FROM the first we have protested against the Duke of Argyll's ill-considered plan of sending out, as surveyor and special reporter on the harbours of India, a young engineer entirely unacquainted with the country. No doubt Mr. Robertson has made the most of his opportunities, and as he is spending another season here, he will, before he completes his special service, have acquired a great many valuable hints and a certain amount of marketable reputation that may prove of use to him in his future career. But this gain to the Duke of Argyll's protégé has been mainly at the expense of India. We have not the slightest hesitation in saying that two years since, when the job was taken in hand, at least half-a-dozen men could have *begun* a report on the harbours, creeks, and roadsteads of India at the point where Mr. Robertson must leave off. . . . . .

We will be bound to say that at the time His Grace thought fit to exercise his home patronage in this matter, an advertisement in two or three Indian newspapers would have drawn out at least half-a-dozen men having practical knowledge of the subject, and some of them possessed of invaluable local experience as to winds, currents, silting, and shifting shoals. Much information on this point is shelved away in our various offices of Marine and in some of those of the Public Works Department; but without some traditional and slowly gained knowledge to guide him in search amongst old documents, an engineer sent out from home must spend greater part of his time in search and selection. We must take for granted that Mr. Robertson was not only presented with a copy of Mr. Clement Markham's book, but also with the papers read at the East India Association by Captain A. D. Taylor, copies of which and reports of discussions thereon, in which other Indian Navy men took part, appeared in our own columns about a year since. But even this is doubtful; for the whole arrangement with and on behalf of Mr. Robertson's surveys of the Indian harbours appears to have been the most hasty and ill-considered proceeding possible. We know it is said that the Government of India indented for a harbour engineer, and therefore the India Office is not to blame for the job. Be that as it may, the whole proceeding bears out our argument—that when the Indian Government want men for special service, it is ten times more likely to obtain the right men on the spot than in sending home for them.—*March* 29, 1872.

BOMBAY HARBOUR AFFAIRS, OLD AND NEW.

THE sometime famous "Bombay Harbour and Pilotage Board"—having been absorbed in, or rather superseded by, that largely-indebted and all-powerful organisation now known as the Port Trust—publishes its Administration Report for the whole period of its existence—namely, from October, 1863, to March 31st, 1873. This aggregate and final report is presented by Lieut. H. Morland, I.N., Secretary of the Board, at the period of its dissolution. It will be inferred from the issue of this historical work that the Board has not been accustomed to give any periodical account of its stewardship. And this has been one of its weak points—albeit the Accountant-General has taken care to publish annual statements of its receipts and expenditure. . . . . .

General readers may be excused in throwing aside this large and needlessly bulky report, but they will thereby miss a notable record—occupying less than five pages—which throws a clear and pleasing light before and after the modern history of this port of Bombay. We refer to the speech of Sir Bartle Frere on the occasion of laying the corner-stone of Kennery Lighthouse in January, 1867—nearly the last address of any extent delivered by His Excellency as Governor of Bombay. Those of us who were fortunate enough to be present at that pleasant festival, and heard the speaker's historical and local allusions uttered on the site, which gave them special significance, turn with lively interest to this memento rescued by the stenographer's art. As already intimated, the erection of the Lighthouse was in itself a victory; and Sir Bartle Frere, speaking from

that old pirate stronghold, might be regarded as the Harbour Board's trophy. His Government, acting under supposed financial exigencies, had staved off the building of the Lighthouse as long as possible, meanwhile promulgating occasional little lectures on the "proper use of the lead." But the Lighthouse being a *fait accompli*, the speaker of the day proceeded, in the most natural and instructive manner, to notice the several changes in commerce and navigation of which the institution of Kennery light was an indication. He alluded to the light which had "for ages" been maintained "on the tomb of old Governor Vaux, at the mouth of the Taptee," to the small one in the Cambay Gulf, and to the little one at Mandvi, in Kutch—all which, though useful for the creeping country craft, are quite inadequate for the coasting steamers of the later day. Then he spoke of the time when the Colaba Lighthouse was one of the wonders of Bombay, and "the only first-class lighthouse in British India." He referred to the factory chimneys and rising spires of our public buildings, which render the Colaba tower less conspicuous by day, and the then new gas-lights, which, from sea, render its revolving light less noticeable by night. After his best manner, in the way of personal references, he connected these reminiscences of the past with allusions to Captain John Young and the Rev. Mr. Fletcher, amongst the older citizens present, and paid a graceful and fitting tribute to the absent Captain Barker, to whose perseverance and earnestness, as we well know, the due lighting of our harbour is mainly due. . . . . .

We are reminded on the first page of this report that, until the passing of Act XXII. of 1855, "the expenses of the port were charged against the Imperial revenue." The effects of the change from that condition of State maintenance of all harbour works, have, we think, scarcely yet been realised either here or at Calcutta, though they are in a fair way to be so under the operation of our Port Trust, which places on sea-borne commerce and the shipping trade not only all current charges for port management, but the full cost of all harbour works, old and new—defences only being left to be provided by the State. . . . The "income of the Port Funds," and also other funds gathered by new imposts, are being "diverted from their legitimate objects" for the purchase of a huge, unproductive, landed estate, and a dozen other properties, which but remotely relate to shipping, while the "expensive works" which "are commercially needed" still require to be constructed. Such is the situation to be faced. We would not add to the anxiety which Colonel Ballard and his colleagues must feel when they come to fully realise the financial and commercial bearings of the institution in their charge. We have shown how the Harbour Board's Report may assist them by contrast, to see how they stand as guardians of the trade of the port—for it is that they have to consider, more than the balance-sheet of the encumbrances for which they are only nominally responsible. . . . . —*July* 14, 1873.

II.—Colonel Ballard's Budget, presented last week, in his character as Chairman of the Port Trust, to his colleagues, the members of the Board, is a gloomy document for Bombay. Gladly would we trace the silver lining behind the cloud which hangs over our commerce, if we could ; for in matters of practical business it is only waste of time and breath to lament the irremediable. But the situation so frankly and clearly described by the Chairman of the Trust is grave ; and it is, therefore, wise in every one concerned to look the facts in the face at once. The vain boasts about Bombay being the centre of the universe have long since been forgotten ; and it will be all we can possibly do to retain any hope of investing our port with that more modest and not yet secured title—Liverpool of the East. With certain not very important exceptions, the charges on the shipping that seeks our harbour, and all the financial administration of the traffic that traverses our foreshores, are now under an institution which, though devised in order to afford additional accommodation and provide facilities for commerce, is, for the present, known and felt chiefly as a huge taxing machine—a Frankenstein that must be propitiated with gifts. . . . . .

Perhaps, British shipowners will send their vessels to other ports, say to Calcutta or Madras ; where, though natural advantages like ours in Bombay are denied, artificial exactions are kept down to a minimum. But as our produce must be exported, ships will come, at some price, to take it away ; but shippers will not pay them any fancy rates merely for visiting Bombay. Therefore, the increased port dues recovered from the

shippers of goods must be again "recovered," either from the ryot or the land revenue. That is, these increased port dues, and all other charges of the kind, which may be levied when they do not represent improved facilities for traffic—and this is the state of the case—are another tax on the agriculture of Western India, another drag on the prosperity of Bombay. The measure of this tax, as it is, may be thus indicated: Colonel Ballard points out that above seven lakhs of the Port Trust's expenditure is paid away for interest and rents; and little or none of this represents accommodation for European shipping. Therefore, with the exception of that portion of the rentals that are recovered under conditions of free competition, that six or seven lakhs represents a dead weight on the trade of Western India. And if the port dues are raised as suggested, all that addition will be a further tax on commerce, pure and simple. We have already pointed out why, as matter of necessity, port dues are chosen instead of wharfage fees, as the means of increasing the Port Trust revenue; but it does not seem to have occurred to Colonel Ballard that this is entirely a levy on the shipping, as distinguished from the mercantile interest. Perhaps this does not make much difference as regards the ultimate pressure on commerce of the total imposts levied; but it is as well to remember that in Bombay the shipowners' and nautical interest is much weaker than that of the mercantile interest proper. . . . . .

Four years, at the rate the world is now going, is a sufficient period in which for the trade of a port to be revolutionised or ruined. The Trustees must give to sea-going shipping some new facilities within a fourth of that time, or the traders of Bombay will cry aloud and spare not. It is idle to indulge in dreams about what they can do when the land shall be sold. Speculations of that kind pertain to the Collector of Bombay—to whom, sooner or later, that huge encumbrance, the land estate, must be made over.—*Aug.* 25, 1873.

SIR ARTHUR COTTON AND THE OLD INDIAN NAVY.

SIR ARTHUR COTTON is not only an enthusiast, but, partly perhaps from the small account he takes of common-place folk, he has the knack of deterring ordinary readers and so-called practical men from following his arguments, by presenting some startling conclusion to begin with, to digest which would tax the stomach of an ostrich. Believing in the immense importance of the gallant engineer's contention in favour of large extension of internal communication by water, we must confess to being not a little taken aback by the announcement that the true outlet, and, we suppose, inlet too, for the heavy sea-borne traffic of India is—at Cape Comorin. Seeing, however, that there has been much talk of a magnificent harbour that could easily be made, fifty miles or so to the eastward of General Cotton's site, and all for the small sum of 75 lakhs, we are prepared to grant that the colossal harbour of Colachul, just to the west of Cape Comorin, is not an impossible project even if it cost a couple of millions—though by what power the funds are to be granted is another question. It is the system of internal communication which is to supply this gigantic port that passes one's comprehension. It takes away the breath, or sends one into the region of dreams, to be told of a network of canals which, branching upwards from the southern point of this peninsula, shall penetrate to Ludiana (why not to Attock?) on the north-west, but, on the north-east, linking itself on to the great Brahmaputra, and, after a trifling additional canalisation of two hundred miles, opening all India out to intercourse with that half-fabled river, the Yangtsekiang, and the illimitable river and canal system of China. Is it not magnificent? . . . . . .

We should be sorry if our somewhat unsympathetic presentment of Sir Arthur Cotton's grandest dream could do anything to disparage the more practical proposals advocated in his well-arranged paper, which we have published in our daily edition. Still more should we regret to say a word that would weaken the force with which, in season and out, in various shapes, he urges his two propositions: (1) "You must store water and distribute it to the thirsty earth, so that the people may increase and multiply in comfort, and live in security from fear of famine"; and (2) "make canals wherever there is produce to be interchanged, so that commerce may put its burden on the water from first to last, and avoid the expensive friction which arises under every variety of land carriage." . . . . . .

The description of the officers of the old Indian Navy given by Sir Arthur in the sentence beginning "The loss of such a body of men," &c., is not only correct and admirable in itself, but it serves to confirm the lecturer's reputation as a man who possesses direct and thorough knowledge of Indian conditions, and of the class of men and the permanent service arrangements required to cope with them successfully. In the phrases we have taken the liberty of italicising are indicated the qualities and attainments that can never be acquired by Royal Navy officers, sent to the East India station as just a little better than being on half-pay on shore, and then ordered to the Persian Gulf in vessels wholly unsuitable for the climate, and condemned for a season or two to the performance of surveying or political duties which are eminently distasteful to men who can have no traditional or personal interest in the work done, or in the changes effected. It was not by naval men stationed in the Gulf or on this coast for a two years' cruise at a time, that the piratical Arabs were brought, one by one, into the peace-preserving meshes of the Maritime Truce—an unpretending diplomatic achievement, without pattern or precedent, but singularly successful, and, as paragraphs in our paper are every day showing, possessing such expansive adaptability that it is now being used to cut short the remaining threads of the slave-trade.

The great principle on which Sir Arthur Cotton pleads for the restoration of a small but well trained and efficient Indian Naval service, is that which runs through all his paper —namely, that of all natural material agencies necessary to the profitable maintenance and extension of Indian commerce, cheap water carriage is the all-essential condition, and for that end safe and commodious harbours must be secured wherever they can best be formed, the choice of site being unfettered by local interests and prepossessions. Impartiality of personal character, public spirit, and a wide view of marine and commercial interests, were characteristics of the leading Indian Navy men, several of whom, as Sir Arthur remarks, are still to the fore in other scenes; and we freely acknowledge that when a local naval service is reorganised it will belong as much to the Bay of Bengal as to the Arabian Sea, though its head-quarters must be here in Bombay. . . . . .

As remarked above, we do not at present venture to discuss the general harbour question with so formidable an antagonist; otherwise, we should just proceed to "pull a crow" with Sir Arthur, because of his sweeping disparagement of Bombay harbour. . . . And, to glance at the inland aspect of the subject, if the reproachful presence of those natural ports on the coast of Kattiawar is sufficient to stultify the outlay on Kurrachee, how would the comparison show after these boasted natural harbours had been brought within the circle of commerce by the construction of a steamboat canal from Poshetra, in the State of Nowanuggur, to the heart of the Punjab? Queries like this will thrust themselves forward; but still we hold that there is far more in Sir Arthur Cotton's paper to be accepted than to be criticised.—*June* 17, 1873.

PORT APPLIANCES AT CALCUTTA: WHO CAN DELIVER BOMBAY?

THE Report for the year 1872-73 of "the Commissioners for making Improvements in the Port of Calcutta" is at hand. . . . Anyhow we may take it, the contract between Calcutta and Bombay, in respect of harbour facilities and port indebtedness, is very discouraging to the latter. Speaking broadly, it may be said that, while Calcutta has a liability of 35 lakhs, Bombay has one of 220 lakhs. Calcutta has already, for that small sum, secured a very respectable amount of stock or plant in modern harbour appliances, which serve the purposes of European shipping, and thereby command a good revenue—some two lakhs more income than Bombay, with its overwhelming debt. In regard to that primary condition, the service of European shipping, the assets of the Bombay Port Trusts are—*nil.* Of course there is the land; but we say now, as often before, let the Collector take it, and the Port Trust have done with the indebtedness. The situation is a dilemma; without increased trade and profit in Bombay, the Elphinstone and Moody Bay land cannot acquire saleable value; but if trade has to sustain the burden of interest on that land, our commerce will not only not increase, but must recede. The right course is obvious, the exigency is emergent: where, then, are the statesmen to take the case in hand? At Poona, at Simla, or at Westminster?—*Sept.* 9, 1873.

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on 11 March, 2020